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Social functioning entails flexibly activating and inhibiting different socio-cognitive processes 
according to the social context. In some circumstances, one’s own behaviour and cognition are 
influenced by the presence of other agents. This is the case of mimicry, the phenomenon whereby 
a person automatically imitates observed actions and emotional expressions. Other times, it is 
one’s own thoughts and feelings that interfere with how we understand other agents, such as 
when we project our mental states onto others. This dissertation presents four studies that in-
vestigated how altercentric (mimicry) and egocentric (self-projection) processes of social cog-
nition are regulated according to the social context and personal dispositions.  
Part I aimed to re-examine the role of social cues previously identified as modulators of mimicry. 
In line with prior research, Study 1 showed that the tendency to mimic others’ happy facial ex-
pressions depends on the reward value associated with the observed agent. However, the effects 
of reward were not in the hypothesised direction, nor could we detect an influence of oxytocin 
treatment, a hormone that underlies the neurobiology of social adaptation. Study 2 was prereg-
istered to resolve conflicting findings regarding the role of direct and averted gaze cues on the 
tendency to automatically imitate others’ hand actions. We revisited the gaze effects using an 
automatic imitation task that controlled for the spatial correspondence between the observed 
and executed hand actions, a confounder that may have affected previous studies. Our data did 
not reveal a general enhancement of automatic imitation following direct gaze compared to 
averted gaze. However, we could identify potential contextual and dispositional factors (e.g., 
autistic traits) that might underlie different mimicry responses to gaze cues. 
Part II aimed to test a new framework to study how one’s own affective experiences influence 
our judgments about others’ emotions. Combining brief emotion induction blocks with psycho-
physical measures of emotion perception, Study 3 showed that facial emotional expressions tend 
to be judged as happier when individuals feel happy than when they feel sad. Emotional egocen-
tric biases were replicated in Study 4, a preregistered experiment that tested the role of perceived 
similarity on egocentricity. Contrary to our predictions, we did not find stronger egocentric bi-
ases when participants judged emotional facial expressions of similar compared to dissimilar 
others, an effect that had been previously shown for egocentricity in the cognitive domain.  
Across all studies, we found evidence supporting the contextual nature of social cognition, even 
for automatic and low-level processes. However, we could not replicate some of the phenomena 
reported in the literature. These results highlight the need to systematically re-evaluate the 
robustness and generalizability of prior findings. Implications of the current work for future re-





Das soziale Funktionsniveau beinhaltet, je nach persönlichen Zielen und sozialem Kontext, das 
flexible Aktivieren und Unterdrücken verschiedener sozialer kognitiver Prozesse. Unter be-
stimmten Umständen werden das eigene Verhalten und die eigene Kognition durch die 
Anwesenheit und die Handlungen anderer Personen beeinflusst. Dies ist der Fall bei Mimikry, 
dem Phänomen, bei dem eine Person automatisch beobachtete Handlungen und emotionale Aus-
drücke imitiert. In anderen Fällen sind es unsere eigenen Gedanken und Gefühle, die unsere In-
formationsverarbeitung über andere Personen beeinträchtigen, zum Beispiel dann, wenn wir 
unsere mentalen Zustände auf andere projizieren. In der vorliegenden Dissertation werden vier 
Studien vorgestellt, in denen untersucht wurde, wie altrozentrische (Mimikry) und ego-
zentrische (Selbstprojektion) Prozesse der sozialen Kognition in Abhängigkeit vom sozialen 
Kontext und persönlichen Dispositionen reguliert werden.  
Teil I zielte darauf ab, die Rolle sozialer Signale, welche zuvor als Einflussfaktoren der Mimikry-
Reaktion identifiziert wurden, erneut zu analysieren. In Übereinstimmung mit früheren Unter-
suchungen zeigte Studie 1, dass die Tendenz, fröhliche Gesichtsausdrücke anderer nachzuahmen 
abhängig von dem mit der beobachteten Person assoziierten Belohnungswert ist. Die Auswir-
kung der Belohnung ging jedoch weder in die vorhergesagte Richtung, noch konnten wir einen 
Einfluss von Oxytocin, einem Hormon, das der Neurobiologie der sozialen Anpassung zugrunde 
liegt, finden. In der präregistrierten Studie 2 wurden widersprüchliche Ergebnisse hinsichtlich 
der Rolle des direkten und abgewandten Blickkontakts auf die Tendenz, die Handbewegung an-
derer automatisch nachzuahmen, untersucht. Wir überprüften den Einfluss des Blickkontakts 
mithilfe einer automatischen Nachahmungsaufgabe, die die räumliche Übereinstimmung zwi-
schen beobachteten und ausgeführten Handbewegungen kontrollierte, da dies ein möglicher 
Störfaktor früherer Studien darstellte. Unsere Daten zeigten keine allgemeine Verbesserung der 
automatischen Nachahmung nach direktem Blickkontakt im Vergleich zum abgewandten Blick. 
Wir könnten jedoch potenzielle kontextbezogene und dispositionelle Faktoren (z.B. autistische 
Eigenschaften) identifizieren, die unterschiedlichen Mimikry-Reaktionen auf den Blickkontakt 
zugrunde liegen könnten. 
Teil II untersuchte, wie die eigenen affektiven Erfahrungen unsere Urteile über die Gefühle an-
derer beeinflussen. Studie 3 kombinierte kurze Phasen der Emotionsinduktion mit psychophysi-
schen Messungen der Emotionswahrnehmung. Es zeigte sich, dass emotionale Gesichtsaus-
drücke tendenziell als fröhlicher beurteilt werden, wenn Personen angeben, dass sie sich fröhlich 
im Vergleich zu traurig fühlen. Emotionale egozentrische Verzerrungen wurden in der präregis-
trierten Studie 4 wiederholt, in der die Rolle der wahrgenommenen Ähnlichkeit im Kontext der 
Egozentrik getestet wurde. Entgegen unseren Vorhersagen fanden wir keine stärkeren egozentri-
viii 
schen Vorurteile, wenn die Teilnehmenden emotionale Gesichtsausdrücke als ähnlich beurteil-
ten. Dieser Effekt wurde zuvor für die Egozentrik im kognitiven Bereich gezeigt. 
In allen Studien fanden wir Hinweise, die die situative Natur der sozialen Kognition für automa-
tische und niedrigstufige Prozesse unterstützen. Allerdings konnten wir einige der in der Litera-
tur berichteten Phänomene nicht replizieren. Diese Ergebnisse unterstreichen die Notwen-
digkeit, die Robustheit und Generalisierbarkeit früherer Befunde systematisch neu zu bewerten. 
Im Zusammenhang mit der Replikationskrise in der Psychologie werden Implikationen der ak-
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1. General introduction 
1.1 Egocentric and altercentric processes of social cognition  
Humans have developed a broad range of cognitive functions to navigate the complexities 
of the social world. Social cognition is the term used to refer to the conjunction of processes 
that allow us to understand and make inferences about others’ intentions, feelings and 
thoughts, which help to regulate our social behaviour (Happé et al., 2017). While there is no 
consensus on the taxonomy of socio-cognitive skills, most accounts include components 
from different levels of social information processing, ranging from emotion and action per-
ception to imitation, empathy, and theory of mind (Chatel-Goldman et al., 2013; Etchepare 
& Prouteau, 2018; Happé et al., 2017; Lieberman, 2007). 
As social beings, our behaviour and cognition are widely influenced by other agents' actions 
(Kampis & Southgate, 2020). People plan actions, pay attention and react to aspects of their 
environment motivated not only by their own perspective and goals, but also by those of 
others around them. For example, we tend to pay more attention to objects when we see 
other people looking at them (Frischen et al., 2007) and unconsciously imitate others' ges-
tures and facial expressions, even when these interfere with our own action goals (Hess & 
Fischer, 2013; Heyes, 2011). Moreover, we may feel what another person is feeling despite 
not having undergone the same experiences (Bird & Viding, 2014; Olszanowski et al., 2020). 
The phenomenon by which information processing about the self is influenced by the rep-
resentations of others' states has been referred to as altercentrism. Altercentric social 
cognition may help align the individual with other group members, thus facilitating inter-
personal coordination, communication, group dynamics, and cumulative culture (Kampis & 
Southgate, 2020).  
Contrasting altercentrism, many social cognition theories emphasise the individual as the 
reference point for accessing the others' minds (Ames, 2004b; Meltzoff, 2007). Even when 
our attention is ostensibly focused on understanding the thoughts and actions of other 
agents, our own experiences may intrude (Epley, Keysar, et al., 2004; Silani et al., 2013). The 
influence of one’s own states on the representations related to the others is known as ego-
centrism. Given the relative similarity within human behaviour, egocentric socio-cognitive 
processes may help us understand and predict other’s actions and cognitions (Epley, Keysar, 
et al., 2004).  
Altercentric and egocentric processes can be seen as complementary processes within social 
cognition. Given the constant and complex interchange between oneself and others, success-
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ful social functioning requires a balance between representing and switching between our 
own mental states and those of others. While being influenced by others' states and behav-
iours can aid empathic processes through emotional resonance and mirroring, one also needs 
to create boundaries between oneself and others to avoid personal distress (Bird & Viding, 
2014; Lamm et al., 2016). Similarly, projecting one's own mental states to others can be a 
useful heuristic to understand other agents. However, it could also lead to biased perceptions 
and misinterpretations of others' cognition and behaviour unless one can distinguish be-
tween oneself and others (Mitchell, 2009; Steinbeis, 2016).  
1.2 Situated social cognition 
Due to its central role in human behaviour, egocentric and altercentric social cognition has 
been of interest to many disciplines, including psychology, cognitive science and neurosci-
ence. On many occasions, socio-cognitive abilities are studied as stable, context-unspecific 
processes, which are assumed to show the same configuration in every situation. However, 
for successful social functioning, it is not only important that one has a particular socio-
cognitive ability, but that this process is activated in a particular situation and at a particular 
time (Melloni et al., 2014; Smith & Semin, 2007). Imagine, for instance, that a person is help-
ing a friend who is going through a hard time. Showing a certain degree of emotional 
resonance and empathy is probably beneficial to relate and support their friend. However, if 
they would be in a competitive situation, such emotional reactivity towards the other’s pains 
could be counter-productive to achieve the personal goals. 
In line with a situated notion of social cognition, many socio-cognitive processes are flexibly 
recruited based on contextual factors (Smith & Semin, 2007). Depending on the environment, 
interpersonal relationships and goals, social cognition can be oriented towards an egocentric 
or an altercentric encoding (Kampis & Southgate, 2020). For example, egocentric interfer-
ences tend to be stronger when inferring states of in-group than out-group members 
(Clement & Krueger, 2002; Simpson & Todd, 2017). In visual perspective-taking tasks, indi-
viduals are faster at judging the self-perspective when one’s own and the other's perspectives 
are in conflict (Samson et al., 2010). In contrast, the other's perspective is judged faster when 
there is no conflict.  
Recognising the importance of context as an inherent explanatory variable is not only im-
portant to understand the mechanisms underlying social cognition but may have clinical 
implications as well. For example, impairments in social functioning in autism spectrum 
conditions were initially related to general deficits in empathy and the mirror neuron system 
(Bernier et al., 2007; Dziobek et al., 2008; Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; McIntosh et al., 2006). 
However, more recent studies have shown that individuals with ASC can show empathic 
and mirroring responses (Hamilton, 2013; Hamilton et al., 2007; Hudry & Slaughter, 2009; 
Oberman et al., 2008). Rather than an inability to exert empathic behaviour, individuals with 
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ASC may adjust their social behaviour differently to the interpersonal context compared to 
neurotypical individuals (Chevallier et al., 2012; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). Understanding 
socio-cognitive processes as malleable and sensitive to current social situations could help 
better characterise deficits in social functioning.  
In this dissertation, I will present a series of studies that examined how contextual factors 
influence egocentric and altercentric processes of social cognition. Study 1 and Study 2 ana-
lysed the impact of social cues on automatically mimicking others' facial expressions and 
actions (altercentric process). Study 3 and Study 4 focused on egocentric processes of affec-
tive inferences and how they are modulated by the perceived similarity with the other.  
1.3 Part I – Altercentrism: Mimicry 
1.3.1 What is mimicry? 
Mimicry is the spontaneous imitation of others' actions, postures and facial expressions. 
Contrarily to intentional forms of imitation, in which an individual deliberately replicates 
the actions of another person, mimicry is an automatic process that occurs without conscious 
awareness. Individuals do not notice when they mimic others nor when others mimic them 
(Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009; Duffy & Chartrand, 2015).  
Researchers have distinguished different forms of mimicry, depending on the type of imi-
tated action (Duffy & Chartrand, 2015). Hess and Fischer (2014) differentiate between 
behavioural and emotional mimicry. The first refers to postures, gestures or facial expres-
sions with a neutral context (e.g., foot-tapping, face touching) and the latter to nonverbal 
behaviours that express an emotional state (e.g., emotional facial expressions). Other re-
search has distinguished between behavioural mimicry of social vs non-social action 
(Cracco, Genschow, et al., 2018). The former refers to gestures that do not inherently express 
an emotion, but are socially meaningful, such as thumbs up or raising the middle finger 
(Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Cracco, Genschow, et al., 2018). These distinctions are important 
when assessing the roles and modulators of mimicry, as different functions can be expected 
for mimicry of communicative gestures or expressions, compared to actions that do not con-
vey any particular social meaning. 
Despite being slightly different phenomena, theoretical accounts on the different manifesta-
tions of mimicry assume common underlying processes. It is generally agreed that mimicry 
is based on a direct mapping of observed and executed actions (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; 
Heyes, 2011). The human mirror neuron system has been proposed as the neural basis sup-
porting mimicry behaviour, as it is activated both when executing an action and when 
observing the same action being performed by another person (Brass & Heyes, 2005; 
Campbell & Cunnington, 2017; Catmur et al., 2009; Heyes, 2011; Likowski et al., 2012).  
General introduction 
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1.3.2 What is the function of mimicry? 
Mimicry is thought to act as a social regulator by promoting affiliation and reinforcing social 
bonds (Hess & Fischer, 2013; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). Individuals 
mimic more those whom they like and like more those who mimic them (Duffy & Chartrand, 
2015; McIntosh, 2006; Neufeld & Chakrabarti, 2016; Stel et al., 2009), a bidirectional link that 
strengthens the interpersonal relationship (van der Schalk, Fischer, et al., 2011). Mimicry can 
also be used to ameliorate unfavourable social situations. For example, studies have shown 
that people exhibit higher mimicry responses to interaction partners that had previously 
excluded them, which has been interpreted as a strategy to recover from the experience of 
being excluded and re-establish the social bond (Lakin et al., 2008).  
In addition to its affiliative role, mimicry seems to facilitate emotion recognition and action 
understanding (Drimalla et al., 2019). According to embodied cognition theories, spontane-
ous mimicry reflects the internal simulation of the perceived emotion, which facilitates the 
understanding of the other's affective state (Niedenthal, 2007). This claim is supported by 
studies showing that blocking the possibility to mimic the observed emotional expression 
impairs its recognition (Niedenthal et al., 2010; Oberman et al., 2007; Stel & van Knippenberg, 
2008). 
Finally, by linking perception and action, mimicry is likely to play a role in social learning, 
coordination and synchrony between individuals (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Heyes, 2011). 
According to the implicit socialisation account, mimicry may support the learning of implicit 
group- and environment-specific skills and actions (Kavanagh & Winkielman, 2016). Auto-
matically mimicking others, individuals learn how the social group reacts and implicitly 
assimilate their gestures, postures, expressions, accents, and mannerisms. 
1.3.3 How is mimicry studied experimentally? 
Different approaches have been used to study mimicry in the lab. Social psychologists typi-
cally measure the frequency of mimicry of foot-tapping or face touching when participants 
are interacting with a confederate (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). 
Such naturalistic studies have high ecological validity but are limited in experimentally con-
trolling contextual factors, such as the emotional displays or eye contact of the interaction 
partner.  
To obtain higher experimental control, cognitive psychology developed a laboratory model 
of mimicry, usually referred to as automatic imitation (Heyes, 2011). Automatic imitation is 
measured with stimulus-response compatibility tasks in which the participant is asked to 
perform a motor movement while simultaneously observing a congruent or incongruent ac-
tion (Brass et al., 2000). Mimicry is indicated if the congruent observed action facilitated the 
participant's motor movement, and/or if the incongruent action interfered with their move-
ment. Automatic imitation paradigms offer high experimental control, as the stimuli’s 
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characteristics, timings, and set of actions to be observed and executed can be manipulated. 
Moreover, the outcome measures (i.e. reaction times, accuracy) are usually more easily quan-
tifiable and sensitive than more naturalistic measurements of behavioural mimicry. 
A third form of mimicry that has capture researchers' attention is (emotional) facial mimicry, 
which refers to the spontaneous matching of the other's emotional facial expressions. Facial 
mimicry is distinguished from other affective processes that lead to congruent facial reac-
tions, such as emotional contagion or affective empathy, in that the mimicked facial 
expressions reflect the sharing of the emotional displays, rather than a response to the oth-
er's emotional state (Hess & Blairy, 2001; Hess & Fischer, 2014). Facial mimicry responses 
are subtle and difficult to observe visually. However, they can be sensitively indexed by 
electromyographically (EMG)-recorded activity in facial muscles (Hess, Arslan, et al., 2017; 
van Boxtel, 2010), or by scoring facial movements from video recordings according to the 
Facial Action Coding System (Sato & Yoshikawa, 2007). More recently, automated facial 
recognition software has also been used to track facial mimicry responses (Drimalla et al., 
2020). 
This dissertation will analyse the literature on behavioural mimicry, automatic imitation and 
facial mimicry jointly, as these phenomena are thought to fulfil comparable functional roles. 
However, it is still unclear how the different forms of mimicry relate to each other 
(Genschow et al., 2017). I acknowledge that certain aspects may differ, especially concerning 
their social modulation. In these cases, differences will be highlighted throughout the topic's 
discussion. 
1.3.4 Social modulation of mimicry 
Early theories understood mimicry as a stimulus-driven, reflex-like phenomenon, where the 
mere observation of an action would automatically trigger a matching nonverbal display in 
the observer (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). This notion has been readjusted to the observation 
that mimicry is not initiated in all circumstances in which a person perceives someone else's 
actions. Even if it happens without conscious awareness, people seem to preferentially 
mimic others' actions and emotional displays when there is a minimal potential of engage-
ment and inhibit mimicry when it would not lead to any social advantage (Fischer & Hess, 
2017; Genschow & Schindler, 2016). Recent accounts have thus moved towards understand-
ing mimicry as a motivated, goal-directed behaviour, the occurrence of which is conditioned 
to particular social contexts (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Fischer & Hess, 2017; Wang & 
Hamilton, 2012). 
If mimicry is a strategy for social advantage, factors related to both the perceiver, the target, 
their relationship, and their social goals will likely play a role in determining whether an 
action, gesture or emotional expression will be mimicked or not (Seibt et al., 2015). In this 
dissertation, I revisited two aspects of the social context that have been shown to influence 
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the degree of mimicry: the reward value of the observed agent (Study 1) and their gaze cues 
(Study 2). 
1.3.4.1 Implicit attitudes & reward 
Because being mimicked tends to be implicitly perceived as an affiliative signal, motivational 
theories predict that people imitate the actions and emotional expressions of individuals they 
hold a positive attitude towards, presumably because this will lead to a higher social benefit 
(Hess & Fischer, 2013; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). In contrast, mimicking someone with whom 
one has a negative relationship or does not want to bond could be seen as socially inappro-
priate and lead to negative consequences. In line with this idea, research has shown that 
people tend to preferentially mimic agents they like and inhibit mimicry when interacting 
with a disliked person (Blocker & McIntosh, 2016; Likowski et al., 2008; McIntosh, 2006; Stel 
et al., 2009). Similarly, mimicry tends to be up-regulated when observing actions or specific 
emotional reactions of in-group members compared to out-group members (Bourgeois & 
Hess, 2008; Guéguen & Martin, 2009; van der Schalk, Fischer, et al., 2011; Yabar et al., 2006). 
The influence of implicit attitudes has also been shown in experiments in which the reward 
value associated with the observed agent was manipulated. Sims et al. (2012) associated dif-
ferent faces to losing and winning monetary rewards using an implicit conditioning 
paradigm. Afterwards, participants observed emotional facial expressions displayed by the 
conditioned agents, while mimicry responses were recorded using electromyography. Con-
gruent with motivational theories of mimicry, happy expressions by agents associated with 
rewards were more strongly mimicked than those of agents paired with losing money (Sims 
et al., 2012). This finding has been replicated in subsequent mimicry studies that used similar 
versions of the reward conditioning paradigm (Haffey et al., 2013; Korb et al., 2019). 
Arguably, these reward manipulations altered the implicit attitudes towards the stimuli, with 
faces linked to higher rewards being more liked (Korb et al., 2019). Rewards have also been 
shown to enhance mimicry by modulating the motivation to engage with the interaction 
partner. For example, sad expressions were mimicked only if participants obtained monetary 
rewards for accurately identifying the emotional expressions displayed (Hess, Blaison, et al., 
2017). When participants did not expect any reward, viewing sad faces did not elicit a match-
ing facial reaction. Altogether, evidence suggests that the reward value ascribed to an 
interactant determines how much we will mimic their emotional expressions and gestures. 
This is congruent with the idea that mimicry is driven by the motivational drive to interact 
with others (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Wang & Hamilton, 2012).  




In addition to the role of interpersonal attitudes and reward, mimicry has been shown to 
depend on affiliative signals displayed by the interaction partner. Emotional expressions and 
gaze cues are a rich source of non-verbal information that help decode others’ intentions 
and internal states during social interactions (Hamilton, 2016). Establishing direct gaze is 
often interpreted as a sign of social interest and intention to engage with the perceiver 
(Wirth et al., 2010). Gaze cues also play an important role in social referencing, as they shift 
the attentional focus toward the gaze direction and elicit joint attention (Frischen et al., 
2007). Given its socially communicative function, it is not surprising that gaze direction has 
been studied as a factor determining mimicry.  
As a cue of social approachability, prior research had hypothesised that individuals would 
preferentially mimic agents that established direct eye contact, compared to agents who 
averted the gaze away from the interaction. As predicted, a series of studies observed 
stronger mimicry when observing hand actions and smiles of individuals with direct gaze 
compared to averted gaze (Forbes et al., 2016; Schrammel et al., 2009; Wang, Newport, et al., 
2011; Wang & Hamilton, 2014). While evidence of an enhancement of mimicry following 
direct gaze seemed consistent across reports, at least two studies could not replicate these 
observations (Farmer et al., 2021; Marsh et al., 2016).  
Crucially, the study by Marsh et al. (2016) used a task that disentangled the influence of gaze 
on imitative and spatial compatibility, two dissociable effects that are confounded in certain 
types of automatic imitation paradigms (Boyer et al., 2012; Catmur & Heyes, 2011; Cracco, 
Study 1 – Research aim (1) 
Study 1 aimed to re-examine the influence of reward on facial mimicry using a modified 
version of the task developed by Sims et al. (2012). Sims et al. (2012) used a classical condi-
tioning paradigm to implicitly associate different face identities with monetary rewards 
and punishments. This task proved to be effective in manipulating the value of the stimuli 
(Korb et al., 2019). However, it had the limitation that the learning of the pairings between 
the face stimuli and monetary outcomes was incidental to the participant's task and could 
not be tracked.  
To fill this gap, Study 1 implemented a reward learning task in which the monetary 
rewards paired with the face stimuli were contingent on the participant's task 
performance. This allowed us to verify that the reward associations were assimilated 
before measuring facial mimicry reactions when observing happy and angry expressions 
displayed by the conditioned face identities. To avoid confounding the effects of 
punishments (losing money) vs rewards (gaining money), our task compared only 
variations in facial mimicry to high vs low reward probabilities of winning money.  
General introduction 
 8 
Bardi, et al., 2018). With this set-up, Marsh et al. (2016) did not observe gaze-related modu-
lations of automatic imitation. Instead, the target’s gaze direction and ethnicity specifically 
influenced spatial compatibility. Given that the automatic imitation task used in the original 
studies on the influence of gaze could not assess the independent effects of imitative vs spa-
tial compatibility, findings by Marsh et al. (2016) opened the possibility that the assumed 
role of direct and averted gaze cues was not directly influencing mimicry but other processes 
of response inhibition.  
In addition, most automatic imitation studies on gaze included only stimuli depicting a single 
facial identity in their paradigm (e.g., Forbes et al., 2017; Wang, Newport, et al., 2011; Wang 
& Hamilton, 2014). Because factors such as gender, ethnicity and emotional facial expres-
sions can influence how gaze cues are interpreted (Adams Jr. & Kleck, 2005; Ohlsen et al., 
2013; Weisbuch et al., 2017), particular attributes of the stimuli used could have contributed 
to the effects of direct and averted gaze.  
 
1.3.5 Dispositional factors influencing mimicry 
In addition to contextual determinants, research has identified that the tendency to mimic 
others depends on individual predispositions. A recent meta-analysis of facial mimicry stud-
ies revealed significant associations between empathy and the tendency to imitate others' 
emotional expressions (Holland et al., 2021). In particular, people with higher empathic dis-
positions or who report sharing the others’ emotional state to a greater degree tend to show 
stronger facial mimicry (Dimberg et al., 2011; Drimalla et al., 2019; Sonnby–Borgström, 
2002). In contrast, non-emotional forms of mimicry, such as automatic imitation, seem more 
invariant to socio-emotional traits. A meta-analysis with a combined sample of almost 1000 
participants did not find any significant associations between automatic imitation and trait 
empathy (Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018). Moreover, a high-powered study also failed to find 
associations between automatic imitation and a series of personality traits, including agree-
ableness, extraversion, autistic traits, schizotypal traits, narcissistic personality, alexithymia 
and dispositional empathy (Darda et al., 2020). The fact that traits related to social-emotional 
Study 2 – Research aim (1) 
Study 2 re-examined the effects of direct and averted gaze on automatic imitation with the 
aim to resolve the inconsistent findings regarding the role of gaze on mimicry. The experi-
ment was designed to control for experimental factors that could have confounded the 
gaze effects in earlier studies. First, as in Marsh et al. (2016), we used paradigm that 
disentangled the measurement of automatic imitation from spatial compatibility. Second, 
we developed a stimulus set that included multiple facial identities and which allowed to 
control for factors such as the targets’ gender, ethnicity, and the direction of the head 
movements that determined the gaze cues.  
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processing seem to be more determinant for facial mimicry than for other non-emotional 
forms of imitative behaviour is not entirely surprising, given that facial expressions are a 
communicative and affective signal. 
Beyond individual differences in the general tendency to mimic others, people may differ in 
how they regulate their mimicry behaviour to the current context. If we conceive mimicry 
as a motivated and strategic behaviour, personal characteristics related to how one processes 
and responds to contextual social cues could be related to individual differences in the social 
modulation of mimicry. Study 1 and Study 2 aimed to examine the role of two personal 
factors proposed to determine the contextual regulation of mimicry: oxytocin (Study 1) and 
autistic traits (Study 2). 
1.3.5.1 Oxytocin 
Oxytocin is an evolutionary ancient hormone and neuromodulator that has been involved 
in several physiological and psychological functions that regulate social and non-social hu-
man behaviour and cognition (Feldman et al., 2016; Harari-Dahan & Bernstein, 2014). It is 
primarily produced in the hypothalamus and secreted both within the brain and into the 
circulatory system (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2011). As an allostatic neuropeptide, it is 
thought to support behavioural strategies to adapt to changing environmental conditions 
(Quintana & Guastella, 2020). To improve the capability for social adaptation, oxytocin may 
increase the salience of socially relevant stimuli (Shamay-Tsoory & Abu-Akel, 2016), pro-
mote social motivation (Bethlehem et al., 2014) and regulate affective states (Ma et al., 2016). 
Intranasal oxytocin administrations have become one of the most used methods to study the 
role of this neuropeptide in human behaviour and cognition. Because of its size, oxytocin 
cannot cross the blood-brain-barrier and reach the brain in appreciable amounts when ad-
ministered peripherally or into the circulatory stream (Quintana et al., 2015). Taking 
advantage of the direct pathways between the nasal cavity and the central nervous system, 
nasal spray delivery is an easy and non-invasive route to manipulate central oxytocin levels 
(Quintana et al., 2018). 
Owing to its involvement in social behaviour and cognition, oxytocin has captured interest 
in mimicry research (Kraaijenvanger et al., 2017). An early study found lower inhibition of 
automatic imitation following intranasal oxytocin treatment (De Coster et al., 2014). How-
ever, this result could not be replicated in a more recent experiment that used a similar 
automatic imitation task (Tomova et al., 2019). Oxytocin effects on emotional mimicry are 
also mixed. Korb et al. (2016) reported marginal oxytocin-driven increases in facial mimicry 
when judging emotional expressions of infant faces, but not of adults. In contrast, Pavarini 
et al. (2019) found up-regulation of mimicry of adult sadness and happiness following in-
tranasal oxytocin, although the latter only in individuals who showed low positive 
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expressivity. Furthermore, no significant effects of oxytocin were detected for mimicry of 
anger. 
Altogether, findings from existing studies show tentative evidence for a role of oxytocin on 
mimicry. However, the pattern of results is complex, and effects seem highly dependent on 
contextual factors, such as the observed emotional expression and the age of the interactant. 
Considering that current theories understand oxytocin as a regulator of (social) behaviour 
(Ma et al., 2016; Quintana & Guastella, 2020), intranasal oxytocin may work by enhancing or 
inhibiting mimicry according to the requirements of the social context. 
 
1.3.5.2 Autistic traits 
Autism spectrum conditions (ASC) are etiologically and clinically heterogeneous develop-
mental disorders characterised by impairments in social interaction, communication, 
restricted interests, and repetitive behaviours (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Amongst the alterations in social functioning, research has identified atypical patterns of 
mimicry behaviour (Forbes et al., 2016; Oberman et al., 2009). Initially, mimicry impairments 
were thought to be linked to a mirror neuron system dysfunction (McIntosh et al., 2006; 
Oberman & Ramachandran, 2007). However, the "broken mirror system hypothesis" was 
challenged by subsequent studies, which could not detect consistent deficits in the ability to 
spontaneously mimic others' facial expressions or gestures in ASC (Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018; 
Hamilton et al., 2007; Press et al., 2010; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2017). 
Even though individuals with ASC may not exhibit fundamental mimicry alterations, some 
studies have reported atypical mimicry regulation to the social context. For example, indi-
viduals with ASC do not seem to regulate their imitative behaviour according to the gaze 
cues of the observed agent (Forbes et al., 2017; Vivanti & Dissanayake, 2014). Similarly, mim-
icry behaviour in ASC was not enhanced by prosocial priming compared to non-social 
priming, an effect that was found in the control sample (Cook & Bird, 2012). Autistic traits 
have also been shown to determine how contextual factors influence facial mimicry in the 
general population. For example, the reward effect observed in Sims et al. (2012) was stronger 
for individuals with low autistic traits. In contrast, mimicry reactions by individuals with 
higher autistic traits were independent of the reward associated with the mimicked agent. 
Study 1 – Research aim (2) 
The second aim of Study 1 was to test the role of oxytocin on facial mimicry. Based on the 
idea that oxytocin is involved in the regulation of social behaviour, we predicted that 
intranasal oxytocin would specifically influence the reward-related modulation of facial 
mimicry, rather than generally increasing or decreasing mimicry behaviour. In particular, 
we hypothesised stronger imitation of emotional expressions by faces paired with high 
rewards vs low rewards following oxytocin treatment compared to placebo. 
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Haffey et al. (2013) also observed increased automatic imitation for hands associated with 
high rewards vs low rewards, but only in individuals with low autistic traits or high 
empathy. 
Taken together, current literature suggests a role of autistic traits in determining the extent 
to which mimicry behaviour is flexibly adjusted to the social context. These findings are 
congruent with the social top-down response modulation theory, which proposes that mim-
icry impairments in ASC are related to reduced adaptability to the social environment (Wang 
& Hamilton, 2012). 
Study 2 – Research aim (2) 
The second aim of Study 2 was to examine whether mimicry patterns to direct and averted 
gaze cues are conditional on autistic traits in the general population. Although there is an 
ongoing debate on whether ASC is best viewed as an extreme of a neurodevelopmental 
continuum or as a distinct category, studies have shown that autistic traits across the gen-
eral population are etiologically linked to autistic traits in individuals with ASC 
(Lundström, 2012; Robinson et al., 2011). Given that quantitative measures of autistic traits 
seem to assess the same latent constructs in ASC and non-clinical samples (Murray et al., 
2014), studying associations with autistic traits in subclinical populations could help iden-
tify relevant phenomena for ASC. 
1.4 Part II – Egocentrism: Self-projection 
1.4.1 What is self-projection? 
Much of our social life is based on our ability to infer the mental states of others. Due to a 
lack of direct access to other people's minds, we need to intuit what others think, want or 
feel by interpreting their actions and emotional expressions. However, in many situations, 
others’ overt behaviour may be ambiguous, or we may just not have enough evidence about 
their state to base our social inferences on. In such cases, we will need to rely on more indi-
rect sources of information to understand others' mental states. 
One common strategy is to use the self as the reference point to access others' minds. For 
instance, we may predict if someone will like a film based on how much we liked it; or decide 
to offer someone a warm blanket because we are ourselves cold. People tend to assume that 
other people think, feel and behave as they do (Epley, Keysar, et al., 2004; Mitchell, 2009). 
The salience of self-knowledge often causes individuals to overestimate the prevalence of 
their own preferences, behaviours and traits, as shown by the widely replicated false con-
sensus effect (Klein et al., 2018; Ross et al., 1977). The tendency to use self-knowledge to 
predict and understand others' mental states is referred to as self-projection or egocentrism 
(Epley, Keysar, et al., 2004; Mitchell, 2009; Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003).  
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Self-projection has been shown to occur in various kinds of situations and inferred content: 
from making inferences about "stable" characteristics, such as personality traits, preferences 
or attitudes (Critcher & Dunning, 2009; Davis et al., 1996; Ready et al., 2000; Tamir & 
Mitchell, 2013); to inferences about “situated” mental states, such as beliefs, intentions and 
emotional reactions elicited under particular circumstances (Ross et al., 1977; Van Boven & 
Loewenstein, 2003; Yik et al., 2019). Especially when inferring “situated” states, self-projec-
tion may be an inherent part of a perspective-taking process (Epley, Keysar, et al., 2004; 
Mitchell, 2009). To assess how another person is thinking or feeling in a specific context, we 
may first imagine ourselves in that situation and assess how we would react. We then infer 
the other’s state by projecting our assumed responses. 
Given the relative similarities between all human minds, basing social inferences on our own 
subjective experiences can be an efficient heuristic, especially when other sources of infor-
mation are limited. However, self-knowledge should represent only the anchor or starting 
point of the inferential process. An adjustment mechanism is needed to account for dissim-
ilarities between oneself and the other person (Epley, Keysar, et al., 2004; Mitchell, 2009; 
Tamir & Mitchell, 2013). For example, even though we liked a film, we may end up not rec-
ommending it to a friend if we know that the other person is not a fan of the film's genre. 
To make accurate inferences, an adjustment from the initial anchor is necessary to correct 
away from the self-knowledge based on the available information about the other and their 
context (Tamir & Mitchell, 2013). A failure in this correction process could lead to egocentric 
biases, which are inaccuracies in social inferences due to an over-attribution of one's own 
mental states. Egocentric judgments will be particularly evident when we make inferences 
about people who are in a different state than ours (Silani et al., 2013). The greater the dif-
ference between ourselves and the other person, the greater the adjustment that is needed. 
1.4.2 How is self-projection studied experimentally?  
Broadly, investigations on self-projection have used two different approaches. On the one 
hand, social psychology research has mostly relied on paradigms in which participants make 
judgments about their traits, attitudes or behaviours along a particular dimension and then 
estimate the position of another individual on that dimension (e.g., Critcher & Dunning, 
2009; Ready et al., 2000). An overestimation of the occurrence of their own choice is taken 
as an indication of self-projection. However, positive correlations between one’s own and 
inferred traits or attitudes of others may not always indicate that the self is used as a proxy 
for social inferences (Bazinger & Kühberger, 2012). Imagine, for example, that we predict 
that a friend will enjoy eating chocolate. If we also like chocolate, the correlation between 
our own and the predicted preference would be high. However, our inference could have 
actually been based on a theory that most people like chocolate, a general belief that, in this 
case, happens to be congruent with our own preference. To overcome this issue, experiments 
that use correlations between self and other attributes to assess self-projection need to in-
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clude adequate control conditions, such as comparing the covariation against an alternative 
inferential strategy (Bazinger & Kühberger, 2012; e.g., Ames, 2004b; Tamir & Mitchell, 2013). 
A different approach to investigate self-projection is to use tasks in which participants infer 
“situated states” of others while being simultaneously exposed to matching or distinct con-
ditions. False belief paradigms and perspective-taking tasks are examples of this second 
approach. Common false belief paradigms test whether one’s own privileged knowledge of 
the location of an object biases the prediction of a protagonist's false belief about the object's 
location (e.g., Coburn et al., 2015; Ryskin & Brown-Schmidt, 2014). In this task, inferences 
about the protagonist's behaviour tend to be biased because the protagonist's beliefs differ 
from the participant’s own knowledge about the situation.  
In perspective-taking tasks, participants are usually confronted with a situation that elicits 
congruent or incongruent perceptions compared to the situation the target person is exposed 
to. For example, in visual perspective-taking tasks, participants are asked to make judgments 
about what another person is seeing (Epley, Morewedge, et al., 2004; Samson et al., 2010). 
Crucially, some of the stimuli are occluded from the target’s point of view and are only 
visible to the participant. In order to unbiasedly infer the other’s perceptions, the participant 
needs to disregard their own view. An intrusion of our own visual input when judging the 
other's visual experience is taken as evidence of self-projection and egocentricity (Apperly 
et al., 2010; Bukowski & Samson, 2017; Keysar et al., 2003; Samson et al., 2010). 
1.4.2.1 Emotional egocentricity paradigms 
So far, research on self-projection has mainly focused on investigating egocentric biases dur-
ing inferences of cognitive states, understood here as beliefs, traits or attitudes. Comparably, 
only a few studies have investigated whether individuals also project their own affective 
states when predicting how another person is feeling. Most current emotional egocentricity 
paradigms follow the perspective-taking approach. Participants are asked to predict how 
another person is feeling in a particular situation, while being in an affective state congruent 
or incongruent to that of the target (e.g., Silani et al., 2013; Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003). 
Evidence of self-projection is indicated if the participant's current state biases the evalua-
tions of the other agent’s state.  
Emotional egocentric biases have been consistently detected with paradigms in which par-
ticipants are induced positive or negative feelings via visuotactile (Silani et al., 2013), visual-
gustatory (Hoffmann et al., 2015) or audio-visual stimulation (von Mohr et al., 2019), or mon-
etary reward and punishment (Steinbeis & Singer, 2014). Participants are asked to rate the 
experience of another person who is supposedly undergoing an affectively congruent or in-
congruent stimulation simultaneously. In line with the idea of self-projection, judgements 
about the other's affective state have been shown to be biased towards self-experiences, an 
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effect that tends to be stronger in incongruent conditions (Hoffmann et al., 2015; Silani et al., 
2013; Steinbeis & Singer, 2014; Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003; von Mohr et al., 2019).  
Notably, in current affective self-projection paradigms, emotion attributions are made based 
on contextual information about the situation the other person was exposed to. Participants 
cannot see the target's emotional responses to the stimulation, so predictions have to be 
based solely on the provided information about the described event. However, in daily life 
situations, we can often rely on the other person’s overt behavioural reactions and emotional 
expressions to understand what they are feeling, an ability referred to as emotion perception. 
We may infer that a person is happy not only because we know they received very positive 
news, but also because they are smiling and speaking cheerfully. Compared to affective per-
spective-taking and theory of mind, emotion perception is thought of as a more automatic 
and implicit form of emotion processing (Etchepare & Prouteau, 2018; Mier et al., 2010; Tracy 
& Robins, 2008). Despite the relevance of emotion perception for affective inferences, most 
literature on self-projection has only focused on investigating emotional perspective-taking 
processes.  
 
1.4.3 Social modulation of self-projection 
While self-projection is a common mechanism for social inference, people do not always 
default to using the self as a proxy. According to the similarity contingency model (Ames, 
2004b), individuals may deploy or withhold self-projection depending on the perceived sim-
ilarity with the other agent. When a person assumes high similarity with the target, they 
tend to ascribe their own attitudes, traits and beliefs to the other. If the perceived similarity 
with the other is low, anchoring on the self would require a significant correction process to 
move away from the egocentric attributions. In those cases, individuals tend to rely on other 
sources of information as a starting point for social inferences.  
The similarity-contingency model is supported by studies showing that people tend to pro-
ject the self-knowledge more when making inferences about similar individuals or groups 
but recruit less or no self-projection when attributing mental states to dissimilar agents 
(Ames, 2004b, 2004a; Davis, 2017). The similarity effects do not revolve around the actual 
Study 3 – Research aim  
Study 3 aimed to develop a paradigm to investigate self-projections during emotion 
perception, a lower-level process of emotion attribution than the type of affective 
inferences studied with prior emotional egocentricity paradigms. In particular, we 
examined whether evaluations of others’ emotional facial expressions are biased towards 
the observers’ own affective states. If self-projection occurs during emotion perception, 
individuals would tend to judge facial expressions as happier when they are feeling happy 
compared to when they are sad.  
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degree of similarity, but on initial subjective evaluations of the similarities with the target, 
which could even be founded on factors of little validity or relevance to the inference at 
stake (Ames, 2004a). For example, effects have been found with lab manipulations in which 
participants just learnt that they shared a few specific attributes with a target (Ames, 2004a), 
or in which participants were primed to pay attention to the similarities or differences with 
various targets groups (Ames, 2004b). Subjective perceptions of similarity may also explain 
the effects of social categorisation observed in social projection paradigms, which found 
consistent evidence for egocentric inferences about in-group members, but not out-group 
members (Clement & Krueger, 2002; Robbins & Krueger, 2005).  
Self-knowledge does not seem to be recruited as an "anti-anchor" when making attributions 
about dissimilar agents (Clement & Krueger, 2002; Robbins & Krueger, 2005). That is, we do 
not predict opposing mental states to dissimilar others (e.g., "As I do not like reading, a dis-
similar person will probably like reading"). Instead, people use alternative inferential 
strategies, such as relying on implicit beliefs or stereotypes about a particular group as a 
starting point. For instance, if we sense that our mother-in-law’s preferred literature genres 
differ from ours, we may employ stereotypes about the types of books people her age typi-
cally read to decide which book to gift her. Alternatively, we could anchor on a well-known 
person in our lives that we think is more similar to the target than ourselves (Clement & 
Krueger, 2002)(Willard & Markman, 2017). That is, instead of basing our predictions on ste-
reotypical information, we may choose the book based on what our partner would like, as 
we know they and their mother have a similar taste in books. Notably, perceived similarity 
does not necessarily function as a dichotomous on-off switch between inferential strategies. 
Varying degrees of self-projection and stereotyping can be recruited when making attribu-
tions for both similar and dissimilar agents (Ames, 2004b).  
So far, the effect of similarity on social projection has been mainly investigated for inferences 
of others' traits, attitudes, and preferences. By contrast, studies assessing the role of similar-
ity on affective self-projection are scarce. The only evidence that perceived similarity may 
condition the degree to which we project our own affective states to others is provided by 
O’Brien and Ellsworth (2012). The authors detected egocentric biases when making judg-
ments about the feelings of thirst and coldness of a similar target, but not when judging 
dissimilar targets. Specifically, participants who ate salty snacks without water or who were 
outside during winter overestimated the feelings of thirst and coldness of a protagonist of a 




1.5 Summary of research aims and hypotheses 
This dissertation aimed to investigate how socio-cognitive processes are regulated according 
to contextual factors and personal dispositions. To achieve a more comprehensive perspec-
tive on the situated nature of social cognition, this work investigated two complementary 
socio-cognitive processes. On the one hand, Study 1 and Study 2 (part I) focused on the 
tendency to mimic others' emotional expressions and hand actions (altercentrism) and how 
its occurrence depends on the social context. On the other hand, Study 3 and Study 4 (part 
II) examined whether one’s own affective states interfere with our evaluations about other’s 
emotional expressions (egocentrism).  
1.5.1 Part I – Social modulation of mimicry  
The research objective of part I was twofold. First, we aimed to conceptually replicate the 
effects of social cues previously identified as modulators of mimicry, namely, reward (Study 
1) and gaze (Study 2). Second, we investigated personal factors that could be related to indi-
vidual differences in the contextual regulation of mimicry, including oxytocin levels (Study 
1) and autistic traits (Study 2).  
Study 1: Facial mimicry, reward & oxytocin 
Study 1 examined the role of oxytocin on the reward-driven modulation of facial mimicry. 
After intranasal administrations of oxytocin or placebo, participants watched happy and an-
gry facial expressions displayed by agents previously paired with high and low reward 
probabilities. The participants’ tendency to mimic emotional expressions was assessed using 
facial EMG. Based on previous research (Korb et al., 2019; Sims et al., 2012), we hypothesised 
that facial mimicry would be stronger when observing emotional expressions of agents as-
sociated with high vs low reward probabilities. In addition, we predicted that the oxytocin 
treatment would enhance the influence of reward on facial mimicry compared to placebo.  
  
Study 4 – Research aim  
Study 4 aimed to test whether perceived similarity determines the degree of affective self-
projection during emotion perception. The degree to which the own affective states 
biased emotion judgements of similar and dissimilar agents was measured using the 
emotional egocentricity paradigm developed in Study 3. A sense of (dis)similarity with 
the evaluated agents was created by assigning the same or a different arbitrary attribute 
to the participant and the agents during the experimental session.   
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Study 2: Automatic imitation, gaze & autistic traits 
Study 2 investigated the impact of gaze cues on automatic imitation. To measure automatic 
imitation, participants were asked to perform finger movements while simultaneously ob-
serving another agent executing an action that could be imitatively and/or spatially 
congruent or incongruent. In some trials, the observed agent had previously directed the 
gaze towards the participant. In other trials, the agent averted the gaze away from the par-
ticipant. Based on previous literature, we expected stronger automatic imitation following 
direct gaze than averted gaze (Wang, Newport, et al., 2011; Wang & Hamilton, 2014). Alter-
natively, gaze could selectively affect spatial compatibility, such as found in Marsh et al. 
(2016). In this case, direct gaze was expected to enhance spatial compatibility effects com-
pared to averted gaze. Additionally, we predicted that the influence of gaze on automatic 
imitation would be conditional to individual differences in autistic traits. In particular, we 
hypothesised weaker gaze effects with increasing levels of autistic traits.  
The hypotheses, methods and statistical analyses of Study 2 were preregistered 
(https://osf.io/84wqe). 
1.5.2 Part II – Emotional egocentricity 
Studies included in part II aimed to test a new framework to investigate affective self-
projection. Complementing existing emotional egocentricity paradigms, which assessed self-
projection during processes of affective perspective-taking (e.g., Silani et al., 2013; von Mohr 
et al., 2019), Study 3 and Study 4 examined the occurrence of egocentric biases in emotion 
perception. Moreover, we assessed whether the extent of emotional egocentricity would 
vary according to individual differences in socio-emotional traits (Study 3) and the perceived 
similarity with the evaluated agents (Study 4). 
Study 3: Emotional egocentricity & socio-emotional traits  
Study 3 tested whether one’s own affective states egocentrically bias evaluations of others’ 
emotional facial expressions. In a within-subject design, participants were induced transient 
positive, negative and neutral affective states. After each emotion induction, a psychophys-
ical procedure was used to measure the extent to which their affective state biased judgments 
about ambiguous emotional expressions. We hypothesised that participants would judge the 
facial expressions as happier when being in a positive state than when feeling sad. In addi-
tion, we explored associations between the degree of emotional egocentric biases and 
dispositional empathy and autistic traits.  
Study 4: Emotional egocentricity & similarity 
Study 4 was planned as an extension of Study 3 to investigate whether the degree of emo-
tional egocentricity was conditional on the perceived similarity with the other. Similarity 
was experimentally manipulated by assigning the same or a different bogus cognitive style 
General introduction 
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to the participant and a series of targets. Using the emotional egocentricity paradigm devel-
oped in Study 3, we measured the extent to which individuals were biased by their own 
affective states when judging emotional facial expressions of similar and dissimilar targets. 
Based on the findings in Study 3, we hypothesised a higher tendency to judge facial expres-
sions as happy following positive vs negative affect induction. Moreover, emotional 
egocentric biases were expected to be stronger when evaluating the facial expressions of 
similar targets than dissimilar targets.  





2. Study 1: Facial mimicry, reward & oxytocin  
The influence of reward on facial mimicry: 
no evidence for a significant effect of oxytocin 
Irene Trilla, Hanna Drimalla, Malek Bajbouj and Isabel Dziobek 
Abstract. Recent findings suggest a role of oxytocin in the tendency to spontaneously 
mimic the emotional facial expressions of others. Oxytocin-related increases of facial 
mimicry, however, seem to be dependent on contextual factors. Given previous liter-
ature showing that people preferentially mimic emotional expressions of individuals 
associated with high (vs low) rewards, we examined whether the reward value of the 
mimicked agent is one factor influencing the oxytocin effects on facial mimicry. To 
test this hypothesis, 60 male adults received 24 IU of either intranasal oxytocin or 
placebo in a double-blind, between-subject experiment. Next, the value of neutral male 
faces was manipulated using an associative learning task with monetary rewards. Af-
ter the reward associations were learned, participants watched videos of the same 
faces displaying happy and angry expressions. Facial reactions to the emotional ex-
pressions were measured with electromyography. We found that participants judged 
as more pleasant the face identities associated with high reward values than with low 
reward values. However, happy expressions by low rewarding faces were more spon-
taneously mimicked than high rewarding faces. Contrary to our expectations, we did 
not find a significant direct effect of intranasal oxytocin on facial mimicry, nor on the 
reward-driven modulation of mimicry. Our results support the notion that mimicry is 
a complex process that depends on contextual factors, but failed to provide conclusive 
evidence of a role of oxytocin on the modulation of facial mimicry. 
This article has been published as:  
Trilla, I., Drimalla, H., Bajbouj, M., & Dziobek, I. (2020). The Influence of Reward on Facial 
Mimicry: No Evidence for a Significant Effect of Oxytocin. Frontiers in Behavioral Neurosci-
ence, 14. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2020.00088 
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2.1 Introduction 
Facial mimicry is defined as the automatic imitation of emotional facial expressions of others. 
It is an inherent aspect of social behaviour and acts as a social regulator by reinforcing social 
bonds and facilitating the understanding of others' emotional states (Hess & Fischer, 2013; 
Niedenthal, 2007). Facial mimicry is distinguished from other affective processes that may 
also lead to congruent facial reactions, such as emotional contagion or affective empathy, in 
that mimicked facial expressions reflect the sharing of the emotional displays, rather than a 
response to the other’s emotional state (Hess & Blairy, 2001; Hess & Fischer, 2014). 
Though initial theories understood mimicry as a stimulus-driven response, whereby the 
mere perception of facial expression would elicit a matching response in the observer, it is 
now well-established that mimicry depends on several factors related to the social context 
and the relationship between the interactants (Fischer & Hess, 2017). For example, pre-ex-
isting social bonds, goals to affiliate, similarity, positive mood, and a pro-social orientation 
have been shown to increase the tendency to mimic (see Seibt et al., 2015 for a review of 
social modulators of facial mimicry). These observations have motivated the notion of mim-
icry as a context-specific social process that occurs when there is a motivation to affiliate 
with the other person (Fischer & Hess, 2017) or when the interaction with the other would 
increase social wellbeing (Wang & Hamilton, 2012). 
One of the factors shown to modulate mimicry is the reward value of the interactant. Using 
an implicit conditioning paradigm, Sims et al. (2012) associated different faces to losing and 
winning monetary rewards. Participants showed stronger facial mimicry in response to 
happy expressions displayed by faces previously conditioned with winning money com-
pared to losing money, a finding that was replicated by Korb et al. (2019). In line with these 
results, fMRI and EEG studies using the same reward manipulation showed a greater func-
tional coupling between reward- and mimicry-related brain areas in response to high 
rewarding faces (Sims et al., 2014), as well as stronger mu suppression, considered to be an 
index of cortical motor simulation (Trilla Gros et al., 2015). Further support for a link be-
tween reward and facial mimicry comes from a study in which sad faces were mimicked 
only when participants were monetarily rewarded for accurately identifying the emotional 
expression (Hess, Blaison, et al., 2017). In trials in which participants did not expect any 
reward, viewing sad faces elicited a smile instead, possibly indicative of a reaction of Scha-
denfreude. Altogether, these studies demonstrate that the reward value ascribed to the 
interactant influences the tendency to mimic their emotional expressions, arguably by im-
pacting the implicit liking and motivation to affiliate with the person. 
On the neurobiological level, oxytocin has been proposed as one endocrine factor, together 
with vasopressin and testosterone, influencing the modulation of mimicry (Kraaijenvanger 
et al., 2017). Oxytocin is a neuropeptide involved in several physiological and psychological 
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functions that regulate both social and non-social behaviour (Quintana & Guastella, 2020). 
Amongst other social processes, oxytocin has been shown to play a role in emotion recog-
nition (Shahrestani et al., 2013) and empathy (Hurlemann et al., 2010). Given the role of 
mimicry in facilitating emotion understanding and regulating social behaviour, it seems rea-
sonable to hypothesize that some socio-cognitive effects of oxytocin could be at least partly 
mediated by an influence on facial mimicry. In line with this, Korb et al. (2016) tested 
whether intranasal administrations of oxytocin would enhance facial mimicry while making 
emotion judgments. Oxytocin increased facial mimicry in response to infants’ expressions 
of anger, but only marginally for adult targets. A small marginal increase was found for 
mimicry of infants’ expressions of happiness. Although these results suggest some involve-
ment of oxytocin in facial mimicry, the effects seem to depend on contextual factors such as 
the emotion and age of the interactant. 
If the role of oxytocin is to promote adaptive social behaviour (Ma et al., 2016), we would 
expect that intranasal oxytocin enhances facial mimicry only in those contexts where there’s 
a motivation to affiliate with the other. Based on this, Pavarini et al. (2019) investigated 
whether oxytocin increased mimicry of approachable emotions (e.g., happiness, sadness) 
more than non-approachable emotions (e.g., fear, anger). They found that intranasal admin-
istrations of oxytocin enhanced mimicry of sadness and happiness, although the latter only 
in individuals who showed low positive expressivity. Concerning non-approachable emo-
tions, no significant effects of oxytocin were found for mimicry of anger. Though these 
results show tentative evidence that oxytocin may selectively increase mimicry for emotions 
that inspire social approach, the small effect size and the complexity of these results warrant 
further investigation into the contextual effects of oxytocin on facial mimicry. 
The current study aimed to examine the influence of oxytocin on the reward modulation of 
facial mimicry. Based on the idea that oxytocin promotes adaptive social behaviour, and that 
facial mimicry preferentially occurs when we interact with rewarding others, we hypothe-
sized that intranasal administrations of oxytocin would enhance facial mimicry compared to 




Sixty healthy men (Mage = 27.40, SDage = 6.03) were recruited for this study. Only male par-
ticipants were included to avoid gender differences in oxytocin response (e.g., Lynn et al., 
2014; Rilling et al., 2014). All participants were German native speakers. Exclusion criteria 
included a history of psychiatric or neurological disorders, heart and cardiovascular condi-
tions, other severe medical conditions (e.g., chronic pain syndrome, chronic degenerative or 
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inflammatory central nervous system diseases), substance use, current psychoactive medi-
cation, history of allergic or toxic reactions, smoking, participation in a pharmacological 
study in the last four months before the study, and nasal congestion or colds. Participants 
were asked to abstain from alcohol 24 h before the experiment, and from eating and drinking 
caffeine beverages for two h before the experiment. 
All participants gave written informed consent and were financially remunerated for their 
participation. The study was conducted in compliance with the Code of Ethics of the World 
Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki, 6th revision), and was approved by the Ethics 
Committee of the Department of Psychology at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. 
2.2.2 Procedure 
The study followed a double-blind, placebo-controlled, between-subject design. At the start 
of the experimental session, participants filled out demographic information and completed 
the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Krohne et al., 1996) to assess their cur-
rent mood. Next, participants self-administered 24 IU of either oxytocin (n = 30) or placebo 
(n = 30) with a nasal spray. The intranasal administration was guided by the experimenter 
and followed the provider’s indications (Apotheke des Universitätsklinikums Heidelberg, 
Germany), as well as recommendations by Guastella et al. (2013). Both the experimenter and 
the participant were blind to the content of the nasal spray, and the treatment assignment 
was done randomly. 
Right after treatment administration, participants completed questionnaires of verbal intel-
ligence (Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-Intelligenztest-B; MWT-B; Lehrl, 2005), empathy 
(Empathy Quotient; EQ; Simon Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) and autistic traits (Au-
tism Spectrum Quotient, 33-items German version; AQ; Simon Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; 
Freitag et al., 2007). Because the physiological effects of intranasal oxytocin do not begin 
until 30 min post-administration (Spengler et al., 2017) and questionnaire completion took a 
maximum of 15 min, we assumed that participants’ answers would not be affected by the 
treatment. During the waiting time until the next mood assessment, participants watched an 
affectively neutral documentary unrelated to the content of the experiment about the pre-
historic monument of Stonehenge. 
Thirty-five minutes after treatment administration, participants’ mood was assessed again 
with the PANAS. Next, participants completed a reward learning paradigm in which differ-
ent neutral faces were associated with low and high reward values. After the face-reward 
associations were learned, participants watched videos of the same faces displaying happy 
and angry expressions (facial mimicry task). Electromyography (EMG) was used to track the 
participants’ facial expressions while watching emotion displays. Facial EMG is a widely 
used method for measuring facial mimicry as it allows to detect subtle face reactions that 
may be undetectable visually (van Boxtel, 2010). The main experimental tasks began between 
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39 and 50 min (M = 42.6, SD = 2.2) after treatment administration, and continued for roughly 
60 min. 
At the end of the session, participants completed a short questionnaire assessing blinding 
integrity and were debriefed about the study aims. Participants were notified about the con-
tent of the nasal spray after the data collection of the full sample was finalized. 
The reward learning task was programmed in MATLAB R2015b (The MathWorks, Inc., 
Natick, MA, USA) using the Psychophysics Toolbox extension (Kleiner et al., 2007). 
OpenSesame (Mathôt et al., 2012) was used for stimulus presentation for the mimicry task. 
Questionnaires were implemented online using the software package SoSci Survey (Leiner, 
2018). 
2.2.3 Reward learning task 
An associative learning paradigm based on Valentin and O’Doherty (2009) was used to pair 
neutral faces with low and high reward values. Pictures of four male faces with neutral ex-
pressions were selected from a validated emotion expressions database (Kliemann et al., 
2013) and presented in pairs. In each trial, participants had to choose between one of the two 
faces displayed side by side (picture size: 400 × 400 px) by pressing either the right or left 
arrow key on a keyboard. Upon selecting a face, participants could either win 10 cents of a 
Euro (win trial) or nothing (no-win trial). For each of the two stimulus pairs, one face was 
associated with a 60% probability of winning (high reward condition), and the other face 
with a 30% probability of winning (low reward condition). The assignment of face identities 
to reward conditions was randomized across participants. Participants were not disclosed 
about the exact reward probabilities assigned to each face but were informed that one face 
would lead to a higher number of win trials overall, compared to the other face in the pair. 
After the participant’s response, the outcome (“10 cents” or “0 cents”), as well as the accu-
mulated earnings, were shown for 2000 ms (see Figure 2.1). Participants were instructed to 
maximize their earnings. A fixation cross was displayed at the beginning of each trial for a 
variable duration between 500 and 1500 ms. 
The task consisted of a minimum of three blocks of 20 trials (10 trials per face pair, presented 
in random order). Participants completed up to four additional 10-trial blocks for each face 
pair if the proportion of high reward choices did not reach 80% by the end of each block. 
This learning criterion was set to make sure that the assimilation of the face-reward associ-
ations was comparable across all participants and stimuli. If participants did not reach the 
80% criterium by the end of the task, the corresponding face stimuli were considered not 
learned and were excluded from the EMG analyses (see “EMG Analysis” section). On aver-
age, participants completed 4.20 blocks (SD = 1.44) per face pair. There were no significant 
differences in the number of blocks completed between oxytocin and placebo groups, t(58) 
= 0.14, p = 0.89. 
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To check whether the reward associations changed how faces were evaluated, participants 
were asked to rate the pictures for pleasantness using a 7-point scale (1: very unpleasant; 7: 
very pleasant) before and after the reward learning task. 
2.2.4 Facial mimicry task 
A passive viewing task was used to assess facial mimicry. In each trial, participants watched 
a 4000 ms-video of a face displaying either a happy or an angry expression (768 × 768 px). 
Videos started with a neutral face that changed into the emotional expression, which peaked 
at around 1500 ms. Dynamic expressions were used as they have been shown to elicit 
stronger facial mimicry responses than static pictures and are more ecologically valid (Sato 
et al., 2008). Preceding each video, a fixation cross was presented for 1500 ms. 
In total, participants watched happy and angry facial expressions of six male actors. Four of 
the face identities had been previously associated with either high or low reward values in 
the reward learning task. The remaining two identities were new to the participants (uncon-
ditioned faces) and were used as a control condition to assess the direct influence of oxytocin 
on facial mimicry. All videos were presented eight times (96 trials total) in randomized order. 
To assure that participants paid attention to the videos, in 25% of the trials a yes/no question 
about the actors' physical attributes (e.g., presence of a beard, hair colour) was asked right 
after the clip presentation (see Figure 2.1). During the mimicry task, videos of the partici-
pants were recorded with a webcam to detect potential artefacts in the EMG data (e.g., if 
participants sneezed, moved, et cetera). 
 
Figure 2.1. (a) Reward learning task: in each trial, participants had to choose between two neu-
tral faces. One face was associated with a 60% probability of winning 10 cents (high reward 
condition), and the other face with a 30% probability of winning 10 cents (low reward condi-
tion). The trial outcome (i “10 cents” in green, or “0 cents” in red, for the win and no-win trials, 
respectively) was displayed superimposed on each picture for 2000 ms. The accumulated earn-
ings were shown below. (b) Facial mimicry task: in each trial, participants watched a 4000-ms 
video of a face displaying a happy or an angry expression. In 25% of the trials, participants had 
to answer an attention-control question concerning a physical attribute of the face they had 
just seen.  
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2.2.5 EMG data acquisition 
During the facial mimicry task, EMG was used to record the activity of the zygomaticus 
major (ZM), a muscle on the corners of the mouth that is activated when smiling, and the 
corrugator supercilii (CS), a muscle located in the eyebrow area that contracts when frown-
ing. Stronger activity in the ZM compared to CS is commonly used as an index of mimicry 
of happiness, while the opposite pattern (i.e. higher CS than ZM) reflects an expression con-
gruent with anger (Hess, Arslan, et al., 2017; van Boxtel, 2010). Bipolar Ag/AgCl electrodes 
were attached to the left side of the face over the two muscles. The ground electrode was 
placed on the centre of the forehead, below the hairline. We followed standard EMG site 
preparation and electrode placement procedures (van Boxtel, 2010). Skin conductance elec-
trode gel was used to facilitate conductance between the electrodes and the facial skin. To 
cover the recording of muscular activity, participants were told that facial electrodes were 
measuring sweat production. 
EMG signals were amplified with EMG amplifiers (Becker Meditec, Karlsruhe, Germany; 
gain = 1230; frequency response 19–500 Hz). The amplified signals were digitized using a 
USB multifunction card USB-6002 (National Instruments Inc., Ireland) connected to a laptop 
computer Dell Latitude 5540, running data acquisition software DasyLab 10.0 (National In-
struments Ireland Resources Limited). The raw EMG signals were sampled with 500 Hz and 
16-bit resolution. Within DasyLab, signals were online (RMS root mean square) integrated 
with a time constant of 50 ms and rectified. The multifunction card USB-6002 acquired also 
trigger signals from the parallel port of the presentation computer. For further processing, 
the integrated EMG and the trigger signals were down-sampled to 20 Hz and stored as an 
ASCII file. 
2.2.6 EMG data reduction and artefact control 
EMG data was pre-processed offline in Matlab R2015b (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA, 
USA) using self-made scripts. Data were segmented from 1500 ms before to 4000 ms after 
stimulus onset. The raw EMG signal and the video recordings of all participants were 
screened visually to detect trials with artefacts. Artefacts were defined as distortions in the 
EMG data associated with, for example, resting the chin on the hand, swinging the head, 
yawning, eye closing, mumbling, and displaying facial expressions in the pre-stimulus pe-
riod. On average, 3.79 trials (SD = 3.56) were rejected per participant. There were no 
significant differences in the number of trials rejected by emotion and reward conditions, 
F(2, 114) = 0.35, p = 0.71. Artefact-free data were Z-standardized within muscles and within 
participants to account for individual and muscle differences. Due to technical issues during 
EMG acquisition, data in the 500 ms directly before and after stimulus onset were distorted 
and could not be used. The period from 1500 ms to 4000 ms after stimulus onset was used as 
the window of interest. As in Sims et al. (2012); this interval was determined based on the 
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time when the emotion expressions peaked during the videos (i.e. at around 1500 ms in this 
study), and because it included the period of maximal EMG responses (see Figure 2.3 and 
Figure 2.4). Change from baseline scores were calculated for each trial and muscle by sub-
tracting the mean EMG amplitude from 500 to 1000 ms preceding stimulus onset (baseline) 
from the mean EMG amplitude of the window of interest. The resulting baseline-corrected 
EMG scores were used as the dependent variable in the statistical analyses. 
2.2.7 Statistical analyses 
Data and code necessary to reproduce the analyses reported here are available at 
https://osf.io/n85sh. All statistical analyses were run in R (R Core Team, 2020) and R studio 
(RStudio Team, 2019). The main R packages used were: afex for ANOVA (Singmann et al., 
2019); lme4 (Bates et al., 2015), lmerTest (Kuznetsova et al., 2017) and emmeans (Lenth, 2020) 
for linear mixed-effects analysis; pwr (Champely, 2018) and TOSTER (Lakens, 2017) for equiv-
alence testing; and ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009) for figures. 
2.2.7.1 Reward manipulation check 
To test whether participants learned the reward associations, the proportion of high reward 
choices for each of the first three learning blocks were fitted in a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA with 
Block (first, second, third) as within-subject factor and Treatment (placebo, oxytocin) as be-
tween-subject factor. A 2 × 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA with Reward (low reward, high reward) and 
Time (pre-, post-reward learning task) as within-subject factors, and Treatment (placebo, 
oxytocin) as between-subject factor, was used to examine whether face pleasantness ratings 
changed after the reward associations were learned. The Holm-Bonferroni method was ap-
plied to adjust for multiple comparisons in post hoc tests. 
2.2.7.2 EMG analysis 
Due to technical problems, EMG data of two participants were not collected. Data from two 
additional participants were excluded from the EMG analyses due to low accuracy (less than 
80%) on the attention control questions in the mimicry task. The EMG analysis sample thus 
included data from 29 participants in the oxytocin group and 27 participants in the placebo 
group. 
EMG data were analysed using linear mixed models (LMM). Separate LMMs were executed 
to test EMG responses to observing happy and angry expressions. Mimicry of happiness was 
defined as increased activation of ZM vs CS response to happy faces. The opposite pattern 
of muscular activity (i.e. stronger CS vs ZM response) in response to angry faces would in-
dicate mimicry of anger. 
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First, we examined the direct influence of oxytocin on facial mimicry. EMG data from trials 
in which participants viewed unconditioned faces (i.e. faces that did not appear in the reward 
learning task, and thus had not been associated with any particular reward value) were used 
as the dependent variable in LMMs with Muscle (ZM, CS), Treatment (placebo, oxytocin) 
and their interaction as fixed effects. 
Second, to test the effects of reward on facial mimicry, and the modulatory role of oxytocin, 
we fitted into LMMs the EMG data from trials that presented low reward and high reward 
faces. Trials in which the face presented did not reach the learning criterion by the end of 
the reward learning task were excluded. The LMMs included the main effects of Muscle (ZM, 
CS), Reward (low reward, high reward), and Treatment (placebo, oxytocin), as well as the 
corresponding two- and three-way interactions, as fixed effects. 
To account for non-independencies in the data, we entered by-participant and by-stimulus 
random intercepts in all LMMs. If a model led to singular fits, the random-intercept for stim-
uli was removed. Sum to zero contrasts were set for all predictors. P-values were computed 
based on Satterthwaite approximation for denominator degrees of freedom. 
2.3 Results 
Overall, 37% of the participants correctly guessed the treatment they had received, 40% made 
an incorrect guess, and 23% reported not knowing. The proportion of participants who made 
correct or incorrect guesses did not significantly differ between the placebo and oxytocin 
groups, χ2(2) = 1.49, p = 0.47. 
With respect to mood changes, participants in both the placebo and oxytocin groups re-
ported less negative affect after treatment administration ( M = 12.6, SD = 3.97) than at 
baseline ( M = 14.02, SD = 4.62), as shown by a significant main effect of time, F(1, 58) = 14.35, 
MSE = 4.19, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.027. No significant change in positive affect was observed, nor 
a significant effect of treatment for neither positive nor negative affect (all p > 0.47). Descrip-
tive statistics of questionnaire scores are available in the supplementary Table S2.1. 
2.3.1 Learning of reward associations 
In line with the expected reward learning curve, the proportion of high reward choices sig-
nificantly increased with the number of blocks, F(1.99, 115.52) = 36.51, MSE = 0.01, p < 0.001, 
η2G = 0.10 (Figure 2.2). Participants chose the high reward faces more often in the second (M 
= 0.72, SD = 0.21), t(116) = −6.33, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = −0.60, and third blocks (M = 0.75, SD 
= 0.20), t(116) = −8.14, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = −0.80, compared to the first block of trials (M = 
0.60, SD = 0.19). The difference between the second and third block did not reach statistical 
significance, t(116) = −1.80, p = 0.07, Cohen’s d = −0.17. There was no significant main effect 
of treatment, F(1, 58) = 0.26, MSE = 0.10, p = 0.61, η2G = 0.004, nor a significant interaction 
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with block, F(1.99, 115.52) = 0.16, MSE = 0.01, p = 0.85, η2G < 0.001, which is consistent with 
previous studies in which intranasal oxytocin did not enhance learning with non-social re-
inforcements compared to placebo (Clark-Elford et al., 2014; Hurlemann et al., 2010). 
Descriptive statistics on the proportion of high reward choices for each block and treatment 
group can be found in the Supplementary Table S2.2. 
A change in the perceived pleasantness of the faces after the reward learning task, indicated 
by a significant reward-by-time interaction, F(1, 58) = 8.74, MSE = 0.31, p = 0.004, η2G = 0.01, 
supports that face-reward associations were assimilated (Figure 2.2). Planned simple effects 
confirmed that, while there were no significant differences in pleasantness ratings at base-
line (low reward: M = 3.72, SD = 0.71; high reward: M = 3.77, SD = 0.89), t(94.30) = −0.36, p > 
0.99, Cohen’s d = −0.06, faces associated with high reward value were rated as more pleasant 
(M = 4.23, SD = 0.98) than faces associated with low reward value (M = 3.76, SD = 0.91) after 
the reward learning task, t(94.30) = −3.37, p = 0.003, Cohen’s d = −0.50. Treatment group did 
not significantly interact with these effects, F(1, 58) = 0.41, MSE = 0.31, p = 0.53, η2G = 0.001, 
nor had an overall influence on pleasantness ratings, F(1, 58) = 1.16, MSE = 1.52, p = 0.29, 
η2G= 0.010. See Supplementary Table S2.3 for descriptive statistics on the pleasantness rat-
ings for each treatment group. 
 
Figure 2.2. (a) Mean proportion of high reward choices for the first three learning blocks of the 
reward learning task. (b) Mean pleasantness ratings for the faces paired with low and high 
reward values, before and after the reward learning task. Error bars are within-subject 95% 
confidence intervals. 
2.3.2 Effects of oxytocin on facial mimicry 
Observation of happy facial expressions elicited higher ZM (M = 0.05, SE = 0.04) compared 
to CS activity (M = −0.06, SE = 0.04), b = 0.05, SE = 0.02, 95% CI = (0.02, 0.09), t = 3.04, p = 
0.002, confirming the occurrence of mimicry of happiness (Figure 2.3). Contrary to our ex-
pectations, the interaction between muscle and treatment was not significant, b = −0.03, SE 
= 0.02, 95% CI = (−0.06, 0.01), t = −1.65, p = 0.10. The main effect of treatment, however, was 
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significant, b = 0.06, SE = 0.02, 95% CI = (0.02, 0.10), t = 2.71, p = 0.007, indicating that both 
ZM and CS were more activated in the oxytocin group (M = −0.06, SE = 0.04) compared to 
the placebo group (M = 0.05, SE = 0.04). 
With respect to responses to angry facial expressions, we did not find any significant differ-
ence between ZM and CS, b = 0.01, SE = 0.02, 95% CI = (−0.03, 0.06), t = 0.64, p = 0.52, which 
indicates that our task did not elicit mimicry of anger (Figure 2.3). No significant main effect 
of treatment, b = −0.003, SE = 0.03, 95% CI = (−0.05, 0.05), t = −0.11, p = 0.91, nor an interaction 
with muscle reactivity were found, b = 0.02, SE = 0.02, 95% CI = (−0.03, 0.06), t = 0.82, p = 
0.41. 
 
Figure 2.3. Zygomaticus major and corrugator supercilii responses to happy and angry facial 
expressions of unconditioned faces, for each treatment group. Plotted data corresponds to Z-
standardized, baseline-corrected electromyographic (EMG) activity averaged within 200-ms 
time-bins. Only data from the time-window between 1500 and 4000 ms post-stimulus onset 
(shaded in grey) was used for statistical analysis. Error bars represent within-subject 95% con-
fidence intervals. 
2.3.3 Effects of reward on facial mimicry and the influence of oxytocin 
The LMM with EMG responses to high and low reward happy faces as dependent variable 
yielded a significant main effect of muscle, b = 0.06, SE = 0.01, 95% CI = (0.03, 0.08), t = 4.37, 
p < 0.001. As before, viewing happy facial expressions elicited stronger ZM activity (M = 
0.07, SE = 0.03) than CS activity (M = −0.05, SE = 0.03), confirming mimicry of happiness. 
Moreover, we found a significant muscle-by-reward interaction, b = 0.03, SE = 0.01, 95% CI 
= (0.002, 0.05), t = 2.10, p = 0.036. Follow-up analyses on the estimated means showed that 
ZM response was higher for low reward happy faces (M = 0.12, SE = 0.03) compared to high 
reward faces (M = 0.02, SE = 0.03), t(2552.70) = 2.54, p = 0.03 (Figure 2.4). This result indicates 
that, contrary to our expectations, low reward happy faces elicited stronger mimicry than 
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higher reward happy faces. No significant differences in CS activity were found between 
high and low reward faces, t(2552.70) = −0.42, p = 0.68. Neither the predicted three-way in-
teraction, nor any of the two-way interactions with treatment reached significance (all p > 
0.39). These results thus provide no significant evidence for a modulation of oxytocin on the 
effects of reward on mimicry of happiness. 
The LMM on EMG responses to angry expressions did not yield any significant main effects 
or interactions (all p > 0.14; Figure 2.4). See the supplementary tables for the descriptive 
statistics (Table S2.4) and the complete results of the LMMs (Table S2.5, Table S2.6). 
 
Figure 2.4. Zygomaticus major and corrugator supercilii responses to happy faces associated 
with low and high reward values, for each treatment group. Plotted data corresponds to Z-
standardized, baseline-corrected EMG activity averaged within 200-ms time-bins. Only data 
from the time-window between 1500 and 4000 ms post-stimulus onset (shaded in grey) was 
used for statistical analysis. Error bars represent within-subject 95% confidence intervals. 
2.3.4 Equivalence testing 
Because null-hypothesis significance testing can only reject the presence of an effect, we 
cannot conclude that intranasal oxytocin does not influence facial mimicry based on the 
non-significant results reported above. Using the Two One-Sided Tests (TOST) procedure of 
equivalence testing (Lakens, 2017), we re-examined our main null findings to test whether 
the effect of oxytocin on facial mimicry was statistically equivalent to the placebo effect, or 
whether our data was just not sensitive enough to detect the predicted group differences. 
We limited this analysis to EMG responses to happy faces, as our task failed to elicit mimicry 
of anger. Given that there is no clear theoretical boundary for oxytocin’s socio-cognitive 
effects for setting the equivalence bounds (Quintana, 2018), we defined the smallest effect 
size of interest-based on the smallest effect size detectable with 80% power given our sample 
size (Quintana, 2018; Tabak et al., 2019). The alpha level was set to 0.05. 
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First, we applied the TOST procedure to test the null effect of oxytocin on EMG responses 
to happy expressions of unconditioned faces. Because the TOST procedure is based on t-
tests, we reduced the original Muscle-by-Treatment interaction tested in the LMM by com-
puting mimicry indices (i.e. difference score between CS and ZM activity in response to 
happy faces) for each participant. Positive scores indicate the occurrence of mimicry of hap-
piness. The equivalence test comparing the mean mimicry index of the oxytocin vs placebo 
groups was non-significant, t(49.15) = 1.55, p = 0.06, given equivalence bounds of −0.76 and 
0.76. This indicates that we cannot reject effects bigger than what could be reliably tested 
based on the statistical power of our study. 
Second, we tested the oxytocin effects on the influence of reward on mimicry of happiness. 
To reduce the original three-way interaction in the LMM (Muscle × Reward × Treatment), 
we subtracted the mimicry index to high reward faces from the mimicry index to low reward 
faces for each participant. Positive scores indicate stronger mimicry of happiness in response 
to high reward vs low reward faces. The equivalence test comparing the oxytocin and pla-
cebo groups did not reach significance, t(48.98) = −1.64, p = 0.05, given equivalence bounds 
of −0.80 and −0.80. Note that the equivalence bounds were recalculated for this second TOST 
because the sample size for this analysis was smaller: data from two participants of the ox-
ytocin group and 3 of the placebo group were not included because they did not reach the 
learning criterium for any of the face pairs in the reward learning task. 
Based on the equivalence tests and the null-hypothesis tests combined, we can neither con-
clude that oxytocin has an effect on facial mimicry nor reliably reject effect sizes that could 
be detected with 80% power given the sample size of this study. 
2.4 Discussion 
This study sought to investigate the modulatory effect of intranasal oxytocin on the link 
between reward and facial mimicry. We hypothesized that intranasal administration of ox-
ytocin would increase facial mimicry, but more so in response to faces previously associated 
with high reward compared to low reward value. 
Our study failed to confirm our original hypotheses. First, we found an influence of reward 
on facial mimicry of happiness, but this effect was in the opposite direction as predicted: 
happy faces associated with low reward were mimicked more than happy faces associated 
with high reward. Second, we did not find evidence for a significant effect of oxytocin on 
facial mimicry, neither for a direct influence, nor on the modulation of the reward-mimicry 
link.  
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2.4.1 The influence of reward on facial mimicry 
Previous studies reported a higher tendency to mimic the emotional expressions of faces 
paired with high rewards than with low rewards (Hess, Blaison, et al., 2017; Korb et al., 2019; 
Sims et al., 2012). Here, we manipulated the value of different neutral faces using an associ-
ative learning task with monetary rewards. No differences in the learning of face-reward 
associations were found between the oxytocin and placebo groups, in line with previous 
studies in which intranasal oxytocin did also not facilitate learning with non-social rein-
forcements (Clark-Elford et al., 2014; Hurlemann et al., 2010). As expected, our reward 
manipulation changed how participants evaluated the faces, such that those linked with 
higher monetary rewards were rated as more pleasant. However, the EMG results did not 
replicate the direction of the reward effects of previous mimicry studies, as participants 
showed stronger mimicry in response to happy faces previously conditioned with low re-
ward compared to high rewarding happy faces. 
Differences in the sample characteristics and experimental design may account for this un-
expected result. For example, previous studies on the reward-mimicry link had 
predominantly female samples, and their stimuli included both female and male targets 
(Hess, Blaison, et al., 2017; Korb et al., 2019; Sims et al., 2012). Conversely, we only included 
male participants and same-gender face identities. Given that there are gender differences 
in how characteristics of the target person, such as gaze direction and gender, influence 
mimicry reactions (Hess & Bourgeois, 2010; Schrammel et al., 2009), it could be that the di-
rection of reward effects is partly dependent on the gender of and the relationship between 
the expresser and the perceiver. 
Our study also differed from previous ones in how reward was manipulated. In Hess, Blaison, 
et al. (2017), the motivation to affiliate, rather than the value of the targets themselves, was 
manipulated by either rewarding (or not rewarding) the correct identification of their emo-
tional expressions. In contrast, Sims et al. (2012) and the current study aimed to directly alter 
the value of the faces, although the paradigm and reward schemas used were different. First, 
Sims et al. (2012) used a classical conditioning task to pair different reward values with face 
identities implicitly. While this task proved to be effective in manipulating the value of the 
stimuli (Korb et al., 2019), it had the limitation that the participant’s learning of the associa-
tions could not be tracked, as task performance was unrelated to the associations between 
the face stimuli and monetary rewards. In contrast, we implemented a reward learning task 
in which the reward outcomes were contingent on the participant’s choices. This allowed us 
to use task performance as an indication of the learning of the face-reward pairings. 
Second, Sims et al. (2012) compared mimicry responses to faces associated with rewards 
(winning money) vs faces associated with punishments (losing money). In the current study, 
face stimuli were only conditioned with different probabilities of winning money. We chose 
relatively low reward probabilities (60% for high reward condition vs 30% for low reward 
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condition) to keep the learning implicit, as pilot testing suggested that at these rates, partic-
ipants were not aware that they had learned the associations, despite learning curves and 
pleasantness ratings were as expected. Note that, even though reward probabilities were 
overall lower than those used in Sims et al. (2012), faces assigned to the high reward condi-
tion were anyway paired twice as often with a monetary outcome than faces in the low 
reward condition. 
These variations in the reward schemas may have affected how the manipulation influenced 
the evaluation of the faces compared to previous studies. Rather than associating a positive 
or negative valence to the face identities (e.g., targets paired with positive outcomes vs tar-
gets paired with negative outcomes), our manipulation may have changed the level of 
uncertainty as to which each face would be accompanied with a rewarding outcome. Ac-
cording to a recent account of social cognition, the inability to precisely predict the states 
and actions of others during social interactions is associated with aversive feelings 
(FeldmanHall & Shenhav, 2019). On this account, processes of inference and affect-sharing 
such as emotional mimicry are thought to be activated to reduce social uncertainty. There-
fore, participants may have reacted with stronger mimicry to low reward faces to promote 
emotion understanding, regain a bond with the interactant, and ultimately reduce the higher 
social uncertainty that the low reward faces conveyed compared to faces associated with 
higher reward probability. 
2.4.2 Null effects of intranasal oxytocin 
Contrary to our predictions, intranasal administrations of oxytocin did not influence the 
degree of facial mimicry of happiness, nor the modulation by reward. Two studies have pre-
viously investigated the effects of oxytocin on facial mimicry, and neither found intranasal 
oxytocin to consistently change the facial reactivity to happy expressions (Korb et al., 2016; 
Pavarini et al., 2019). Only in their exploratory analysis did Pavarini et al. (2019) detect oxy-
tocin-related increases in mimicry reactions to happy faces in a subsample of participants 
who showed reduced positivity expressivity at baseline. A meta-analysis found small in-
creases in the expression of positive emotions after intranasal oxytocin, although it did not 
significantly improve the recognition of happiness (Leppanen et al., 2017). Due to the sample 
size, our study had limited power to detect small or medium effects, a shortcoming that was 
further highlighted by the inconclusive results of the equivalence tests applied. While our 
data could not provide conclusive evidence on the (lack of) effects of intranasal oxytocin, 
cumulative null findings may indicate that, even if oxytocin would influence the degree of 
mimicry of happiness, this effect is probably small. 
Mimicry of happiness is highly frequent and very consistent across individuals and social 
contexts (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Hess & Bourgeois, 2010), which may render an effect of 
oxytocin difficult to detect. Instead, oxytocin manipulations may be more prone to affect 
Study 1: Facial mimicry, reward & oxytocin 
 34 
mimicry reactions to emotions that are more context- and person-dependent, such as sad-
ness and anger. Given that our mimicry task did not elicit congruent facial responses to 
angry expressions, we were unable to test the effects of oxytocin and reward on mimicry for 
anger. However, previous studies did find oxytocin-related increases in mimicry in response 
to angry expressions (Korb et al., 2016) and a trend towards an increase of mimicry of sad-
ness (Pavarini et al., 2019). 
Nevertheless, current evidence of the role of oxytocin on facial mimicry remains weak. Be-
yond our null findings, oxytocin did not have a robust direct influence on mimicry reactions 
in previous studies. Rather, effects were only observed in response to certain stimuli (e.g., 
children’s emotional faces vs adult faces, in Korb et al., 2016), emotional expressions (e.g., 
angry vs happy in Korb et al., 2016; and sad vs happy and angry, in Pavarini et al., 2019), and 
type of mimicry tasks (e.g., offset task vs intensity task, in Korb et al., 2016). Altogether, this 
suggests that oxytocin may not act by directly influencing the basic mechanisms underlying 
mimicry. Instead, it could play a role in the modulation of facial mimicry by the social con-
text. This would fit well with current theories of oxytocin, which posit that oxytocin 
improves social adaptation by increasing social salience (Shamay-Tsoory & Abu-Akel, 2016) 
and promoting approach behaviour and reducing avoidance (Harari-Dahan & Bernstein, 
2014). However, our results on the oxytocin modulation of the reward-mimicry link failed 
to provide conclusive evidence supporting this hypothesis. Further research is therefore 
warranted to better disentangle under which conditions intranasal oxytocin has a reliable 
effect. 
2.4.3 Limitations 
One limitation of our study is that we were not able to test oxytocin effects on mimicry of 
anger. Given that an affiliation intent is necessary for emotional mimicry (Fischer & Hess, 
2017), and that angry expressions may be interpreted as a threat signal, our task may not 
have provided a suitable context for mimicry of anger to occur. To test whether oxytocin 
effects on mimicry are emotion-specific, future studies should present additional emotional 
expressions, and measure facial reactions in more interactive paradigms that promote affil-
iative goals. 
Even though the sample size of this study was similar to other oxytocin studies (e.g., Korb 
et al., 2016), it had insufficient power to detect small-to-medium effects, which are the effect 
sizes typically observed in oxytocin research (Walum et al., 2016). As evidenced by the in-
conclusive results from the equivalence tests, further studies with higher statistical power 
are needed to draw reliable conclusions about the presence or absence of a meaningful effect 
of oxytocin on facial mimicry. Prospective research would benefit from determining a-priori 
the smallest effect size of interest for equivalence testing. Even though setting the equiva-
lence boundaries according to the sample size of this study helped us to determine that our 
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data was not sensitive enough to detect even large effects, a better approach would derive 
more precise and meaningful theoretical predictions based on prior studies, instead of on a 
resource question (Lakens et al., 2018). Also, the inclusion of female participants in future 
studies is encouraged, as so far, all intranasal oxytocin studies on mimicry have exclusively 
tested men, and gender differences are commonly observed in oxytocin research (e.g., Lynn 
et al., 2014; Rilling et al., 2014). 
Finally, while intranasal oxytocin is the most accessible and widespread method to study the 
role of oxytocin on human behaviour, this methodology is not without limitations. First, 
even though oxytocin is administered intranasally to take advantage of the direct pathways 
between the nasal cavity and the central nervous system (Quintana et al., 2015), it is still 
unclear what doses are needed to reach relevant brain regions and induce behavioural effects 
(Leng & Ludwig, 2016). Compared to 12 IU and 40 IU, the dose administered here (24 IU) 
exerted the maximum impact on neural reactivity in a study on dose-dependency (F. B. 
Spengler et al., 2017). However, dose-dependent effects were not observed on the behav-
ioural level. Moreover, it is yet to be determined to what extend oxytocin’s central actions 
account for its socio-cognitive effects, or whether the peripheral oxytocinergic system is also 
involved (Leng & Ludwig, 2016; Quintana et al., 2015; Valstad et al., 2016). Further research 
is thus warranted to improve our understanding of the oxytocinergic system and to develop 
improved methods to study the role of oxytocin on social behaviour and cognition. 
2.4.4 Conclusion 
Results from this study add to the evidence that facial mimicry is influenced by the reward 
value of the interactant and reinforces the notion of mimicry as a context-specific social 
process. Nevertheless, the fact that the reward effects were in the opposite direction as re-
ported in previous mimicry studies highlights the need to closely evaluate the impact of 
experimental protocols, sample characteristics, and contextual factors on the modulation of 
mimicry by reward. Other replication attempts in psychological science show that small dif-
ferences in study designs may lead to meaningful changes in the results (Noah et al., 2018). 
Rather than invalidating the reported findings, failed replications should be taken as an op-
portunity to identify new possible moderators of the investigated effects (Van Bavel et al., 
2016). 
Also, we did not find evidence for a significant role of oxytocin on the effect of reward on 
mimicry in response to happy expressions. While this is the first time, to our knowledge, 
that the influence of oxytocin on the reward-mimicry link is investigated, our results coin-
cide with previous reports of null effects of oxytocin on mimicry of happiness. Nevertheless, 
the sample size of this study, which limited the power to detect small or medium effects, and 
the fact that only male participants were included, warrant a cautious interpretation and 
generalizability of these null results. As in other fields, oxytocin research has suffered from 
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strong publication bias (Lane et al., 2016), and some of the early findings have not been rep-
licated (e.g., Nave et al., 2015). Parallel to efforts in improving the methodological quality of 
oxytocin studies (Walum et al., 2016), it is warranted that failed replications and null results 
like this one are brought to light and considered when assessing the role of oxytocin on 





2.5 Supplementary tables 
Table S2.1. Mean (standard deviation) of questionnaire scores for the full sample and for each treatment 
group. 
Measurements  Full sample  
(n = 60) 
Placebo 
(n = 30) 
Oxytocin 
(n = 30) 
Autism Spectrum Quotient 8.40 (4.69) 8.87 (4.01) 7.93 (5.31) 
Empathy Quotient 36.33 (10.49) 36.10 (11.08) 36.57 (10.04) 
Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-Intelligenztest-B 26.67 (4.58) 27.33 (4.82) 26.00 (4.32) 
Positive affect scale 
(PANAS) 
Pre-treatment  30.98 (6.91) 30.27 (7.70) 31.70 (6.08) 
Post-treatment  30.47 (6.95) 29.97 (7.49) 30.97 (6.46) 
Negative affect scale 
(PANAS)  
Pre-treatment  14.02 (4.62) 14.13 (5.08) 13.90 (4.20) 
Post-treatment  12.60 (3.97) 12.73 (4.77) 12.47 (3.05) 
Note. PANAS: Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. 
Table S2.2. Mean (standard deviation) proportion of high reward choices in each of the first three trial 
blocks of the reward learning task. 
 Full sample 
(n = 60) 
Placebo 
(n = 30) 
Oxytocin 
(n = 30) 
Block 1 0.60 (0.19) 0.59 (0.19) 0.60 (0.19) 
Block 2 0.72 (0.21) 0.70 (0.21) 0.73 (0.22) 
Block 3 0.75 (0.20) 0.73 (0.21) 0.77 (0.19) 
Table S2.3. Mean pleasantness ratings (standard deviation) for the faces paired with low and high reward 
values, as rated before and after the reward learning task. 
  Full sample 
(n = 60) 
Placebo 
(n = 30) 
Oxytocin 
(n = 30) 
Pre-reward learning Low reward 3.72 (0.71) 3.75 (0.76) 3.68 (0.66) 
 High reward 3.77 (0.89) 3.85 (0.78) 3.68 (0.99) 
Post-reward learning Low reward 3.76 (0.91) 3.80 (0.95) 3.72 (0.88) 
 High reward 4.23 (0.98) 4.42 (0.81) 4.05 (1.12) 
Table S2.4. Mean (standard deviation) EMG scores for each recorded muscle, as a function of treatment 
group, reward and emotion conditions. EMG scores refer to Z-standardized, baseline-corrected EMG data 
for the interval between 1500 and 4000 ms post-stimulus onset. 
  Placebo (n = 27) Oxytocin (n = 29) 










No reward 0.02 (1.08) -0.03 (0.86) 0.08 (1.10) -0.08 (0.93) 
Low reward 0.11 (0.97) -0.04 (0.76) 0.12 (0.73) -0.08 (0.71) 
High reward 0.03 (0.85) -0.06 (0.74) 0.02 (0.85) -0.03 (0.70) 
Angry 
expressions 
No reward 0.04 (1.38) -0.02 (0.88) 0.005 (1.75) 0.01 (0.78) 
Low reward 0.04 (0.85) 0.0001 (0.62) 0.05 (0.75) -0.02 (0.81) 
High reward -0.04 (0.76) -0.01 (0.87) 0.03 (0.96) -0.06 (0.76) 
  
 
Table S2.5. Results of the linear mixed models conducted to test the effect of treatment (placebo vs oxytocin) on EMG scores for each recorded muscle (zygomaticus major 
vs corrugator supercilii) in response to expressions of happiness (Model 1) and anger (Model 2) by unconditioned faces (i.e. faces not presented in the reward learning 
task). 
  Model 1: EMG responses to happy expressions  Model 2: EMG responses to angry expressions 
 Estimate  SE 95% CI ß t p  Estimate  SE 95% CI ß t p 
Muscle 0.05 0.02 0.02 – 0.09 0.07 3.04 .002  0.01 0.02 -0.03 – 0.06 0.02 0.64 .522 
Treatment 0.06 0.02 0.02 – 0.10 0.08 2.71 .007  -0.003 0.03 -0.05 – 0.05 -0.003 -0.11 .910 
Muscle x Treatment -0.03 0.02 -0.06 – 0.01 -0.04 -1.65 .100  0.02 0.02 -0.03 – 0.06 0.02 0.82 .414 
Random Effects  
 
 
σ2 0.51  0.82 
τ00 0.01 participant, 0.003 stimuli  0.01 participant 
ICC 0.02  0.01 
N 56 participant, 6 stimuli  56 participant 
Observations 1734  1706 
Marginal R2/ Conditional R2 0.013 / 0.035  0.001 / 0.013 
Note. p-values for the fixed effects calculated using Wald-statistics approximation, uncorrected. Significant p-values, according to alpha < 0.05, are indicated in bold. Model equation: 
EMG scores ~ Muscle + Treatment + Muscle*Treatment + (1|Participant) + (1|Stimuli). EMG scores refer to the Z-standardized, baseline-corrected EMG activity for each 
muscle, averaged within the interval between 1500 and 4000 ms post-stimulus onset. The inclusion of the random intercept for stimuli in Model 2 led to singular fits and was 
therefore removed from the final model. Estimate: unstandardized coefficient; SE: standard error; CI: confidence interval; ß: standardized coefficient; t: test statistic coefficient; p: 







Table S2.6. Results of the linear mixed models conducted to test the effect of treatment (placebo vs oxytocin) on EMG scores for each recorded muscle (zygomaticus major 
vs corrugator supercilii) in response to expressions of happiness (Model 3) and anger (Model 4) by faces previously associated with low reward and high reward. 
  Model 3: EMG responses to happy expressions  Model 4: EMG responses to angry expressions 
 Estimate  SE  95% CI  ß  t  p  Estimate  SE  95% CI  ß  t  p 
Muscle 0.06 0.01 0.03 – 0.08 0.08 4.37 <.001  0.02 0.01 -0.01 – 0.05 0.03 1.48 .140 
Reward 0.02 0.01 -0.01 – 0.05 0.03 1.50 .134  0.02 0.01 -0.01 – 0.04 0.02 1.26 .209 
Treatment 0.03 0.02 -0.02 – 0.07 0.04 1.24 .215  -0.004 0.02 -0.03 – 0.03 -0.01 -0.28 .777 
Muscle x Reward 0.03 0.01 0.00 – 0.05 0.04 2.10 .036  0.01 0.01 -0.02 – 0.03 0.01 0.53 .594 
Muscle x Treatment -0.002 0.01 -0.03 – 0.02 -0.002 -0.12 .902  -0.02 0.01 -0.05 – 0.01 -0.03 -1.43 .152 
Reward x Treatment 0.005 0.01 -0.02 – 0.03 0.01 0.36 .719  0.004 0.01 -0.02 – 0.03 0.01 0.28 .777 
Muscle x Reward x Treatment -0.01 0.01 -0.04 – 0.01 -0.02 -0.85 .397  0.01 0.01 -0.02 – 0.04 0.02 0.85 .397 
Random Effects    
σ2 0.53  0.53 
τ00 0.01 participant, 0.0004 stimuli  0.003 participant, 0.0003 stimuli 
ICC 0.03  0.01 
N 51 participant, 6 stimuli  51 participant, 6 stimuli 
Observations 2966  2944 
Marginal R2/ Conditional R2 0.010 / 0.035  0.002 / 0.008 
Note. p-values for the fixed effects calculated using Wald-statistics approximation, uncorrected. Significant p-values according to alpha < 0.05 are indicated in bold. Model equation: 
EMG scores ~ Muscle + Reward + Treatment + Muscle*Reward + Muscle*Treatment + Reward*Treatment + Muscle*Reward*Treatment + (1|Participant) + (1|Stimuli) . EMG 
scores refers to the Z-standardized, baseline-corrected EMG activity for each muscle, averaged within the interval between 1500 and 4000 ms post-stimulus onset. Estimate: 
unstandardized coefficient; SE: standard error; CI: confidence interval; ß: standardized coefficient; t: test statistic coefficient; p: p-value; σ2: within-group variance; τ00 = between-





3. Study 2: Automatic imitation, gaze & autistic traits  
Conditional effects of gaze on automatic 
imitation: the role of autistic traits 
Irene Trilla, Hannah Wnendt and Isabel Dziobek 
Abstract. Establishing direct gaze has been shown to enhance the tendency to auto-
matically imitate the other person’s actions, an effect that seems to be reduced in 
autism. Most previous studies, however, used experimental tasks that may have con-
founded the measurement of automatic imitation with spatial compatibility effects. 
This calls into question whether gaze cues regulate automatic imitation or instead af-
fect domain-general processes of response inhibition. Using a task that disentangled 
imitative from spatial compatibility effects, the current study re-examined the role of 
autistic traits on the modulation of automatic imitation by direct and averted gaze 
cues. While our results do not provide evidence for an overall significant influence of 
gaze on neither automatic imitation nor spatial compatibility, autistic traits were pre-
dictive of reduced inhibition of imitative behaviour following averted gaze. 
Nonetheless, exploratory analyses suggested that the observed modulation by autistic 
traits may actually be better explained by the effects of concomitant social anxiety 
symptoms. In addition, the ethnicity of the imitated agent was identified as another 
potential modulator of the gaze effects on automatic imitation. Overall, our findings 
highlight the contextual nature of automatic imitation but call for a reconsideration 
of the role of gaze on imitative behaviour. 
 
This article has been published as:  
Trilla, I., Wnendt, H., & Dziobek, I. (2020). Conditional effects of gaze on automatic imitation: 
The role of autistic traits. Scientific Reports, 10(1), 15512. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-72513-6  
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3.1 Introduction 
Imitating the body postures, gestures and facial expressions of others is known to facilitate 
the understanding of their mental states (Drimalla et al., 2019) and to regulate social behav-
iour (Hess & Fischer, 2013; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). While 
imitation may be intentional under certain circumstances, people tend to unconsciously copy 
observed body movements, even when they are irrelevant and could interfere with the task 
at hand, a process referred to as automatic imitation (Heyes, 2011). Automatic imitation has 
been shown to be an adaptive and flexible behaviour that is highly dependent on the social 
context. According to the social top-down response modulation (STORM) theory, automatic 
imitation is subtly controlled by social goals to promote one’s social advantage (Wang & 
Hamilton, 2012). 
One of the initial studies on the social modulation of automatic imitation identified gaze as 
an important signal that regulates imitative behaviour (Wang, Newport, et al., 2011). To-
gether with facial expressions and body gestures, gaze cues are a rich source of non-verbal 
information to decode others' intentions and internal states during social interactions 
(Hamilton, 2016). Establishing direct gaze may signal social interest and intention to engage 
with the perceiver (Wirth et al., 2010), but it can also generate the feeling of being observed, 
an effect thought to promote prosocial behaviour (Hamilton & Lind, 2016). Moreover, gaze 
is important for social referencing, as it shifts the attentional focus toward the gaze direction 
and elicits joint attention (Frischen et al., 2007).  
In the context of automatic imitation, Wang et al. (2011) showed that people tend to copy 
observed irrelevant movements more if the imitated agent establishes direct gaze, compared 
to when the agent averts the gaze away from the participant. This finding has since been 
replicated in successive experiments (Wang & Hamilton, 2014), which further demonstrated 
that the enhancement of automatic imitation following direct gaze is related to audience 
effects and the signalling of affiliation intent, rather than due to gaze-triggered shifts in spa-
tial attention. Behavioural findings are supported by neuroscientific studies showing that 
direct gaze enhances neural mirroring of others’ motor actions compared to averted gaze 
(Prinsen et al., 2017; Prinsen & Alaerts, 2019), and which identified the medial prefrontal 
cortex as a key brain region mediating the control of automatic imitation by gaze (Wang, 
Ramsey, et al., 2011).  
While at first glance the evidence of gaze-triggered control of imitation seems strong, all 
aforementioned studies used an experimental paradigm that may have confounded the meas-
urement of automatic imitation with more general processes of response inhibition, namely 
spatial compatibility. Typically, automatic imitation is assessed with stimulus-response com-
patibility tasks in which participants are required to perform a hand or finger movement 
(e.g., ‘lift index finger’) while at the same time observing a compatible (e.g., ‘index finger 
Introduction 
 43 
lift’) or incompatible (e.g., ‘middle finger lift’) action by another agent (Heyes, 2011). A ten-
dency to automatically imitate the observed irrelevant movement is indicated if the 
participant’s performance is facilitated by observing a compatible action and/or interfered 
when observing an incompatible action. In many versions of this paradigm, however, the 
hand stimulus is displayed as a mirror view of the participant's hand, such that the observed 
movement is spatially aligned with the action required by the participant. In such conditions, 
the effects attributed to automatic imitation could also be explained in terms of the spatial 
compatibility between both movements (Catmur & Heyes, 2011): the participant’s response 
might be facilitated not (only) because they both perform topographically similar move-
ments (i.e. imitative compatibility), but because the stimulus and response actions involve a 
similar change in relative position (i.e. spatial compatibility). While many automatic imita-
tion studies may have confounded both effects, there is evidence that imitative and spatial 
compatibility are two dissociable and independent processes (Boyer et al., 2012; Catmur & 
Heyes, 2011).  
In an attempt to avoid spatial effects, the direction of the observed movement in the original 
automatic imitation paradigm with gaze cues was orthogonal to the response movement 
(Wang, Newport, et al., 2011). However, results from a recent meta-analysis indicate that 
orthogonal set-ups are not free from the influence of spatial compatibility effects (Cracco, 
Bardi, et al., 2018). Thus, this finding casts doubts on whether the gaze effects measured with 
this paradigm are actually affecting processes of automatic imitation or, instead, are influ-
encing spatial compatibility. 
With this confounder in mind, Marsh et al. (2016) examined the influence of gaze and group 
membership on automatic imitation using a paradigm that disentangled the effects of imita-
tive and spatial compatibility. As in typical automatic imitation tasks, participants were 
asked to perform finger movements when observing imitatively compatible or incompatible 
actions. However, in half of the trials, participants observed finger movements by the agent's 
left hand (i.e. mirror view), and the other half presented the agent’s right hand. While imi-
tative and spatial compatibility coincide in the left-hand trials, the inclusion of right-hand 
trials allows dissociating automatic imitation from spatial compatibility. Using this set-up, 
Marsh et al. (2016) failed to replicate the effect of gaze on automatic imitation. Instead, social 
cues selectively influenced spatial compatibility, such that stronger spatial effects were 
found for in-group members with direct gaze and out-group members with averted gaze. 
Their results thus challenge conclusions from previous research on the social modulation of 
automatic imitation that did not control for the independent contributions of imitative and 
spatial processes.  
In the face of these conflicting findings, the first aim of this preregistered study was to re-
examine the influence of gaze cues on automatic imitation. As in the study by Marsh et al. 
(2016), we used a paradigm that measured the effect of direct and averted gaze cues on 
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automatic imitation and spatial compatibility independently. Based on the previous litera-
ture, we expected that imitative compatibility effects would be stronger following direct gaze 
than averted gaze. Alternatively, gaze could selectively affect spatial compatibility, such as 
found in Marsh et al. (2016). In this case, we would expect that direct gaze increases spatial 
compatibility effects compared to averted gaze. 
Second, we tested whether autistic traits modulate how gaze cues influence automatic imi-
tation. A previous study found that individuals with autism spectrum conditions (ASC) tend 
to automatically imitate others’ actions, but the strength of their imitative responses is not 
regulated according to the gaze direction of the observed agent (Forbes et al., 2017). Im-
portantly, this reduced contextual modulation of imitation could not be completely 
attributed to insensitivity to gaze cues, as direct gaze elicited alerting responses in both ASC 
and control samples. This and other evidence of atypical imitative behaviour in response to 
social signals (Cook & Bird, 2012; Forbes et al., 2017) may seem in conflict with studies show-
ing intact automatic imitation in individuals with autistic traits (Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018; 
Darda et al., 2020). In an attempt to integrate these findings, motivational accounts such as 
the STORM theory have proposed that, although the basic mechanisms of imitation seem to 
be preserved, individuals with ASC may be impaired in adjusting their imitative behaviour 
to the social context (Wang & Hamilton, 2012). Accordingly, our second hypothesis pre-
dicted that the impact of gaze cues on automatic imitation would be weaker with increasing 
levels of autistic traits in a non-clinical sample.  
In addition to the prespecified research questions, we explored if the influence of gaze on 
automatic imitation is conditional to other contextual factors. This question was motivated 
by earlier research showing that gaze cues are processed differently depending on the eth-
nicity and group membership of the observed face (Collova et al., 2017; Marsh et al., 2016; 
Weisbuch et al., 2017). For example, in the study by Marsh et al. (2016), in-group members 
with direct gaze elicited stronger compatibility effects than out-group members with direct 
gaze. Given these context-dependent reactions to gaze, we examined whether the ethnicity 
of the observed agent would also shape the impact of gaze on automatic imitation.  
Lastly, we explored the role of social anxiety as a predictor of the impact of gaze on auto-
matic imitation. Social anxiety is highly prevalent in individuals with ASC, and is also 
characterized by impairments in social attention, such as fear and avoidance of direct eye 
contact (Hessels et al., 2018; Kleberg et al., 2017). Despite the similarities in some of the social 
impairments, atypical gaze patterns in social anxiety seem to be more consistent with anxi-
ety-driven avoidance, while alterations in gaze responding in ASC have been related to 
reduced social motivation (Kleberg et al., 2017; Kliemann et al., 2010). Examining whether 
and how social anxiety symptoms modulate the influence of gaze on automatic imitation 
could shed light on the mechanisms behind the observed effects in ASC.  
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To sum up, the current study aimed to (1) re-test the influence of direct and averted gaze on 
automatic imitation using a task that disentangled imitative and spatial compatibility, and 
(2) examine whether autistic traits modulate the influence of gaze on compatibility effects. 
Exploratory analyses further examined whether other social cues (i.e. ethnicity of the ob-
served agent) and individual differences in social functioning (i.e. social anxiety) shape the 
impact of gaze on imitative behaviour. 
3.2 Methods 
The preregistration form of this study is available at https://osf.io/84wqe. 
3.2.1 Participants 
Sixty participants (31 females, 28 males, 1 non-binary; Mage = 26.6, SDage = 4.80; 58 right-
handed, 2 ambidextrous) took part in this study. An a-priori power analysis using G*Power 
3 (Faul et al., 2007) estimated a sample of 35 to 63 participants (alpha = 0.05, power = 0.9, 
within-subject repeated-measures analysis of variance) for a ηp² reported between .35 (Gaze 
x Automatic imitation effect in Experiment 1; Wang, Newport, et al., 2011)) and .23 (Gaze x 
Automatic imitation effect in the control sample; Forbes et al., 2017). 
None of the participants reported current psychiatric or neurological disorders, current psy-
choactive medication, or history of regular substance use. Only participants with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and who made fewer than three errors in the Ishihara test for 
colour-blindness (Ishihara, 1972) were included.  
All participants gave written informed consent and were financially remunerated for their 
participation. The study was conducted in compliance with the Code of Ethics of the World 
Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki) and was approved by the Ethics Committee of 
the Psychology department at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. 
3.2.2 Materials  
3.2.2.1 Stimuli 
Clips of five male and five female actors performing direct and averted head movements 
were selected from the Amsterdam Dynamic Facial Expression Set (ADFES; van der Schalk 
et al., 2011). In the direct gaze clips, the actors start with the head oriented to their left side 
and turn towards the observer. In the averted gaze clips, the actors start facing the observer 
and turn the head towards their right. The original videos were cut to 2500 ms, and copies 
with vertically flipped frames were additionally created to obtain direct and averted gaze 
clips in which the head moves towards the left. The size of the clips was 768 x 576 pixels. 
Actors maintained a neutral expression in all clips. Two of the identities (1 male, 1 female) 
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were presented in the practice trials, and the remaining eight identities were used for the 
experimental trials. For each gender, half of the actors were of Northern-European descent 
(white), and half were Mediterranean (Turkish or Moroccan; dark-skinned).  
Gaze clips were combined with hand stimuli (Figure 3.1). Different female and male right 
hands were photographed to create the frames that would be sequentially presented in the 
automatic imitation task to simulate index and middle finger movements. In total, seven 
frames were obtained for each hand: the hand in resting position on a vertical panel, the 
hand with the index finger fully lifted, the hand with the middle finger fully lifted, and two 
intermediate positions for each of the two finger movements. Hand images were paired with 
the gaze stimuli based on the physical attributes of the actors and hands. All hand images 
were edited to match the size and skin tone to each actor and were flipped to obtain both 
right- and left-hand stimuli.  
3.2.2.2 Automatic imitation task 
A stimulus-response compatibility paradigm was used to measure the effects of gaze on im-
itative and spatial compatibility. Participants were required to lift the index or middle finger 
of their right hand in response to colour cues, while at the same time observing imitatively 
congruent (e.g., index finger lift when prompted to lift the index finger) or incongruent ac-
tions (e.g., middle finger lift when prompted to lift the index finger). The irrelevant finger 
movements were performed by actors who had previously directed the gaze towards the 
participant (direct gaze condition) or away from them (averted gaze condition). To dissociate 
imitative and spatial compatibility effects, half of the trials presented the actors' left hand, 
and the other half showed their right hand (Catmur & Heyes, 2011). With this set-up, imita-
tive and spatial compatibility overlapped in the left-hand trials (i.e. mirror view), but these 
effects were disentangled in the right-hand trials (Figure 3.1).  
Each trial of the task started with a fixation cross located at the height of the actors’ eye area 
for 1000 ms (Figure 3.2). Next, participants observed a 2500-ms clip of a direct or an averted 
head movement, with the actor’s hand in resting position. To avoid anticipatory responses, 
the final frame of the gaze clip with the resting hand remained static for a variable duration 
selected randomly between 200 and 800 ms. Three finger movement frames were then pre-
sented sequentially for 34 ms to induce the apparent motion of an index or middle finger lift. 
Eighty milliseconds after the movement onset, a purple or a green dot appeared superim-
posed between the actor’s index and middle finger knuckles to cue the participant’s required 
response. The stimulus-response correspondence (green dot = “lift index finger”, purple dot 
= “lift middle finger”, or vice versa) was counterbalanced across participants. An asynchro-
nous onset of the response cue with respect to the irrelevant finger movement has been 
shown to facilitate imitative compatibility effects (Catmur & Heyes, 2011). The last frame of 
the finger movement remained onscreen until a response was made, or after 2000 ms.  
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3.2.2.3 Autistic traits and social anxiety questionnaires  
The Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) was used to measure individual differences in autistic 
traits (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The short German version of the AQ (Freitag et al., 2007) 
consists of 33 items assessing different aspects related to ASC (e.g., social and communica-
tion skills, imagination and attention). The AQ has been shown to have good test-retest 
reliability and inter-rater reliability (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) as well as good discriminative 
validity (Woodbury-Smith et al., 2005).  
Social anxiety was assessed with the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & 
Clarke, 1998) and the Social Phobia Scale (SPS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998). These are widely 
used self-report scales that evaluate two categories of feared situations in social anxiety dis-
orders: those related to being observed by others (SPS), and those related to social interaction 
(SIAS). Finally, the German version of the Gaze Anxiety Rating Scale (GARS) was used to 
measure self-reported fear and avoidance of making eye contact in social situations (Domes 
et al., 2016).  
The internal consistency of all questionnaires in our sample was high, as indexed by 
Cronbach’s α > .82. Descriptive statistics for all questionnaire scores, Cronbach’s α and the 
correlations between autistic traits and social anxiety measures are available in the supple-
mentary Table S3.8.  
 
Figure 3.1. Experimental conditions of the automatic imitation task. Three factors were manip-
ulated following a full factorial within-subject design: Gaze (direct, averted), Imitative 
compatibility (compatible, incompatible) and Spatial compatibility (compatible, incompatible). 
Dashed frames indicate spatially compatible conditions; solid frames indicate spatially incom-
patible conditions. In this example, participants would be required to lift their right index finger 
in response to a green dot, and the right middle finger in response to a purple dot.  
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3.2.3 Procedure 
The testing session started with the automatic imitation task. MATLAB R2016b (The 
MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, United States) and the Psychophysics Toolbox 
extension (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007) were used to present the stimuli and collect 
the responses. Participants were instructed to pay attention to the head movement of the 
actors, and to perform the corresponding finger action at the appearance of the response 
cue. They were encouraged to respond as fast as possible without sacrificing accuracy. 
Throughout the task, participants held down two keyboard keys (“n” and “m”, marked with 
a green and a purple sticker) with the index and middle finger of their right hand. The key 
released upon making a finger lift indicated the participant’s response. Reaction times were 
recorded from the onset of the response cue until the key release. To ensure spatial (in)com-
patibility between the observed and performed movements, the position of the participant’s 
hand was matched to the orientation of the hand presented on the screen by placing the 
keyboard vertically at a 45º angle (Figure 3.2).  
After the instructions, participants completed 10 practice trials with accuracy feedback to 
train the mapping between the colour of the response cue and the finger responses. If par-
ticipants made more than two errors, additional trials were performed until a cumulative 
accuracy of 70% was reached. On average, participants completed 10.08 (SD = 0.33) practice 
trials. 
The experimental phase consisted of 256 trials (32 trials per condition) without feedback, 
divided into 4 blocks. Each block comprised 64 trials, balanced for the colour of the response 
cue (green, purple), imitative compatibility (compatible, incompatible), the observed finger 
movement (index finger lift, middle finger lift) and the identity of the actor. Across all blocks, 
trials were also balanced for the hand presented (right hand, left hand) and the direction of 
the head movement of the gaze clips (towards the right, towards the left). All trials within a 
block presented the same hand of the actors. The order of hand blocks (‘right-left-right-left’ 
or ‘left-right-left-right’) was counterbalanced across participants. Trials within blocks were 
randomly ordered. Participants could take a short break between blocks.  
After the automatic imitation task, participants were asked to rate on a 5-point scale (0 = not 
at all, 4 = a lot) whether they generally felt “observed”, “ignored”, “connected”, “confirmed”, 
“rejected”, “put under pressure”, “relieved” and “distracted” when watching the clips of the 
actors directing the gaze towards them, and the clips of the actors directing the gaze away 
from them. These ratings aimed to assess the meaning that participants attributed to direct 
and averted gaze signals. Lastly, participants provided basic demographic information (age, 
gender, occupation and level of education) and completed the questionnaires assessing au-




Figure 3.2. (a) Trial sequence of the automatic imitation task. This example represents a direct 
gaze, left-hand trial. (b) Keyboard set-up used to match the position of the participant’s hand 
to the orientation of the hand stimuli displayed.  
3.2.4 Statistical analysis 
All statistical analyses were conducted in R (R Core Team, 2020) and R studio (RStudio Team, 
2019). Data and code necessary to reproduce all analyses reported here are available at 
https://osf.io/9gku6/.  
3.2.4.1 Data exclusion 
Reaction times (RT) and error rates were assessed independently as measures of perfor-
mance. For RT analyses, trials were excluded if no response was made, if the response was 
incorrect, or if RTs were smaller than 200 ms or greater than 1000 ms. To minimize the effect 
of outliers, trials that deviated 1.5 times from the interquartile range of RTs within each 
condition and participant were further excluded. We chose the interquartile range instead 
of the standard deviation to measure dispersion for outlier detection as it is more robust 
against extreme values and non-normality. On average, 8.55% (SD = 7.41) of the trials were 
excluded per participant. For error rate analyses, only trials in which no response was made 
within the 2000 ms-response window were excluded. This led to a rejection of 0.05% (SD = 
0.18) of trials per participant. 
3.2.4.2 Confirmatory analyses 
Generalized linear mixed-effects models (GLMM) on single-trial data were used to test our 
hypotheses. Our original plan was to conduct analyses of variance on aggregate data (i.e. on 
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the mean RT and error rates for each condition and participant) to follow the statistical 
methods used in previous studies (see preregistration at https://osf.io/84wqe). However, 
GLMM provides additional advantages as they allow to: (1) account for random effects for 
both participants and stimuli, so more of the error can be modelled, (2) fit the data of indi-
vidual trials instead of the means for each participant, which gives more statistical power, 
(3) accommodate missing data, so we could include data of all participants irrespective of the 
number excluded trials, and (4) test the effect of continuous variables, such as AQ scores 
(Kliegl et al., 2011). Moreover, GLMMs allowed us to specify the distribution of the depend-
ent variable to match the distributional properties of raw RT and error rate data (Lo & 
Andrews, 2015). This facilitates interpretability and comparison of results to previous studies 
that analysed untransformed RT. Unless otherwise specified below, results from the GLMMs 
reported here led to the same conclusions as the preregistered analyses, which can be found 
in the supplementary material. 
The GLMMs on RT and error rates data included the following fixed effects: main effects of 
‘Imitative compatibility’ (2 levels: compatible, incompatible), ‘Spatial compatibility’ (2 levels: 
compatible, incompatible), ‘Gaze’ (2 levels: direct, averted) and ‘AQ’ (continuous variable); 
the 2-way interactions ‘Gaze*Imitative’, ‘Gaze*Spatial’, ‘AQ*Imitative’, ‘AQ*Spatial’, and 
‘AQ*Gaze’; and the 3-way interactions ‘AQ*Gaze*Imitative’ and ‘AQ*Gaze*Spatial’.  
To simplify the pattern of results, we restricted the description of results to: (1) the main 
effects of imitative and spatial compatibility, which would indicate the occurrence of com-
patibility effects, and the main effect of gaze, which would suggest that gaze cues were 
processed; (2) the two-way interaction ‘Gaze*Imitative’ and ‘Gaze*Spatial, which would 
show that the degree of the corresponding compatibility effect depends on the gaze direction 
of the observed agent; and (3) the 3-way interactions ‘AQ*Gaze*Imitative’ and 
‘AQ*Gaze*Spatial’, which would suggest that autistic traits modulate the influence of gaze 
on imitative (or spatial) compatibility.  
Fixed effects with categorical predictors were tested using effect coding contrasts, and con-
tinuous predictors (i.e. AQ) were mean-centred. To account for non-independencies in the 
data, all GLMMs included by-participant and by-stimulus random intercepts. The levels of 
the factor ‘Stimulus’ corresponded to each of the possible combinations of the actor pre-
sented in the gaze clips, the direction of their head movement (turn towards the right side, 
turn towards the left side), the finger that the actor lifted (index finger, middle finger) and 
the colour of the response cue (green, purple).  
GLMMs that included RT as the dependent variable used an Inverse Gaussian distribution 
with Identity link function. The Inverse Gaussian is a right-skewed unimodal distribution 
with continuous responses greater than or equal to 0 that reproduces the distributional shape 
of raw RT (Lo & Andrews, 2015). This was chosen over other possible distributions (i.e. 
Gaussian and Gamma) on the basis of model comparisons using AIC and BIC values and 
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likelihood-ratio tests. The Identity link function was selected as we assumed that our ma-
nipulations linearly affected the RT rather than some function of RT (Lo & Andrews, 2015). 
This assumption underlies experiments based on mental chronometry and is inherent when 
using linear regression or linear mixed models. A mixed-effect logistic regression with bino-
mial distribution was conducted for error rate data to adhere to the binary nature of this 
variable (correct response, incorrect response).  
For all models, p-values were calculated using Wald-statistics approximation. The statistical 
threshold was set at p < .05, and tests were two-tailed. 
3.2.4.3 Exploratory analyses 
Exploratory analyses were conducted on RT data, as this was a more sensitive measure than 
error rates. The statistical procedure applied for each exploratory analysis is described in the 
corresponding Results subsection to ease comprehensibility. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Confirmatory analyses 
The mean and standard deviation of RT and error rates for each condition, as well as the 
complete GLMM statistics, are presented in the supplementary Table S3.2 and Table S3.3. 
3.3.1.1 Reaction times 
The GLMM on RT data confirmed the occurrence of both imitative compatibility, b = 10.23, 
95% CI = [7.57, 12.90], SE = 1.36, t = 7.53, p < .001, and spatial compatibility effects, b = 22.31, 
95% CI = [19.63, 24.99], SE = 1.37, t = 16.34, p < .001 (Figure 3.3). That is, participants were 
faster to perform correct finger movements when they observed an imitatively compatible 
(M = 489.44, SE = 1.40) than an imitatively incompatible action (M = 501.46, SE = 1.54). Simi-
larly, participants responded faster to a spatially compatible action (M = 485.56, SE = 1.52) 
compared to a spatially incompatible action (M = 505.53, SE = 1.40). The main effect of gaze 
was also statistically significant, b = -4.62, 95% CI = [-7.29, -1.96], SE = 1.36, t = -3.41, p = .001, 
indicating that participants responded faster following direct gaze (M = 492.95, SE = 1.48) 
than after averted gaze (M = 497.83, SE = 1.47). 
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Figure 3.3. Raincloud plots of reaction times (upper panels) and error rates (lower panels) of 
imitatively compatible and incompatible trials (left panels), and of spatially compatible and in-
compatible trials (right panels), for both direct gaze (dark blue) and averted gaze (light blue) 
conditions. Each point represents the average reaction time or error rate of an individual par-
ticipant for the corresponding condition. *** p < .001. 
Gaze did not significantly interact with neither imitative compatibility, b = 2.51, 95% CI = [-
2.75, 7.78], SE = 2.69, t = 0.93, p = .35, nor spatial compatibility, b = -5.10, 95% CI = [-10.44, 
0.23], SE = 2.72, t = -1.87, p = .06. The 3-way interaction between spatial compatibility, gaze 
and AQ was also not significant, b = 0.16, 95% CI = [-0.83, 1.14], SE = 0.50, t = 0.31, p = .75. 
However, AQ significantly modulated the effect of gaze on imitative compatibility, b = -1.29, 
95% CI = [-2.28, -0.31], SE = 0.50, t = 2.59, p = .01. To further disentangle this 3-way interac-
tion, we tested the conditional effects of AQ on imitative compatibility for direct gaze and 
averted gaze conditions separately. As seen in Figure 3.4, the imitative effect following 
averted gaze, i.e. the difference in RT between imitatively incompatible (slope = 0.85) and 
compatible trials (slope = -0.23), was significantly stronger with increasing AQ scores, b = 
1.08, 95% CI = [0.37, 1.79], SE = 0.36, t = 2.97, p = .003. In other words, individuals with fewer 
autistic traits seemed to show a lower tendency to imitate the actors with averted gaze than 
individuals with higher autistic traits. The influence of AQ on imitative compatibility fol-
lowing direct gaze (slope Incomp= 0.12; slope Comp = 0.39) was not significant, b = -0.27, 95% CI 
= [-0.97, 0.42], SE = 0.35, t = -0.78, p = .44. 
In the preregistered analysis, the AQ modulation of the gaze effects on imitative compatibil-
ity did not reach statistical significance (see supplementary Table S3.1). Note, however, that 
the originally planned approach is not directly comparable to the one reported here. For the 
preregistered analysis, we first computed imitative compatibility scores for each participant 
by subtracting the mean RT of imitatively compatible trials from the mean RT of imitatively 
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incompatible trials. Imitative compatibility scores were then used as the dependent variable 
in a linear mixed model testing the interaction between AQ and gaze. The preregistered 
analysis thus examined whether the difference in the level of imitation following direct gaze 
compared to averted gaze varied across AQ scores, a 2-way interaction that was not statisti-
cally significant, b = -0.97, 95% CI = [-2.36, 0.41], SE = 0.71, t = -1.38, p = .17. In contrast, the 
model described here tested whether the influence of autistic traits on imitatively compatible 
and incompatible trials differed for direct gaze and averted gaze conditions.  
 
Figure 3.4. Predicted effects of autistic traits (as measured by the Autism Spectrum Quotient; 
AQ) on reaction times for imitatively compatible (light green line) and imitatively incompatible 
trials (dark green line), for direct gaze (left panel) and averted gaze (right panel) conditions. For 
illustration purposes, raw AQ scores are shown in the x-axis, but note that AQ scores were 
mean-centred before conducting the GLMM. Shaded areas indicate 95% CI. 
3.3.1.2 Error rates 
The GLMM on error rates yielded significant main effects of imitative compatibility, OR = 
1.58, 95% CI = [1.35, 1.85], SE = 0.08, t = 5.59, p < .001, and spatial compatibility, OR = 1.70, 
95% CI = [1.45, 2.00], SE = 0.08, t = 6.46, p < .001. Compatibility effects indicate that error 
rates were higher in imitatively incompatible (M = 0.05, SE = 0.004) and spatially incompat-
ible trials (M = 0.05, SE = 0.004) than in imitatively compatible (M = 0.04, SE = 0.003) and 
spatially compatible trials (M = 0.03, SE = 0.003), respectively (Figure 3.3). None of the re-
maining main effects or interactions were statistically significant (all p > .07).  
3.3.2 Exploratory analyses 
3.3.2.1 General compatibility 
To make our results comparable to previous automatic imitation studies in which imitative 
and spatial compatibility were confounded, we ran an additional GLMM on RT data from 
the subset of trials in which spatial and imitative compatibility overlap (i.e. left-hand trials) 
(Marsh et al., 2016). This model yielded a main effect of general compatibility, b = 33.11, 95% 
CI = [29.45, 36.77], SE = 1.87, t = 17.73, p < .001, with faster correct responses in compatible 
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(M = 481.00, SE = 1.98) than in incompatible trials (M = 513.15, SE = 117.40). The main effect 
of gaze was also significant, b = -4.95, 95% CI = [-8.58, -1.33], SE = 1.85, t = -2.68, p = .007, 
showing that responses following direct gaze (M = 494.21, SE = 2.00) were faster than fol-
lowing averted gaze (M = 499.10, SE = 2.06). Neither the interaction between gaze and general 
compatibility, b = -2.65, 95% CI = [-9.87, 4.58], SE = 3.69, t = -0.72, p = .47, nor the predicted 
three-way interaction with AQ, b = -1.34, 95% CI = [-2.68 – 0.01], SE = 0.69, t = -1.95, p = .05, 
reached the significance threshold. See supplementary Table S3.4 for the full model statistics. 
3.3.2.2 Interaction between gaze and the ethnicity of the imitated agent 
To explore whether participants reacted differently to the gaze cues of Northern-European 
actors compared to Mediterranean actors, we ran a GLMM with RT data that included the 
same predictors as in the confirmatory analysis, except that the variable ‘AQ’ was replaced 
by the 2-level categorical factor ‘Ethnicity’. The model specification and full statistics are 
available in the supplementary Table S3.5. 
As in all previous models, the main effects of imitative compatibility, spatial compatibility 
and gaze were significant (all p < .002). In addition, we found a significant 3-way interaction 
between the actors’ ethnicity, gaze and imitative compatibility, b = 13.72, 95% CI = [4.20, 
23.25], SE = 4.86, t = 2.82, p = .005 (Figure 3.5). Follow-up analyses revealed a significant 
effect of gaze on imitative compatibility for Northern-European actors, b = 9.41, 95% CI = 
[2.29, 16.54], SE = 3.64, t = 2.59, p = .01, but not for Mediterranean actors, b = -4.60, 95% CI = 
[-11.64, 2.44], SE = 3.59, t = -1.28, p = .20. Specifically, Northern-European identities elicited 
imitative effects only when they established direct gaze, MIncomp-Compt.= 13.45, SE = 2.60, z = 
5.18, p < .001, but not with averted gaze, MIncomp-Compt.= 4.14, SE = 2.60, z = 1.60, p = .11. In 
contrast, Mediterranean-looking actors triggered imitative compatibility effects in both di-
rect gaze, MIncomp-Compt.= 9.59, SE = 2.60, z = 3.70, p < .001, and averted gaze conditions, 
MIncomp-Compt.= 14.00, SE = 2.64, z = 5.23, p < .001.  
 
Figure 3.5. Mean reaction times of imitatively compatible (light green bars) and incompatible 
trials (dark green bars) as a function of gaze cues and ethnicity of the observed actors. Error 
bars represent within-subject 95% CI. *** p < .001, ** p < .01. 
Results 
 55 
3.3.2.3 Social anxiety 
To explore whether symptoms of social anxiety modulated the influence of gaze on auto-
matic imitation, we ran three GLMMs on RT data that included the same predictors as in the 
confirmatory analyses, except that the variable ‘AQ’ was replaced by the scores of each of 
the social anxiety questionnaires (SIAS, SPS and GARS), respectively. The supplementary 
Table S3.6 includes the specifications and results of these models. 
In addition to the significant main effects of imitative compatibility, spatial compatibility 
and gaze (all p < .002), the model with SIAS as predictor revealed a significant 3-way inter-
action between SIAS, gaze and imitative compatibility, b = -0.68, 95% CI = [-1.09, -0.26], SE = 
0.21, t = -3.19, p = .001. Follow-up analyses showed that, as in the case of AQ, the imitative 
effect in the averted gaze condition was significantly stronger with increasing SIAS scores, 
b = 0.37, 95% CI = [0.07, 0.67], SE = 0.15, t = 2.40, p = .02. Conversely, imitative effects follow-
ing direct gaze were weaker as a function of SIAS scores, b = -0.32, 95% CI = [-0.62, -0.02], SE 
= 0.15, t = -2.12, p = .03. The 3-way interaction between SIAS, gaze and spatial compatibility 
was not significant, b = 0.22, 95% CI = [-0.20, 0.64], SE = 0.21, t = 1.04, p = .30. 
A similar pattern of results was found in the GLMMs with the other two measures of social 
anxiety: both the 3-way interaction between imitative compatibility, gaze and SPS, b = -0.72, 
95% CI = [-1.32, -0.13], SE = 0.30, t = -2.38, p = .02, and between imitative compatibility, gaze 
and GARS, b = -0.36, 95% CI = [-0.70 – -0.01], SE = 0.17, t = -2.05, p = .04, were significant. No 
significant interactions were found with spatial compatibility (all p > 0.35).  
Given that autistic traits and social anxiety seem to modulate the gaze effects on automatic 
imitation in a similar fashion, and that AQ scores correlated positively with social anxiety 
measures, all rs(60) > .29, p < .05 (Table S3.8), we conducted an additional GLMM to explore 
whether the observed modulation by AQ could be (partly) attributed to the influence of 
comorbid social anxiety symptoms. This model included both the 3-way interaction 
‘AQ*Gaze*Imitative’ and ‘SIAS*Gaze*Imitative’, as well as the corresponding 2-way interac-
tions and main effects for all factors (see supplementary Table S3.7). To avoid overfitting, 
this model tested the effects on imitative compatibility but not on spatial compatibility. Re-
sults showed that, when accounting for the influence of SIAS, the estimated predictive value 
of the interaction between AQ, gaze and imitative compatibility was lower and no longer 
statistically significant, b = -0.56, 95% CI = [-1.82, 0.71], SE = 0.65, t = -0.86, p = .39. The 3-
way interaction with SIAS remained significant, b = -0.54, 95% CI = [1.08, -0.004], SE = 0.27, 
t = -1.97, p = .048.  
3.3.2.4 Attributed meaning of gaze 
Paired-samples t-tests were conducted to compare how participants felt in response to direct 
vs averted gaze clips for each rated attribute. P-values were adjusted using the Holm-Bon-
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ferroni correction. Participants reported feeling significantly more observed, connected 
with, accepted, distracted, and pressured by the observed faces following direct gaze com-
pared to averted gaze (all p < .001, Cohen’s d > 0.50). Conversely, averted gaze clips induced 
more feelings of being ignored and rejected than direct gaze clips (all p < .001, Cohen’s d > 
0.45). No significant differences were found between gaze conditions with respect to feeling 
relieved (p = 0.31, Cohen’s d = 0.13). Summary statistics and complete t-tests results are 
available in the supplementary Table S3.9. 
3.4 Discussion 
The current preregistered study aimed to resolve inconsistent findings on the influence of 
gaze cues on automatic imitation. Using a task that disentangled imitative and spatial com-
patibility, we did not find significant evidence for an overall influence of direct and averted 
gaze on neither automatic imitation nor spatial processes. However, autistic traits predicted 
the degree to which participants adapted their imitative behaviour to the gaze cues, such 
that higher autistic traits were associated with a lower inhibition of imitative responses fol-
lowing averted gaze. In addition, exploratory analyses identified that the ethnicity of the 
imitated agent, as well as symptoms of social anxiety, may be other modulators of the gaze 
effects on automatic imitation.  
3.4.1 Why did we not replicate the effects of gaze on automatic imitation? 
Several factors could explain our failure to replicate the previously reported effect of gaze 
on automatic imitation. First, participants may have ignored the gaze clips in our study. 
However, this explanation is unlikely as gaze direction had an overall influence on reaction 
times, such that participants responded faster following direct gaze than averted gaze. This 
main effect of gaze has been observed in previous studies (Forbes et al., 2017; Wang, Newort, 
et al., 2011; Wang & Hamilton, 2014), and is thought to reflect the attention reorienting prop-
erties of gaze cues. As shown by eye-tracking data collected in a previous automatic 
imitation study with gaze clips, direct gaze triggers participants to look at the face region 
more than averted gaze (Prinsen et al., 2017). In addition, participants in our study reported 
feeling more observed, connected and accepted when the actors established direct gaze com-
pared to averted gaze, which induced more feelings of rejection and of being ignored. 
Although these subjective effects were recalled only after the task was finished, they are a 
further indication that gaze information was processed in accordance with the social evalu-
ations of gaze cues (Wirth et al., 2010).  
Second, it could be that gaze alone is not a powerful enough signal to regulate imitative 
behaviour. In our task, the actors that participants observed maintained a neutral expression 
throughout the gaze clips. In contrast, the agent presented in previous studies established 
eye contact with a small smile (Forbes et al., 2017; Prinsen et al., 2017; Wang, Newport, et al., 
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2011; Wang & Hamilton, 2014). The combined product of eye contact with a smile, rather 
than the direct gaze itself, is what may have been interpreted as a signal of social engagement 
and promoted automatic imitation. In fact, according to the authors, imitative effects during 
pilot testing in their lab were not elicited if the model established direct gaze without a smile 
(Wang & Hamilton, 2014). Similarly, even though Marsh et al. (2016) did not find effects on 
automatic imitation, the influence of gaze on spatial compatibility was conditional upon the 
group membership of the observed agent. This further suggests that direct and averted gaze 
may not uniformly influence compatibility effects, but rather the (social) meaning and im-
pact of gaze critically depends on other contextual factors (Hamilton, 2016).  
To explore this idea, we examined whether participants in our study reacted differently to 
the gaze cues depending on the ethnicity of the observed actors. Results showed that the 
degree of automatic imitation was significantly influenced by the gaze cues of Northern-
European actors but not of Mediterranean actors. Specifically, Northern-European identities 
were only imitated following direct gaze, but not after averted gaze, while Mediterranean 
actors were automatically imitated regardless of their gaze direction. Although we did not 
register the ethnicity of our participants, study samples tested in our lab are typically com-
posed of a majority of European descent. Under this assumption, our observations are 
congruent with gaze cuing studies showing a higher sensitivity to gaze cues of own-race 
(Collova et al., 2017; Dalmaso et al., 2015; Weisbuch et al., 2017) and high-status faces 
(Dalmaso et al., 2012; Liuzza et al., 2013). Due to the exploratory nature of this finding, the 
combined role of gaze and ethnicity on automatic imitation should be taken carefully until 
further replication. Nevertheless, our results provide tentative evidence that, as speculated 
above, the influence of gaze on automatic imitation is dependent on other contextual factors.  
Our experimental design also deviated from other studies in that eight different identities 
performed the observed head movements and motor actions. In contrast, most previous par-
adigms presented the same female actress in all trials (Wang, Newport, et al., 2011; Wang & 
Hamilton, 2014). Just by the mere-exposure effect, i.e. the increasing preference for a stimu-
lus with repeated exposure (Montoya et al., 2017), participants in earlier studies may have 
developed increased liking and sympathy for the actress over trials. As familiarity (Deaner 
et al., 2007) and holding a positive attitude towards the other (Liuzza et al., 2013) seems to 
enhance sensitivity to gaze cues, increased interest for the observed agent could have made 
their gazing behaviour more relevant to the participant. This, in turn, may have increased 
the likelihood to observe gaze effects in previous studies.  
Lastly, it could be that our stimuli lacked ecological validity. In a recent TMS study, obser-
vation of hand movements following direct gaze elicited stronger cortical motor resonance 
than after averted gaze in a live two-person context, but not when the gaze cues and hand 
actions were presented via videotaped recordings (Prinsen & Alaerts, 2019). Though video 
stimuli used in the current and prior studies allow for better experimental control, they lack 
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the richness and social meaning inherent in real human interactions, which may hinder the 
motivation to pay attention to and engage with the stimuli. As such, future studies could 
further investigate the role of gaze on imitation in more naturalistic settings. 
3.4.2 Do autistic traits (and social anxiety) modulate the effects of gaze on 
automatic imitation? 
Previous studies have shown that individuals with ASC tend to automatically imitate others’ 
actions (Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018; Sowden et al., 2016), but their imitative behaviour is not 
typically regulated according to the social context (Cook & Bird, 2012; Forbes et al., 2017). In 
line with this observation, we found that autistic traits in a non-clinical sample predicted the 
extent to which participants adapted their imitative responses to the gaze cues. However, 
the modulation by autistic traits reached statistical significance only in the GLMM analysis, 
not in the preregistered tests. Although this discrepancy could be because mixed-effects 
models on single-trial data are more powerful than the preregistered analysis plan, results 
from post-hoc tests further challenge the value of autistic traits in predicting the impact of 
gaze on automatic imitation.  
In particular, exploratory analyses indicated that social anxiety might modulate the effects 
of gaze on automatic imitation in a similar direction to autistic traits. That is, higher scores 
in both the AQ (autistic traits) and SIAS (social anxiety) were associated with reduced inhi-
bition of imitative behaviour following averted gaze, and weaker imitative responses 
following direct gaze, although the latter effect was significant only for SIAS. Given that 
previous literature typically framed the gaze effects as an enhancement of imitation follow-
ing direct gaze (Hamilton, 2016; Wang, Newport, et al., 2011; Wang & Hamilton, 2014), the 
influence of AQ and SIAS on imitative reactions to averted gaze could seem surprising. How-
ever, if we consider this type of imitation an automatic process (Heyes, 2011), it is plausible 
that factors influencing the social modulation of imitation would mostly operate by influ-
encing the ability to inhibit (automatic) imitative responses in situations in which such 
behaviour would be socially disadvantageous, rather than (or in addition to) enhancing im-
itation when this would lead to positive social outcomes.  
Given the positive correlations between AQ scores and social anxiety measures, the question 
arose of whether the observed modulation by autistic traits could be related to the concom-
itant influence of social anxiety. In line with this hypothesis, the predictive value of autistic 
traits decreased and was no longer statistically significant when the effect of SIAS was ac-
counted for. Because social anxiety symptoms are common in ASC (Spain et al., 2018), future 
investigations should assess whether the reduced social modulation of imitation previously 
observed in individuals with ASC (Cook & Bird, 2012; Forbes et al., 2017) could be better 
explained by comorbid social anxiety. Nevertheless, the stronger weight of SIAS may also be 
an indication that aspects related to fear of social interactions and atypical social attention, 
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which are symptoms measured by SIAS and shared with ASC (Hessels et al., 2018; Kliemann 
et al., 2010; Spain et al., 2018), may be more relevant to the gaze modulation of imitation than 
other ASC-related constructs assessed by the AQ, such as impairments in communication 
skills or imagination (Freitag et al., 2007). Future work in larger (sub)clinical samples is 
needed to disambiguate the patterns of relations between autistic traits and social anxiety 
underlying the influence of gaze on automatic imitation.  
3.4.3 Do social factors modulate automatic imitation independent of spatial 
compatibility?  
Methodological limitations of earlier studies called into question whether social cues thought 
to regulate automatic imitation could be actually affecting more domain-general mecha-
nisms of response inhibition, such as spatial compatibility (Marsh et al., 2016). In line with 
this idea, a recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies found consistent evidence for the 
involvement of domain-general brain networks (e.g., dorsolateral frontoparietal cortex) in 
the control of imitative responses, and only limited support for the engagement of domain-
specific systems related to social cognition, such as the theory of mind network (Darda & 
Ramsey, 2019). 
In our study, none of the factors tested (i.e. gaze, ethnicity, autistic traits, social anxiety) 
showed any significant effects on spatial compatibility. Thus, our data do not support the 
previous observation that social cues selectively affect spatial compatibility (Marsh et al., 
2016). Instead, results from this study are more consistent with the idea that gaze cues, at 
least in interaction with other factors, modulate automatic imitative responses, even when 
spatial effects are controlled for. In agreement with the domain-specific hypothesis, neu-
rostimulation studies have implicated the right temporoparietal junction in the control of 
imitative responses independently of spatial compatibility effects (Sowden & Catmur, 2015), 
and the medial prefrontal cortex has been identified as a central region in the social modu-
lation of automatic imitation (Wang, Ramsey, et al., 2011; Wang & Hamilton, 2015). 
Nevertheless, non-significant results do not prove the absence of an effect. It is possible that 
social cues also modulate spatial compatibility, but that we were unable to detect it. Because 
spatial effects are typically stronger in magnitude than imitative effects (here, spatial effects 
for RT data, b = 22.31, were twice as strong as imitative effects, b = 10.23; Catmur & Heyes, 
2011; Marsh et al., 2016), subtle changes by social cues may be more difficult to uncover. The 
only tentative indication of social modulation of spatial compatibility was a close-to-signif-
icant interaction with gaze in the GLMM on RT data, with stronger spatial effects in response 
to averted gaze compared to direct gaze. However, this effect was in the opposite direction 
as hypothesized and is not in congruence with the interaction between gaze and group mem-
bership reported in Marsh et al. (2016). Altogether, the inconsistent findings with respect to 
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whether and how social cues impact spatial compatibility call for cautions conclusions re-
garding the contextual nature of domain-general compatibility effects. 
3.4.4 Limitations 
Even though our sample size was determined based on the magnitude of the gaze effects 
reported in previous automatic imitation studies (Forbes et al., 2017; Wang, Newport, et al., 
2011), and it included at least twice as many participants, we had limited power to investigate 
effects of small-to-medium size, which are more likely for interactions with personality traits 
and contextual factors. Underpowered studies do not only limit the chance of finding an 
effect but also reduce the likelihood that a statistically significant result reflects a true effect 
(Button et al., 2013). Therefore, and given the exploratory nature of some of the analyses 
reported here, further studies with bigger sample sizes are needed to validate the observed 
social modulation of imitation, as well as the role of autistic traits and social anxiety. 
Moreover, this and previous studies on the effects of gaze on imitative behaviour have used 
tasks that measure imitation of very simple, meaningless finger or hand actions (Forbes et 
al., 2017; Marsh et al., 2016; Wang, Newport, et al., 2011; Wang & Hamilton, 2014). Though 
these tasks are widely used in automatic imitation research, they may not fully capture the 
nature of the actions and gestures that would be spontaneously imitated in real social inter-
actions. Future research could aim to replicate the observed contextual effects of gaze with 
automatic imitation paradigms that build on more socially meaningful gestures, such as in 
(Bortoletto et al., 2013; Cracco, Genschow, et al., 2018). Prospective studies would also benefit 
from including a baseline condition in which no gaze cue precedes the observed irrelevant 
finger/hand action. A comparison between each gaze condition with the baseline may shed 
light on whether the gaze effects are due to a stronger tendency to imitate the other’s actions 
following direct gaze and/or reduced imitative responses after averted gaze. 
3.4.5 Conclusion 
Our study highlights the importance of (preregistered) replications in psychological re-
search. Even though several studies supported the influence of gaze on automatic imitation 
(Forbes et al., 2017; Prinsen et al., 2017; Wang, Newport, et al., 2011; Wang, Ramsey, et al., 
2011; Wang & Hamilton, 2014), most of the successful replication attempts were conducted 
using the same paradigm as in the original study. Albeit direct replications are crucial to 
controlling for sampling error, partial and conceptual replications (i.e. experiments that test 
the same phenomenon with different methodology) are also needed to confirm the internal 
validity and generalizability of the findings, especially when a research topic appears to be 
highly sensitive to contextual factors (Schmidt, 2009).  
Results from this study indicate that the influence of gaze on automatic imitation may not 
be as consistent and uniform as reported in the literature. By using different stimuli and task 
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manipulations, Marsh et al. (2016) and the current study have helped identify potential mod-
ulators of the gaze effects on automatic imitation masked before. For example, preliminary 
findings from our study suggest that characteristic of the imitated agent (e.g., ethnicity), as 
well as individual differences in social functioning (e.g., autistic traits, social anxiety), should 
be considered when assessing the role of gaze cues on the regulation of imitative behaviour. 
Moreover, our results strengthen the idea that imitative and spatial compatibility effects are 
dissociable processes, although more work is needed to determine how social factors affect 
them. Future research should systematically test the relationship between the different con-
textual modulators to better characterize the key elements involved in the social regulation 
of automatic imitation. 
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3.5 Supplementary material 
3.5.1 Preregistered statistical analyses 
Analysis sample 
Following the preregistered exclusion criteria, data from 2 participants were removed from 
these analyses due to the rejection of more than 40% of the trials in one or more conditions. 
This led to an analysis sample size of 58 participants (30 females, 27 males, 1 non-binary).  
Hypothesis 1: Effects of gaze on imitative and spatial compatibility 
To test the effects of gaze on imitative and spatial compatibility, we computed the mean 
reaction times (RT) and mean error rates (ER) for each of the 8 conditions for each partici-
pant. Each dependent variable (RT, ER) was analysed with a three-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA with ‘Gaze’ (2 levels: direct, averted), ‘Spatial compatibility’ (2 levels: compatible, 
incompatible) and ‘Imitative compatibility’ (2 levels: compatible, incompatible) as within-
subject factors. 
The ANOVA on RT yielded a significant main effect of both imitative compatibility, F(1, 57) 
= 22.04, MSE = 727.05, p < .001, ηp2 = .28, and spatial compatibility, F(1, 57) = 49.36, MSE = 
841.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .46. Specifically, participants were faster to perform the correct finger 
movements when they observed an imitatively compatible action (M = 494.96, SD = 34.46) 
compared to an imitatively incompatible action (M = 506.44, SD = 34.92). Similarly, RT were 
lower for spatially compatible trials (M = 491.10, SD = 32.65) compared to incompatible trials 
(M = 510.03, SD = 33.47). The main effect of gaze was also statistically significant, F(1, 57) = 
8.55, MSE = 307.89, p = .005, ηp2 = .13, showing that participants responded faster after direct 
gaze (M = 498.18, SD = 34.91) than averted gaze (M = 502.94, SD = 36.11). Neither of the 
predicted interactions gaze*imitative compatibility, F(1, 57) = 2.07, MSE = 425.33, p = .16, ηp2 
= .04, nor gaze*spatial compatibility, F(1, 57) = 1.57, MSE = 320.49, p = .21, ηp2 = .03, were 
statistically significant.  
The repeated-measures ANOVA on ER yielded a significant main effect of imitative compat-
ibility, F(1, 57) = 13.66, MSE = 0.002, p < .001, ηp2 = .19, such that participants made fewer 
errors in imitatively compatible trials (M = 0.03, SD = 0.05) than in incompatible trials (M = 
0.05, SD = 0.05 ). The main effect of spatial compatibility was also significant, F(1, 57) = 14.28, 
MSE = 0.001, p < .001, ηp2 = .20, with spatially compatible trials (M = 0.03, SD = 0.05) leading 
to fewer errors than spatially incompatible trials (M = 0.04, SD = 0.05). None of the remaining 




Hypothesis 2: AQ modulation of the effects of gaze on imitative and spatial compatibility 
To test hypothesis 2, we first computed imitative and spatial compatibility scores for each 
participant and gaze condition, for both RT and ER. Compatibility scores were calculated by 
subtracting the mean RT [ER] of imitatively [spatially] compatible trials from the mean RT 
[ER] of imitative [spatially] compatible trials. Positive values indicate the occurrence of a 
compatibility effect (i.e. slower RT [higher ER] in incompatible trials than compatible trials).  
The computed compatibility scores were fitted to linear mixed-effect models (LMM) to test 
the influence of autistic traits on the effect of gaze on imitative and spatial compatibility. 
The general model was as follows: DV ~ Gaze + AQ + Gaze*AQ + (1|Participant), where 
‘Gaze’ (categorical predictor with 2 levels: direct, averted), ‘AQ’ (continuous predictor; 
mean-centred) and the interaction between the two (‘Gaze*AQ’) were the fixed effects, and 
‘1|Participant’ added random intercepts for participants. Imitative and spatial compatibility 
scores computed for RT and ER were used as dependent variables. Neither the main effects 
nor the predicted interaction ‘Gaze*AQ’ reached statistical significance in any of the four 
models tested (all p > .15; Table S3.1). 
  
 
Table S3.1. Results of the linear mixed models conducted according to the preregistered analyses. 
 Imitative compatibility scores Spatial compatibility scores 
 Model 1: Reaction times Model 2: Error rates Model 3: Reaction times Model 4: Error rates 
 b 
(95% CI) 
SE t p Odd Ratios 
(95% CI) 
SE t p b 
(95% CI) 
SE t p Odd Ratios 
(95% CI) 
SE t p 
Gaze 5.51 
(-1.94 – 12.96) 
3.80 1.45 0.15 0.001 
(-0.010 – 0.012) 
0.006 0.24 0.81 -4.17 
(-10.70 – 2.35) 
3.33 -1.25 0.21 0.006 
(-0.007 – 0.019) 
0.006 0.95 0.34 
AQ 0.47 
(-0.44 – 1.39) 
0.47 1.02 0.31 0.001 
(-0.001 – 0.002) 
0.001 0.92 0.36 -0.24 
(-1.23 – 0.74) 
0.50 -0.49 0.63 -0.0004 
(-0.002 – 0.001) 
0.001 -0.64 0.52 
Gaze*AQ -0.97 
(-2.36 – 0.41) 
0.71 -1.38 0.17 0.0002 
(-0.002 – 0.002) 
0.001 0.18 0.86 -0.56 
(-1.78 – 0.65) 
0.62 -0.91 0.36 -0.001 
(-0.003 – 0.001) 
0.001 -0.73 0.47 
Random Effects        
σ2 418.72 0.001 321.50 0.002 
τ00 153.91 Participant 0.001 Participant 265.81 Participant 0.001 Participant 
ICC 0.27 0.43 0.45 0.09 
N 58 Participant 58 Participant 58 Participant 58 Participant 
Observations 116 116 116 116 










Note. p-values for the fixed effects calculated using Wald-statistics approximation, uncorrected. Model equation: Compt. scores ~ Gaze + AQ + AQ*Gaze + (1|Participant) + 
(1|Stimulus). AQ: Autism Spectrum Quotient; b: unstandardized coefficient; SE: standard error; ß: standardized coefficient; CI: confidence interval; t: test statistic coefficient; p: p-





3.5.2 Supplementary tables: Confirmatory analyses 
Table S3.2. Mean and standard deviation of reaction times (ms) and error rates for each imitative and spatial 
compatibility condition, as a function of gaze. 
  Reaction times Error rates 
  Direct gaze Averted gaze Direct gaze Averted gaze 
  M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Imitative 
compatibility 
Compatible 485.91 96.79 492.97 95.82 0.04 0.21 0.03 0.21 
Incompatible 500.12 105.14 502.80 104.59 0.05 0.25 0.05 0.25 
Spatial 
compatibility 
Compatible 484.32 105.50 486.82 104.34 0.03 0.20 0.04 0.21 
Incompatible 501.91 95.76 509.14 94.43 0.06 0.26 0.05 0.25 
 
 
Table S3.3. Results of the generalized linear mixed-effects models conducted for the confirmatory analyses. 
 Model 1: Reaction times  Model 2: Error rates 
 b 95% CI SE ß t p  
Odds 
Ratios 95% CI SE ß t p 
Imitative compt. 10.23 7.57 – 12.90 1.36 0.05 7.53 <0.001  1.58 1.35 – 1.85 0.08 1.12 5.59 <0.001 
Spatial compt. 22.31 19.63 – 24.99 1.37 0.10 16.34 <0.001  1.70 1.45 – 2.00 0.08 1.30 6.46 <0.001 
Gaze -4.62 -7.29 – -1.96 1.36 -0.02 -3.41 0.001  0.99 0.84 – 1.16 0.08 -0.03 -0.15 0.877 
AQ 0.29 -4.97 – 5.54 2.68 0.01 0.11 0.915  0.97 0.92 – 1.02 0.03 -0.75 -1.09 0.274 
Gaze * Imitative 2.51 -2.75 – 7.78 2.69 0.01 0.93 0.350  0.94 0.68 – 1.29 0.16 -0.08 -0.39 0.698 
Gaze * Spatial -5.10 -10.44 – 0.23 2.72 -0.01 -1.87 0.061  1.12 0.81 – 1.54 0.16 0.14 0.67 0.503 
AQ * Imitative 0.45 -0.04 – 0.94 0.25 0.01 1.79 0.074  1.03 1.00 – 1.06 0.02 0.36 1.79 0.073 
AQ * Spatial -0.15 -0.64 – 0.34 0.25 -0.004 -0.59 0.552  1.01 0.98 – 1.04 0.02 0.10 0.50 0.614 
AQ * Gaze -0.08 -0.57 – 0.41 0.25 -0.002 -0.31 0.755  1.01 0.98 – 1.04 0.02 0.14 0.69 0.490 
AQ * Gaze * Imitative -1.29 -2.28 – -0.31 0.50 -0.02 -2.59 0.010  1.00 0.94 – 1.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.953 
AQ * Gaze * Spatial 0.16 -0.83 – 1.14 0.50 0.002 0.31 0.754  0.97 0.91 – 1.03 0.03 -0.21 -1.05 0.294 
Random Effects    
σ2 0.0001  3.29 
τ00 32.25Stimulus, 620.88Participant  0.03 Stimulus, 1.00 Participant 
ICC -  0.24 
N 60 Participant, 64 Stimulus  60 Participant, 64 Stimulus 
Observations 14047  15353 
Marginal R2/ Conditional R2 -  0.035 / 0.265 
Note. p-values for the fixed effects calculated using Wald-statistics approximation, uncorrected. Inter-class correlation (ICC) and R2 coefficients are not reported for Model 1 as 
available methods for the estimation of such parameters are not optimized for GLMM with inverse-Gaussian distributions (Nakagawa et al., 2017). Model equation: DV ~ Imitative 
+ Spatial + Gaze + AQ + Gaze*Imitative + Gaze*Spatial + AQ*Imitative + AQ*Spatial + AQ*Gaze + AQ*Gaze*Imitative + AQ*Gaze*Spatial + (1|Participant) + (1|Stimulus). AQ: 
Autism Spectrum Quotient; b: unstandardized coefficient; SE: standard error; ß: standardized coefficient; CI: confidence interval; t: test statistic coefficient; p: p-value; σ2: within-
group variance; τ00 = between-group variance; ICC = interclass correlation (ratio of between-cluster variance to total variance); N: number of random effects. 
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3.5.3 Supplementary tables: Exploratory analyses 
Table S3.4. Results of the generalized linear mixed-effects model used to explore the influence of gaze and 
autistic traits on general compatibility. 
 Reaction times 
 b 95% CI SE ß t p 
General compt. 33.11 29.45 – 36.77 1.87 0.15 17.73 <0.001 
Gaze -4.95 -8.58 – -1.33 1.85 -0.02 -2.68 0.007 
AQ 0.11 -5.27 – 5.49 2.75 0.01 0.04 0.967 
Gaze * General compt. -2.65 -9.87 – 4.58 3.69 -0.01 -0.72 0.473 
AQ * General compt. 0.22 -0.45 – 0.89 0.34 0.01 0.64 0.524 
AQ * Gaze -0.56 -1.24 – 0.11 0.34 -0.01 -1.65 0.100 
AQ * Gaze * General compt. -1.34 -2.68 – 0.01 0.69 -0.02 -1.95 0.051 
Random Effects  
σ2 0.0001 
τ00 50.81 Stimulus, 857.63 Participant 
N 60 Participant, 64 Stimulus 
Observations 7010 
Note. p-values for the fixed effects calculated using Wald-statistics approximation, uncorrected. Inter-class 
correlation (ICC) and R2 coefficients are not reported as available methods for the estimation of such parameters 
are not optimized for GLMM with inverse-Gaussian distributions (Nakagawa, Johnson & Schielzeth, 2017). Model 
equation: RT ~ General compt. + Gaze + AQ + Gaze*General compt. + AQ*General compt. + AQ*Gaze + 
AQ*Gaze*General compt. + (1|Participant) + (1|Stimulus). AQ: Autism Spectrum Quotient; b: unstandardized 
coefficient; SE: standard error; ß: standardized coefficient; CI: confidence interval; t: test statistic coefficient; p: p-
value; σ2: within-group variance; τ00 = between-group variance; ICC = interclass correlation (ratio of between-
cluster variance to total variance); N: number of random effects.  
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Table S3.5. Results of the generalized linear mixed-effects model used to explore the influence of ethnicity 
and gaze on imitative and spatial compatibility. 
 Reaction times 
 b 95% CI SE ß t p 
Imitative compt. 10.30 7.64 – 12.95 1.36 0.05 7.60 <0.001 
Spatial compt. 22.29 19.65 – 24.92 1.34 0.10 16.57 <0.001 
Gaze -4.65 -7.30 – -2.00 1.35 -0.02 -3.44 0.001 
Ethnicity 1.02 -4.22 – 6.26 2.67 0.01 0.38 0.702 
Gaze * Imitative 2.45 -2.68 – 7.59 2.62 0.01 0.94 0.350 
Gaze * Spatial -5.06 -10.20 – 0.08 2.62 -0.01 -1.93 0.054 
Ethnicity * Imitative -3.00 -8.22 – 2.22 2.66 -0.01 -1.13 0.260 
Ethnicity * Spatial -4.18 -9.42 – 1.07 2.68 -0.01 -1.56 0.118 
Ethnicity * Gaze 4.01 -1.23 – 9.26 2.68 0.01 1.50 0.134 
Ethnicity * Gaze * Imitative 13.72 4.20 – 23.25 4.86 0.02 2.82 0.005 
Ethnicity * Gaze * Spatial -3.54 -12.74 – 5.66 4.69 -0.004 -0.75 0.451 
Random effects  
σ2 0.0001 
τ00 32.13 Stimulus, 621.05 Participant 
N 60 Participant, 64 Stimulus 
Observations 14047 
Note. p-values for the fixed effects calculated using Wald-statistics approximation, uncorrected. Inter-class 
correlation (ICC) and R2 coefficients are not reported as available methods for the estimation of such parameters 
are not optimized for GLMM with inverse-Gaussian distributions (Nakagawa, Johnson & Schielzeth, 2017). Model 
equation: RT ~ Imitative + Spatial + Gaze + Ethnicity + Gaze*Imitative + Gaze*Spatial + Ethnicity*Imitative + 
Ethnicity*Spatial + Ethnicity*Gaze + Ethnicity*Gaze*Imitative + Ethnicity*Gaze*Spatial + (1|Participant) + 
(1|Stimulus). b: unstandardized coefficient; SE: standard error; ß: standardized coefficient; CI: confidence interval; 





Table S3.6. Results of the generalized linear mixed-effects models used to explore the modulation of social anxiety traits on the influence of gaze on imitative and spatial 
compatibility. 
 Model 1: SIAS Model 2: SPS Model 3: GARS 
 b 95% CI SE ß t p b 95% CI SE ß t p b 95% CI SE ß t p 
Imitative compt. 10.26 7.60 – 12.92 1.36 0.05 7.56 <0.001 10.16 7.49 – 12.83 1.36 0.05 7.46 <0.001 10.29 7.64 – 12.94 1.35 0.05 7.61 <0.001 
Spatial compt. 22.20 19.54 – 24.86 1.36 0.10 16.36 <0.001 22.21 19.53 – 24.88 1.36 0.10 16.30 <0.001 22.28 19.64 – 24.91 1.34 0.10 16.58 <0.001 
Gaze -4.57 -7.23 – -1.90 1.36 -0.02 -3.36 0.001 -4.47 -7.15 – -1.80 1.36 -0.02 -3.28 0.001 -4.62 -7.27 – -1.97 1.35 -0.02 -3.42 0.001 
Quest. -0.69 -3.27 – 1.88 1.31 -0.08 -0.53 0.598 -1.21 -4.83 – 2.40 1.84 -0.09 -0.66 0.511 0.34 -1.76 – 2.44 1.07 0.05 0.32 0.750 
Gaze * Imitative 2.97 -2.36 – 8.29 2.72 0.01 1.09 0.275 2.91 -2.33 – 8.15 2.67 0.01 1.09 0.277 2.50 -2.66 – 7.67 2.63 0.01 0.95 0.342 
Gaze * Spatial -5.34 -10.61 – -0.07 2.69 -0.01 -1.99 0.047 -5.15 -10.48 – 0.19 2.72 -0.01 -1.89 0.059 -5.13 -10.40 – 0.14 2.69 -0.01 -1.91 0.057 
Quest.* Imitative 0.05 -0.16 – 0.26 0.11 0.003 0.47 0.639 0.18 -0.12 – 0.48 0.15 0.01 1.17 0.241 -0.04 -0.21 – 0.13 0.09 -0.003 -0.45 0.653 
Quest.* Spatial 0.12 -0.08 – 0.33 0.11 0.01 1.16 0.244 0.17 -0.13 – 0.47 0.15 0.01 1.14 0.255 0.05 -0.12 – 0.22 0.09 0.003 0.56 0.576 
Quest.* Gaze -0.08 -0.29 – 0.13 0.11 -0.004 -0.78 0.435 -0.23 -0.53 – 0.07 0.15 -0.01 -1.50 0.134 -0.06 -0.23 – 0.11 0.09 -0.004 -0.72 0.471 
Quest.* Gaze * Imitative -0.68 -1.09 – -0.26 0.21 -0.02 -3.19 0.001 -0.72 -1.32 – -0.13 0.30 -0.01 -2.38 0.017 -0.36 -0.70 – -0.01 0.17 -0.01 -2.05 0.041 
Quest.* Gaze * Spatial 0.22 -0.20 – 0.64 0.21 0.01 1.04 0.299 0.02 -0.58 – 0.62 0.31 0.0001 0.07 0.947 0.15 -0.19 – 0.49 0.17 0.01 0.88 0.379 
Random Effects    
σ2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
τ00 31.80 Stimulus, 651.78 Participant 31.79 Stimulus, 649.58 Participant 31.63 Stimulus, 655.59 Participant 
N 60 Participant, 64 Stimulus 60 Participant, 64 Stimulus 60 Participant, 64 Stimulus 
Observations 14047 14047 14047 
Note. The predictor “Quest.” refers to the corresponding questionnaire of social anxiety (SIAS, SPS or GARS). p-values for the fixed effects calculated using Wald-statistics 
approximation, uncorrected. Inter-class correlation (ICC) and R2 coefficients are not reported as available methods for the estimation of such parameters are not optimized for 
GLMM with inverse-Gaussian distributions (Nakagawa, Johnson & Schielzeth, 2017). Model equation: RT ~ Imitative + Spatial + Gaze + Questionnaire + Gaze*Imitative + 
Gaze*Spatial + Questionnaire*Imitative + Questionnaire*Spatial + Questionnaire*Gaze + Questionnaire*Gaze*Imitative + Questionnaire *Gaze*Spatial + (1|Participant) + 
(1|Stimulus). SIAS: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale; SPS: Social Phobia Scale; GARS: Gaze Anxiety Rating Scale; b: unstandardized coefficient; SE: standard error; ß: standardized 
coefficient; CI: confidence interval; t: test statistic coefficient; p: p-value; σ2: within-group variance; τ00 = between-group variance; N: number of random effects. 
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Table S3.7. Results of the generalized linear mixed-effects model used to explore the modulation of AQ and 
SIAS on the effect of gaze on imitative compatibility. 
 Reaction times 
 b 95% CI SE ß t p 
Imitative compt. 10.44 7.75 – 13.14 1.37 0.05 7.60 <0.001 
Gaze -4.61 -7.30 – -1.92 1.37 -0.02 -3.36 0.001 
SIAS -1.38 -4.72 – 1.97 1.71 -0.15 -0.81 0.420 
AQ 2.23 -4.99 – 9.46 3.69 0.11 0.61 0.545 
Gaze * Imitative 2.82 -2.47 – 8.11 2.70 0.01 1.04 0.296 
SIAS * Imitative -0.14 -0.41 – 0.13 0.14 -0.01 -1.00 0.318 
SIAS * Gaze -0.10 -0.37 – 0.17 0.14 -0.01 -0.71 0.480 
AQ * Imitative 0.60 -0.04 – 1.24 0.33 0.01 1.85 0.065 
AQ * Gaze 0.09 -0.55 – 0.72 0.32 0.002 0.27 0.786 
SIAS * Gaze * Imitative -0.54 -1.08 – -0.00 0.27 -0.02 -1.97 0.048 
AQ * Gaze * Imitative -0.56 -1.82 – 0.71 0.65 -0.01 -0.86 0.388 
Random effects  
σ2 0.0001 
τ00 30.82 Stimulus, 641.04Participant 
N 60 Participant, 64 Stimulus 
Observations 14047 
Note. p-values for the fixed effects calculated using Wald-statistics approximation, uncorrected. Inter-class 
correlation (ICC) and R2 coefficients are not reported as available methods for the estimation of such parameters 
are not optimized for GLMM with inverse-Gaussian distributions (Nakagawa, Johnson & Schielzeth, 2017). Model 
equation: RT ~ Imitative + Gaze + SIAS + AQ + Gaze*Imitative + SIAS*Imitative + SIAS*Gaze + AQ*Imitative + 
AQ*Gaze + SIAS*Gaze*Imitative + AQ*Gaze*Spatial + (1|Participant) + (1|Stimulus). b: unstandardized 
coefficient; SE: standard error; ß: standardized coefficient; CI: confidence interval; t: test statistic coefficient; p: p-






Table S3.8. Descriptive statistics, internal consistency reliability, and correlations between questionnaires 
of autistic traits and social anxiety. 
 M SD Range α 1 2 3 
1. AQ 9.47 5.41 1 – 25 .82    
2. SIAS 26.43 12.15 4 – 59 .89 .64***   
     [.46, .77]   
3. SPS 12.20 8.67 2 – 43 .88 .44*** .68***  
     [.21, .64] [.49, .81]  
4. GARS 22.72 14.87 0 – 67 .94 .29* .59*** .50*** 
     [.04, .52] [.39, .74] [.30, .67] 
Note. Cronbach’s alpha was used as an index of internal consistency. Correlation coefficients were computed 
with Spearman's rank correlations. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each 
correlation. M: mean; SD: standard deviation; α: Cronbach’s alpha; AQ: Autism Spectrum Quotient (33-items 
version; Freitag et al., 2007); SIAS: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Stangier et al., 1999); SPS: Social Phobia Scale 
(Stangier et al., 1999); GARS: Gaze Anxiety Rating Scale (Domes et al., 2016); * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
 
Table S3.9. Summary and t-test statistics for the ratings on the attributed meaning of direct and averted 
gaze. 
 Mean (SD) T-test Cohen’s 
d  Direct gaze Averted gaze 
Observed 1.73 (1.29) 0.30 (0.65) t(59) = 8.33, 95% CI [1.09, 1.78], p < .001 1.08 
Connected 1.55 (1.23) 0.57 (0.77) t(59) = 7.15, 95% CI [0.71, 1.26], p < .001 0.92 
Accepted 1.30 (1.14) 0.45 (0.70) t(59) = 6.24, 95% CI [0.58, 1.12], p < .001 0.81 
Distracted 2.12 (1.12) 1.28 (1.03) t(59) = 5.05, 95% CI [0.50, 1.16], p < .001 0.65 
Pressured 1.32 (1.11) 0.67 (0.95) t(59) = 3.95, 95% CI [0.32, 0.98], p = .001 0.51 
Ignored 0.28 (0.67) 1.27 (1.18) t(59) = -6.27, 95% CI [-1.30, -0.67], p < .001 0.81 
Rejected 0.52 (0.77) 1.03 (0.94) t(59) = -3.60, 95% CI [-0.80, -0.23], p = .001 0.46 
Relieved 0.93 (1.09) 1.12 (1.11) t(59) = -1.02, 95% CI [-0.54, 0.18], p = .31 0.13 








4. Study 3: Emotional egocentricity & socio-
emotional traits 
Affective states influence emotion perception:  
evidence for emotional egocentricity 
Irene Trilla, Anne Weigand and Isabel Dziobek 
Abstract. Research in social cognition has shown that our own emotional experiences 
are an important source of information to understand what other people are feeling. 
The current study investigated whether individuals project their own affective states 
when reading other’s emotional expressions. We used brief autobiographical recall 
and audio-visual stimuli to induce happy, neutral and sad transient states. After each 
emotion induction, participants made emotion judgments about ambiguous faces dis-
playing a mixture of happiness and sadness. Using an adaptive psychophysics 
procedure, we estimated the tendency to perceive the faces as happy under each in-
duced affective states. Results demonstrate the occurrence of egocentric projections, 
such that faces were more likely judged as happy when participants reported being 
happy compared to when they were sad. Moreover, the degree of emotional egocen-
tricity was associated with individual differences in perspective-taking, with smaller 
biases being observed in individuals with a higher disposition to take others’ perspec-
tive. Our findings extend previous literature on emotional egocentricity by showing 
that self-projection occurs when we make emotion attributions based on the other’s 
emotional expressions, and supports the notion that perspective-taking tendencies 
play a role in the ability to understand the other’s affective states. 
 
This article has been published as:  
Trilla, I., Weigand, A., & Dziobek, I. (2020). Affective states influence emotion perception: 
Evidence for emotional egocentricity. Psychological Research.  
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-020-01314-3  
Study 3: Emotional egocentricity & socio-emotional traits 
 74 
4.1 Introduction 
The ability to understand the emotions of others is crucial to successfully function in social 
interactions. Due to a lack of direct access to other people’s mind, we have to rely on indirect 
sources of information to infer how others feel. For example, we could use information about 
the context the other person is exposed to or read their emotional expressions. While these 
external cues about the other can be valuable means to emotion understanding, research in 
social cognition has shown that one’s own affective state is also used to guide judgments 
about others’ emotional experiences (Silani et al., 2013; Steinbeis & Singer, 2014). That is, 
people tend to project their own emotions when inferring what other people feel, a process 
known as emotional egocentricity. Self-projection can be an efficient heuristic, especially 
when our experiences are similar to the other’s. However, it can also lead to inaccurate emo-
tion attributions unless egocentric inferences are adjusted to account for dissimilarities 
between oneself and the other person (Mitchell, 2009).  
Emotional egocentricity has been studied using tasks in which participants are asked to 
make emotion judgments about themselves and another person while being simultaneously 
exposed to either affectively congruent stimulation (e.g., both were touched by a pleasant 
material) or affectively incongruent stimulation (e.g., the participant received pleasant touch, 
while the target was touched by an unpleasant material; Silani et al., 2013). A tendency to 
project one’s own emotions onto others is typically indicated by emotion judgments biased 
towards the participants’ own affective states, particularly in incongruent conditions. Ego-
centric biases have consistently been observed in similar perspective-taking paradigms that 
used monetary reward and punishment (Steinbeis & Singer, 2014), as well as visuo-gustatory 
(Hoffmann et al., 2015) and audio-visual (von Mohr et al., 2019) stimulation to induce con-
gruent and incongruent affective states to the participant and the target. 
A common feature of the existing emotional egocentricity tasks is that participants are not 
able to see the target’s reactions to the affective stimulations, so emotion judgments are 
exclusively based on information about the type of stimulation the other is exposed to. Under 
these conditions, social cognitive processes such as perspective-taking may be activated to 
infer the other’s emotion. In particular, performance in these paradigms has been taken as 
an indicator of the participants’ self-other distinction abilities, as egocentric biases in this 
context are thought to reflect a failure to distinguish the representation of one’s own affec-
tive states from that of the other (Silani et al., 2013; Hoffmann, Koehne, et al., 2016; Tomova 
et al., 2014). 
In daily life situations, however, we can often rely on more basic abilities that do not require 
perspective-taking processes to understand what others are feeling, such as emotion percep-
tion. Imagine, for example, that you give a present to a friend. You will probably first judge 
whether they liked it or not based on interpreting their emotional reactions when they un-
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wrap it. Indeed, the accurate reading of emotional signals such as facial expressions (Lindner 
& Rosén, 2006), body postures (de Gelder et al., 2015) or speech prosody (Golan et al., 2007) 
has been shown to be key for understanding the affective states of others. Until now, how-
ever, little attention has been placed on studying egocentricity during perception-based 
emotion attribution. 
Previous research on the influence of mood on emotion perception provides a first indication 
of egocentric biases when reading others' emotional states. Studies inducing positive and 
negative affective states to participants have shown that emotional facial expressions are 
more easily recognized when they are congruent with the participant’s induced mood (Lee 
et al., 2008; Niedenthal et al., 2000; Qiao-Tasserit et al., 2017; Schmid & Schmid Mast, 2010). 
These mood-congruency effects have been often contextualized under general cognitive the-
ories of affect congruence, according to which affective states activate linked memory 
representations and facilitate the encoding and processing of affectively-congruent infor-
mation (Forgas, 2017). However, mood-congruency effects could also reflect emotional 
egocentricity: they may result from an over-attribution of one’s own affective states to oth-
ers. In line with this interpretation, biases in emotion perception seem to be stronger when 
the participant's emotion and the emotion expressed by the target are incongruent (Schmid 
& Schmid Mast, 2010). Compared to classic emotional egocentricity paradigms, however, 
these biases may stem from more implicit and unconscious processes of self-projection, ra-
ther than reflecting self-other distinction abilities. 
The current study sought to revisit mood-congruent biases in emotion perception as a meas-
ure of emotional egocentricity. First, we developed a novel approach to estimate the degree 
to which one’s own affective states bias judgments of emotional facial expressions. Using a 
combination of brief autobiographical recall and audio-visual stimuli, we induced happy, 
neutral and sad transient states to the participants. After each emotion induction, partici-
pants completed a short emotion perception task in which they made binary decisions 
(“happy” or “sad”?) about the expression of faces displaying a mixture of happiness and sad-
ness. We hypothesized that emotion judgments would be biased by the participants’ affective 
states, such that they would more likely judge the ambiguous faces as happy when feeling 
happy than when being sad. 
Second, we predicted that the magnitude of egocentric biases during the emotion judgments 
would be related to the participants’ disposition to consider and react to other people’s ex-
periences. In particular, we examined associations with two components of dispositional 
empathy measured with the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980). On the one 
hand, the empathic concern scale taps into affective empathy and measures the tendency to 
react with feelings of sympathy and concern for unfortunate others (Davis, 1980). On the 
other hand, the perspective-taking scale assesses the tendency to adopt the point of view of 
another person, a facet of cognitive empathy (Davis, 1980). An association between mood-
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congruent biases and dispositional empathy would indicate that the mood effects on emotion 
perception are related to processes of social cognition. Finally, we explored associations with 
autistic traits, as stronger egocentricity during cognitive mentalizing (Bradford et al., 2018; 
Pearson et al., 2013) and deficits in emotion recognition (Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2013) are 
commonly observed in autism spectrum conditions (ASC). 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Participants 
Fifty German-speaking adults (31 females, Mage = 27.82, SDage = 6.66, rangeage = 19 - 44) were 
recruited for this study. An a-priori power analyses using G*Power 3 (Faul et al., 2007) esti-
mated a sample of 49 participants (alpha = 0.05, power = 0.80, three measurement levels, 
within-subject repeated-measures analysis of variance) for a ηp² = 0.17. The effect size was 
determined based on the emotional egocentricity effects reported in Silani et al. (2013; be-
havioural experiment 1: ηp² = 0.074; behavioural experiment 2: ηp² = 0.277) and Hoffmann et 
al. (2016; ηp² = 0.180). 
Exclusion criteria included current psychiatric or neurological disorders, cognitive or neu-
rological impairments, and psychoactive medication. All participants gave written informed 
consent and were financially remunerated for their participation. The study was conducted 
in compliance with the latest revision of the Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association 
(Declaration of Helsinki) and was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Psychology de-
partment at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. 
4.2.2 Materials and procedure 
4.2.2.1 Emotional egocentricity paradigm 
The emotional egocentricity paradigm comprised three blocks, corresponding to the three 
affective state manipulations applied to each participant (happy, neutral and sad). Each block 
was divided into two parts: an emotion induction, followed by an emotion perception task. 
MATLAB R2015b (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, United States) and the Psy-
chophysics Toolbox extension (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007) were used for stimulus 
presentation. 
Emotion induction. A combination of a brief autobiographical recall and audio-visual clips 
was used to induce transient happy, neutral and sad states. At the beginning of each block, 
participants were asked to remember an event in their lives that elicited one of the two target 
emotions, or a neutral state. Participants wrote down keywords that reminded them of that 
particular event and were given 4 minutes to imagine themselves in that situation and to 
relive the emotions they felt at that time. To elicit happiness, participants were asked to 
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think of an enjoyable moment with friends or children, or a time in which they cuddled or 
fooled around with a pet. To elicit sadness, participants were prompted to think of a person 
suffering or the death of a loved one. For the neutral block, participants had to recall a morn-
ing routine. The content of these memories was selected to match the theme of the 60-
seconds clips they would watch immediately after.  
Each clip included 11 pictures presented for 4.5 seconds, with 1-second cross-dissolve tran-
sitions in between. Images for the clips were taken from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2005), the Nencki Affective Picture System (NAPS; Marchewka et 
al., 2013; Riegel et al., 2016) or collected by the experimenters. All emotional pictures had 
been previously rated by 22 participants in a pilot study as respectively evoking sadness (M 
= 4.03, SE = 0.53) and happiness (M = 8.50, SE = 0.31) on a 11-point scale (1 = sad, 11 = happy). 
Examples of sad-inducing pictures are crying children or extreme poverty scenes, while 
happy-inducing images included smiling children, baby animals, or people dancing. Images 
used in the neutral clip depicted daily life objects such as tableware, and were selected from 
the IAPS and NAPS databases (valence ratings between 4.50 and 5.50; both databases used a 
9-point scale). The presentation of pictures was accompanied by audio matching in valence. 
An excerpt from American Honey by Sam & Chesney was used for the happy clip; Adagio 
for Strings by Samuel Barber was used for the sad clips; and kitchen sounds were used for 
the neutral clip. 
Emotion perception task. A forced-choice psychophysical procedure was used to assess 
the perception of ambiguous emotional faces after each emotion induction. Twenty-one 
morphs of a female face were generated by mixing a happy facial expression with a sad facial 
expression in steps of 5%. The original stimuli were selected from the FACES database (Ebner 
et al., 2010). Face morphs (496 x 659 pixels) were grey-scaled and embedded within a grey 
oval that occluded the hair and clothing (Figure 4.1).  
Each trial of the task started with a fixation cross shown for 1500 ms, followed by a face 
morph for 500 ms. Next, the response options (“happy”, “sad”) appeared on the right and left 
side of the screen, respectively, until the participant made their response via key press 
(Figure 4.1). A 1-up/1-down adaptive method (Leek, 2001) was used to estimate the point on 
the happy-sad morph continuum at which observers were equally likely to judge the target 
emotion as happy or sad (point of subjective equality; PSE). PSEs have been used in previous 
studies to measure emotion perception biases (Harris et al., 2016; Marneweck et al., 2013). 
Here, lower PSEs indicate a higher tendency to perceive faces as happy (i.e. less happiness 
is required in the face to be equally likely judged as happy or sad). The adaptive procedure 
was implemented in MATLAB using the Palamedes Toolbox (Prins & Kingdom, 2018). One 
ascending and one descending interleaved staircases were set to select the morph stimulus 
on a trial-by-trial basis based on the participant’s previous response. Specifically, the morph 
level presented in each subsequent trial within a staircase was increased one step in the 
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happy-sad morph continuum (i.e. 5% happier face) if the previous trial was a “sad” response, 
and decreased one step (i.e. 5% sadder face) if the previous trial was a “happy” response. The 
descending staircase started with a 90-10% happy-sad morph, and the ascending with a 30-
70% happy-sad morph. The starting morph level for each staircase was determined based on 
pilot data, which showed that PSE with our stimuli was around the 60-40% happy-sad morph. 
Each staircase stopped after eight reversals. A reversal is defined as a transition point within 
a staircase in which the participant switched their response from perceiving a happy face to 
a sad face, or vice versa. The PSE was estimated by averaging the morph levels of the last 
five reversals of both staircases. On average, participants completed 37.96 trials per block 
(SD = 5.83), which corresponds to a task length of approximately 1.5 minutes. A short task 
duration was important to ensure that PSEs were measured within the duration of the emo-
tion induction effects. 
 
Figure 4.1. (a) Example of the continuum of sad-happy face morphs used in the emotion per-
ception task. Due to copyright restrictions, the depicted face identity does not correspond to 
the one used in the study. (b) Example of a trial of the emotion perception task. The morph 
level presented was selected on a trial-by-trial basis using a 1-up/1-down adaptive procedure. 
4.2.2.2 Procedure 
The study followed a within-subject design. Prior to the experimental session, participants 
completed a series of online questionnaires to collect basic demographic information and 
measure dispositional empathy and autistic traits. The scales Perspective-taking and Em-
pathic Concern of the Interpersonal Reactivity Scale (IRI; Davis, 1980) were used to assess 
cognitive and affective empathy, respectively. In the German version of the IRI (Paulus, 
2009), each scale consists of 4 items, scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never) 
to 5 (always). The short German version of the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001; Freitag et al., 2007) was used to assess individual differences in autistic 
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traits. This version consists of 33 statements scored on a 4-point scale from “definitely agree” 
to “definitely disagree”. All questionnaires were implemented in SoSci Survey (Leiner, 2018).  
In the experimental session, participants completed three blocks of the emotional egocen-
tricity paradigm. The three blocks corresponded to the happy, neutral and sad conditions, 
and each consisted of an emotion induction procedure, followed by the emotion perception 
task. Before and after each emotion induction, participants rated their current mood on a 9-
point scale (-4 = sad, 4 = happy). The order of happy and sad blocks was counterbalanced 
across participants, but neutral was always kept in the middle. Participants had a break of 5 
minutes between blocks. Before the start of the first block, participants were introduced to 
the paradigm. To keep the experiment's aim implicit, we presented a cover story, whereby 
each of the subsequent blocks contained two separate experiments, the first concerned with 
testing a new emotion induction procedure for future research, and the second with how we 
perceive emotions in a face. Participants also completed a shorter version of the emotion 
perception task to get familiar with the paradigm. The identity of the face morphs used in 
the practice was different from the face identity used in the main emotion perception task. 
4.2.2.3 Statistical analysis 
The effectiveness of the emotion induction was checked with a 2 x 3 analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) on the participants’ reported mood as the dependent variable, and time (pre-in-
duction, post-induction) and emotion condition (happy, neutral, sad) as within-subject 
factors. The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used where applicable, and post-hoc t-tests 
with Bonferroni correction were performed to characterize the significant effects. In addition 
to the group analysis, mood ratings were individually screened to identify participants for 
which emotion induction was not successful. A total of 10 participants did not show the 
expected pattern of mood ratings, defined as: positive mood ratings after happy induction, 
negative mood ratings after sad induction, and mood ratings after neutral induction lying 
between those in the happy and sad conditions.  
Two complementary approaches were used to examine the influence of the affective state 
on emotion perception. First, a repeated-measures ANOVA with PSE as dependent variable 
and emotion condition (happy, neutral, sad) as a within-subject factor was conducted. This 
approach reproduced the statistical analyses typically conducted in studies that use factorial 
designs to test the effects of induced mood on emotion perception (e.g., Lee et al., 2008; 
Niedenthal et al., 2000; Schmid & Schmid Mast, 2010). Given that this analysis takes the 
emotion condition as a proxy of affective state, the data from the 10 participants whose mood 
ratings did not indicate successful emotion induction were excluded. This resulted in an 
analysis sample of 40 participants. 
Arguably, the self-reported mood ratings are a more accurate indication of the participant’s 
affective experience than the condition in which each PSE was measured. Therefore, 
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stronger evidence of the influence of the emotional state on emotion perception would be 
shown if post-induction mood ratings significantly predict PSEs regardless of emotion con-
dition. To test this, we performed a linear mixed-effects analysis of the relationship between 
mood ratings and PSEs. As fixed effects, we included the post-induction mood ratings as our 
main predictor of interest, and the pre-induction mood ratings as a control covariate. As 
random effects, we had intercepts for participants, as well as by-participant random slopes 
for the effect of post-induction mood ratings. P-values for the LMMs were computed based 
on Satterthwaite approximation for denominator degrees of freedom.  
For this second analysis approach, we did not exclude any participant based on the reported 
mood in each condition. However, one influential case was detected based on examination 
of DFBETAS, a standardized measure that indicates the level of influence single observations 
have on coefficient estimates (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2012). To obtain unbiased regression esti-
mates, data from this participant was removed from the analysis sample and the linear mixed 
model was fitted a second time. Results reported below correspond to the model tested with-
out this influential case (n = 49). Visual inspection of residual plots did not reveal any obvious 
deviations from homoscedasticity or normality. 
The beta coefficients estimated for the random slope in the linear mixed model reflect the 
extent to which the self-reported mood influenced emotion perception for each participant. 
We used these coefficients as individual indices of emotional egocentricity, with more neg-
ative scores indicating stronger egocentric bias. To examine whether individual differences 
in empathy and autistic traits are related to the degree of self-projection during emotion 
perception, Pearson correlations were conducted between emotional egocentricity scores 
and the IRI and AQ scores. 
Data and code to reproduce the statistical analyses are available at https://osf.io/5f4vn/. All 
statistical analyses were run in R (R Core Team, 2020) and R studio (RStudio Team, 2019). 
We used the following R packages: ez for ANOVA (Lawrence, 2016); lme4 (Bates et al., 2015), 
lmerTest (Kuznetsova et al., 2017) and influence.ME (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2012) for linear 
mixed-effects analysis; Hmisc (Harrell & Dupont, 2018) for correlations; and ggplot2 
(Wickham, 2009) for figures. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Manipulation check 
The repeated-measures ANOVA on mood ratings revealed a significant interaction between 
emotion condition and time, F(2, 98) = 126.32, p < .001, ηp² = .721. Planned pairwise compar-
isons confirmed that, while there were no significant differences in mood ratings before 
emotion induction (all p > .16; pre-happy induction: M = 1.44, SE = 0.09; pre-neutral induc-
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tion: M = 1.14, SE = 0.13; pre-sad induction: M = 1.12, SE = 0.12), participants felt significantly 
happier after happy induction (M = 2.72, SE = 0.13) than after neutral induction (M = 0.60, SE 
= 0.11), t(49) = 12.43, p < .001, 95% CI [1.78, 2.46], Cohen’s d = 1.76, and significantly less 
happy after sad induction (M = -1.60, SE = 0.16) compared to neutral induction, t(49) = -12.66, 
p < .001, 95% CI [-2.55, -1.85], Cohen’s d = 1.79, as well compared to happy induction, t(49) = 
18.41, p < .001, 95% CI [3.85, 4.79], Cohen’s d = 2.60 (Figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.2. Mean self-reported mood ratings before and after each emotion induction procedure. 
Positive ratings represent happy state; negative ratings indicate sad state. Error bars represent 
within-subject 95% confidence intervals. 
4.3.2 Egocentric biases in emotion perception 
The ANOVA on the estimated PSEs showed a significant main effect of emotion condition, 
F(2, 78) = 4.67, p = .018, ηp² = .107, indicating that emotion perception was influenced by the 
participants’ affective state (Figure 4.3). In line with the predicted mood-congruency bias, 
the PSE in the happy condition (M = 67.38, SE = 0.78) was descriptively lower than in the sad 
condition (M = 70.45, SE = 0.82), although this difference did not reach statistical significance 
after correction for multiple comparisons, t(39) = -2.50, p = .051, 95% CI [-5.57, -0.58], Cohen’s 
d = 0.39. Differences in PSE between the neutral (M = 68.47, SE = 0.53) and sad conditions, 
and between the neutral and happy conditions were also not statistically significant (all p > 
.08). Though weaker, the main effect of emotion condition on PSEs remained significant even 
with inclusion of the full sample, F(2, 98) = 3.31, p = .049, ηp² = .063. 
The influence of the affective state on emotion perception was further demonstrated by the 
linear mixed model analysis, which showed that the mood participants reported after the 
emotion induction was a significant predictor of their PSE (Estimate = -0.40, SE = 0.18, t = -
2.23, p = .031, 95% CI [-0.76, -0.05]). As indicated by the negative slope, the happier partici-
pants were, the more likely they were to judge the emotional expressions as happy, indicated 
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by lower PSEs (Figure 4.3). Pre-induction mood ratings did not significantly influence the 
PSEs (Estimate = -0.30, SE = 0.42, t = -0.71, p = .48, 95% CI [-1.12, -0.53]). 
 
Figure 4.3. (a) Main effect of emotion condition on the point of subjective equality (PSE). PSEs 
indicate the percentage of happiness in the morph level at which participants were equally 
likely to judge the face as happy or sad. Lower PSEs are interpreted as a higher tendency to 
perceive happy expressions. Error bars represent within-subject 95% confidence intervals. (b) 
Effect of post-emotion induction mood on PSEs as estimated by the linear mixed model. The 
thick red regression line represents the predicted overall effect of mood (fixed effect), with 95% 
confidence intervals. A negative slope indicates that a happier mood predicted a higher ten-
dency to perceive the faces as happy (i.e. lower PSEs). The estimated regressions lines for each 
participant (random effects) are represented with thinner grey lines. 
4.3.3 Gender differences 
Given that both male and female participants made emotion judgments of a single female 
identity, we explored gender differences by re-running the main ANOVA with gender (2 
levels: female, male) added as a between-subject factor. As before, there was a significant 
main effect of emotion condition, F(2, 76) = 4.85, p = .016, ηp² = .113, but neither the main 
effect of gender (p = .27), nor its interaction with emotion condition (p = .50), were statisti-
cally significant.  
Adding gender and its interaction with post-induction mood ratings as predictors in linear 
mixed model analysis led to the same pattern of results: post-induction mood ratings re-
mained a significant predictor of PSE (Estimate = -0.61, SE = 0.25, t = -2.44, p = .019, 95% CI 
[-1.09, -0.12]), while gender (p = .13), its interaction with post-induction mood (p = .65), and 
the main effect of pre-induction mood ratings (p = .94) were not statistically significant. 
4.3.4 Associations between egocentric bias, empathy and autistic traits 
The slopes estimated for each participant in the linear mixed model were used as an index 
of emotional egocentricity, with more negative values indicating stronger egocentric bias. A 
weak but significant correlation was found between perspective-taking and emotional ego-
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centricity bias, r(49) = 0.36, p = .012, indicating that higher perspective-taking abilities are 
associated with a reduced influence of the affective state on emotion perception (Figure 4.4). 
Neither empathic concern nor autistic traits correlated significantly with emotional egocen-
tricity scores (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1. Summary of correlations, means and standard deviations for emotional egocentricity, IRI and AQ 
scores. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 
1. Emotional egocentric bias − 0.40 0.22  
 
  
2. Perspective-taking (IRI) 14.45 2.61 0.36* 
[0.08, 0.58] 
  











Note. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each correlation. IRI: Interpersonal Re-
activity Index; AQ: Autism Spectrum Quotient; * p < .05; ** p < .01. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Correlation between emotional egocentricity and perspective-taking, as measured 
by the Interpersonal Reactivity Scale (IRI). Emotional egocentricity scores reflect the degree to 
which one’s own emotional state biased emotion perception, with more negative scores indi-
cating stronger egocentricity. A positive correlation indicates that emotional egocentricity 
decreases with higher perspective-taking tendencies. 
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4.4 Discussion 
Research in social cognition has identified that one’s own emotional experiences are an im-
portant source of information to understand how another person is feeling. Previous studies 
detected egocentric biases when people make inferences about someone’s affective state 
based on information about the other’s context (Hoffmann et al., 2015; Silani et al., 2013; 
Steinbeis & Singer, 2014). The goal of the current study was to investigate whether emotional 
egocentricity also occurs when affective inferences rely on reading the person’s emotional 
expressions. 
Using a combination of brief emotion induction blocks with psychophysical measures of 
emotion perception, we were able to detect the occurrence of egocentric biases when partic-
ipants judged ambiguous emotional faces. As hypothesized, facial expressions were more 
readily classified as happy when participants reported feeling happy compared to sad. These 
results indicate a tendency to project one’s own affective states when making inferences 
about others’ emotions. Moreover, we found an association between perspective-taking and 
the extent to which one’s own mood influenced the emotion judgments, which provides 
evidence that these egocentric biases are related to social cognitive abilities.  
Our results replicate the mood-congruent biases in emotion perception documented in the 
literature. One limitation of previous studies is that they could not disentangle whether the 
observed effects were due to the influence of the affective state experienced by the partici-
pant, or due to more general framing or priming effects, whereby exposure to affective 
stimuli may increase the readiness to process cues of the same valence. Evidence for percep-
tual biases provided in previous emotion induction studies consisted of comparing emotion 
recognition between groups exposed to induction of different affective states (Lawrie et al. 
2019; Lee et al., 2008; Niedenthal et al., 2000, 2001; Schmid & Schmid Mast, 2010). Although 
most studies included manipulation checks to demonstrate that groups differed in the expe-
rienced mood, statistical analyses could not rule out the possibility that the perceptual biases 
were caused by the mere exposure to an affective context, beyond whether or not this elicited 
an affective state to the participant. For example, Aguado et al. (2018) showed that perception 
of emotional expressions is enhanced when faces are introduced by a statement describing 
events that elicit affectively congruent emotions (e.g., angry faces are recognized faster when 
primed with the sentence “He notices someone has vandalized his car.”). Arguably, this ma-
nipulation did not lead to significant changes in the participant’s affective state, yet it elicited 
similar perceptual biases to those in mood induction studies. 
Our study addressed this limitation by additionally using a statistical model that tested 
whether the participant’s reported mood, instead of the emotion condition, predicted the 
PSEs. This statistical analysis allowed us to account for the inter-subject variability in mood 
ratings within conditions, which increased the power to detect any influences of affective 
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state. The observed relationship between affective state and emotion perception (i.e. the hap-
pier the participant was, the more likely they perceived the faces as happy) provides more 
direct support to the existence of mood-congruency effects, and strengthens the results from 
the ANOVA analyses, which despite showing an overall effect of emotion condition on PSEs, 
post-hoc pairwise comparisons between conditions did not reach statistical significance.  
The observation of egocentric biases extends previous literature on emotional egocentricity 
by showing that self-projection also occurs during perception-based emotion attribution. 
Relying on self-knowledge for understanding other’s mental states can be an efficient heu-
ristic, especially when only limited information about the other is available (Ready et al., 
2000). Given that, in our study, participants had to make quick judgments about ambiguous 
emotional expressions, one’s own affect may have been used to guide their decisions. In fact, 
judgments of ambiguous faces, rather than clearer emotional expressions, have been shown 
to be more influenced by the participant’s affective state (Cavanagh & Geisler, 2006). Future 
studies should assess to what extent individuals attribute their own affective states when 
making emotion judgments in more naturalistic situations in which additional contextual 
information and more time to correct for egocentric projections are available. 
Importantly, the processes underlying egocentric biases in this study may be distinct from 
those previously observed in classic emotional egocentricity paradigms. In those tasks, par-
ticipants are asked to make emotion judgments about a person based on information about 
the affective stimulation the other is exposed to, while at the same time receiving an affec-
tively (in-)congruent stimulation themselves (e.g., Silani et al., 2013; von Mohr et al., 2019). 
To unbiasedly infer the other’s feelings, participants need to disengage from their own ex-
perience and adopt the other’s perspective, a process that relies on self-other distinction 
abilities (Lamm et al., 2016; Steinbeis, 2016). Under those conditions, emotional egocentric 
biases have been interpreted as a failure to differentiate between the representations of one’s 
own affective states and others (Hoffmann, Koehne, et al., 2016; Silani et al., 2013; Tomova 
et al., 2014). 
In our paradigm, participants were not primed to think about their own affective state while 
judging the other’s emotional expressions, nor were asked to switch between self and other 
processing. In this context, the intrusion of the self-affect was more implicit and uncon-
scious. Participants may have not actively tried to inhibit their own state nor tease apart the 
self- and other-representations as in previous emotional egocentricity tasks. Therefore, 
while our results support the idea that one’s own experience is recruited when reading oth-
ers’ emotions, egocentric biases here should not be interpreted as an index of the 
participants’ self-other distinction abilities.  
Instead, egocentric judgments during emotion reading could be related to the participants’ 
general disposition to shift attention towards the other’s experience during social interac-
tions. Specifically, we found a small but significant correlation between emotional 
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egocentricity and individual differences in the perspective-taking scale of the IRI, such that 
individuals with a higher predisposition to adopt the point of view of others were less influ-
enced by their own affective states. This goes in line with the results of a recent meta-
analytic study that found a positive association between dispositional perspective-taking and 
emotion recognition accuracy (Israelashvili et al., 2019). A higher tendency to engage in per-
spective-taking may lead to more attention deployed to the other during processes of mental 
state inference, thus minimizing the influence of one’s own affect and facilitating a more 
accurate representation of the other’s experience. Supporting this hypothesis, perspective-
taking tendencies have been related to the extent to which participants focus on the other 
person’s perspective relative to their own in a visual perspective-taking task (Bukowski & 
Samson, 2017). Egocentric biases in our study may have partly resulted from a lower dispo-
sition to amplify the other's representation rather than a failure in inhibiting the self-
representation.  
While our results suggest that components of cognitive empathy are linked to the tendency 
to project one’s own emotions onto others, we did not find evidence for an involvement of 
affective empathy. Specifically, individual differences in empathic concern did not signifi-
cantly correlate with the degree of emotional egocentricity. Though conclusions from null 
results should be drawn cautiously, our finding parallels previous studies in which emotional 
egocentricity was also not associated with empathic concern (Hoffmann, Banzhaf, et al., 
2016) nor with other factors related to affect sharing such as alexithymia (von Mohr et al., 
2019). Instead, emotional empathy seems to be more related to altercentric biases, that is, to 
the influence of the other’s emotions on the judgment of our own affective states (Hoffmann, 
Banzhaf, et al., 2016).  
Finally, we did not find evidence for an association between emotional egocentricity and 
autistic traits. Even though stronger egocentric biases have been reported in ASC (Bradford 
et al., 2018; Pearson et al., 2013), as well as in individuals from the general population with 
high autistic traits (Brunyé et al., 2012), these were mainly detected in cognitive mentalizing 
tasks. The only study known to us that specifically investigated emotional egocentricity did 
not find differences in the magnitude of egocentric biases between individuals with ASC and 
controls (Hoffmann, Koehne, et al., 2016). Taken together, these findings point to a dissoci-
ation in the impact of autistic traits on cognitive and affective mentalizing: while people 
with high autistic traits may show difficulties when inferring others’ knowledge and beliefs, 
autistic traits do not seem to significantly impact the capacity to overcome self-projections 
during emotion inferences.  
Some limitations of the study should be mentioned. First, only face morphs of one female 
identity were used in the emotion perception task. Previous research has shown that factors 
such as liking or the perceived similarity with the other influence the degree to which people 
project their own mental states (Davis, 2017; O’Brien & Ellsworth, 2012). As such, one could 
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expect that female participants in our study would have shown stronger egocentric biases 
than male participants as they were rating same-gender targets. Our exploratory analysis 
did not show significant gender differences in the influence of the affective state on emotion 
judgments. Nevertheless, given our sample size, this result should be interpreted with cau-
tion, as we had limited power to test the moderation by gender. Moreover, due to our task 
design, we could not have distinguished whether potential gender effects would reflect in-
group biases, different motivational attitudes towards the target, or general gender differ-
ences in emotion attribution. By including more diversity of face identities and controlling 
for the perceived similarity with the target, future studies should address this issue and im-
prove the generalizability of the findings.  
Second, participants made binary emotion choices in the emotion perception task, while 
some of the morphs may have actually been perceived neither as happy nor sad. The 2-
alternative forced-choice design was chosen to increase the likelihood to detect egocentricity 
effects and limit the task duration. To increase ecological validity, new emotional egocen-
tricity paradigms could offer a wider range of emotion options. In addition, future task 
designs would benefit from adding a control condition in which participants make non-emo-
tion judgments about the target while being under the emotion induction effects. This would 
allow drawing more definite conclusions about the specificity of the mood effects in relation 
to emotion reading vs other mood-congruent perceptual biases unrelated to social cognitive 
processes. 
Finally, although the emotion induction procedure worked on average, there was variability 
in the effectiveness of the manipulation, with some participants not reporting the expected 
mood in each condition. Moreover, even though the assessment of PSEs was completed 
within a short time (approx. 1.5 min) right after each emotion induction, we cannot rule out 
that the strength of the induced affect decreased throughout the task. Attenuated affective 
self-representations may have reduced the chance of observing a bias. In future work, the 
use of personalized and longer-lasting forms of emotion induction could facilitate the detec-
tion of mood-congruency effects.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, our study implemented a novel approach to quantify ego-
centric biases during emotion attribution. The adaptive psychophysical task allowed us to 
detect subtle changes in the tendency to perceive emotional faces as happy when partici-
pants were in different affective states. Unlike some of the previous mood-congruence 
studies (e.g., Harris et al., 2016; Lee et al., 2008; Niedenthal et al., 2000, 2001; Schmid & Schmid 
Mast, 2010), we used a within-subject design, which gave us the possibility to estimate indi-
vidual bias scores and explore associations with socioemotional traits. The simplicity of the 
paradigm makes it appropriate to be used in emotional egocentricity research with clinical 
samples.  
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In conclusion, the current study established the existence of egocentric biases when reading 
facial expressions of emotion. We showed that individuals are more likely to perceive am-
biguous happy-sad face morphs as happy when they are feeling happy compared to when 
they are sad. More importantly, the magnitude of the egocentric bias was associated with 
perspective-taking tendencies, which suggests that socio-cognitive processes may underlie 
mood-congruency biases in emotion perception. Our study extends the literature on emo-
tional egocentricity by showing that self-projection also occurs when we rely on the other’s 
emotional expressions for understanding their affective state. 
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5. Study 4: Emotional egocentricity & similarity 
BRIEF REPORT 
Projecting one’s own affective states onto others:  
no influence of perceived similarity 
Irene Trilla, Friedrich Eiserbeck and Isabel Dziobek 
 
Abstract. Research has shown that people project their own emotional experiences 
when inferring the affective states of others. This preregistered study investigated 
whether the degree of affective self-projection depends on the perceived similarity 
with the other, an effect that has been observed for inferences of cognitive mental 
states. In a within-subject experiment, the perceived similarity between the partici-
pants and a series of targets was manipulated using a minimal group paradigm. After 
being induced positive and negative affective states, participants made emotion judg-
ments of morphed happy and sad facial expressions of a similar and a dissimilar target. 
Confirming the occurrence of affective self-projection, facial expressions were judged 
as happier after positive induction than after negative induction. However, contrarily 
to more cognitive forms of social projection, we did not find evidence to support that 
the degree of self-projection depends on the perceived similarity with the other during 




This manuscript is available as a preprint and has been submitted for publication:  
Trilla, I., Eiserbeck, F., & Dziobek, I. (2020). Projecting one’s own affective states onto others: 
No influence of perceived similarity. PsyArXiv. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/j2ct4 
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5.1 Introduction 
One common strategy to understand others' mental states is to use one’s own thoughts and 
feelings as a reference, a process referred to as self-projection. Evidence of self-projection 
comes from studies in which people’s beliefs and affective states interfered with their infer-
ences about the experiences of another person (Mitchell, 2009; Samson et al., 2010; Silani et 
al., 2013; Trilla, Weigand, et al., 2020). This is typically shown by egocentrically-biased judg-
ments about the other’s mental and affective states.  
Research in social psychology has shown that individuals preferentially rely on their own 
experiences when making social inferences about people they perceive similar to themselves, 
such as in-group members (e.g., Ames, 2004b; Clement & Krueger, 2002; Davis, 2017; Robbins 
& Krueger, 2005). To predict the mental states of dissimilar others, people tend to recruit 
other inferential strategies, such as using implicit beliefs or stereotypes about a particular 
social group (Ames, 2004b; Ames et al., 2012), or taking as reference a known person who is 
more similar to the target (Willard & Markman, 2017). This flexible use of self-projection 
according to the perceived similarity with the other may guarantee more accurate infer-
ences. Provided that people who share specific characteristics tend to react more alike, 
attributing their thoughts and feelings onto similar individuals can be an effective inferential 
strategy, especially when we have little information about the other. Conversely, the use of 
self-projection to infer the mental states of dissimilar others, or of those who are in a situa-
tion incongruent with our own current experience, can lead to stronger egocentric biases 
(Samson et al., 2010; Silani et al., 2013; Tamir & Mitchell, 2013). In this case, a process of 
adjustment is needed to correct away from the self-projection and account for the dissimi-
larities between oneself and the other (Tamir & Mitchell, 2013). 
So far, the role of perceived similarity has been mainly demonstrated for the projection of 
cognitive mental states, such as traits, beliefs and attitudes (Ames, 2004b; Ames et al., 2012; 
Clement & Krueger, 2002; Davis, 2017). To our knowledge, only one study has assessed how 
similarity influences affective self-projection (O’Brien & Ellsworth, 2012). In this study, par-
ticipants were deprived of drinking water, or exposed to a cold setting, before inferring the 
visceral states of a protagonist of a written story. Participants attributed their feelings of 
coldness and thirst more strongly to protagonists with whom they shared the same political 
views, compared to protagonists who held opposing attitudes. The study by O’Brien and 
Ellsworth (2012) provides initial evidence that perceived similarity influences processes of 
affective self-projection. However, it is yet to be determined whether such modulation ex-
tends to more automatic and low-level forms of emotion inferences. As in the case of 
cognitive inferences, research has shown that people tend to over-attribute their affective 
states when reading others’ overt emotional expressions (Trilla, Weigand, et al., 2020).  
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To expand our understanding of the role of perceived similarity on affective self-projection, 
the present study examined the extent to which individuals attribute their affective states 
when judging emotional facial expressions of similar and dissimilar targets. Similarity was 
manipulated using a minimal group paradigm that assigned the same or a different arbitrary 
characteristic to the participant and the evaluated targets. We predicted that emotion attrib-
utions would be more biased towards one’s own affective experiences when judging a similar 
target compared to a dissimilar target. 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Participants 
Sixty-four adults (31 females, 32 males, 1 non-binary; Age: M = 27, SD = 5.2) were recruited 
for this study. The sample size was decided based on a power analysis to detect a small-to-
moderate effect size (Cohen’s d = 0.35) using a one-tailed paired-samples t-test for the main 
contrast of interest, with alpha = 0.05 and power = 0.80 (see preregistration: 
https://osf.io/kjb84). None of the participants reported current psychiatric or neurological 
disorders, current psychoactive medication, severe cognitive or neuropsychological impair-
ments, history of regular substance use, or colour-blindness.  
The study conformed to the Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association (Declaration 
of Helsinki) and was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Psychology Department at 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. All participants provided informed written consent. 
5.2.2 Materials and procedure 
5.2.2.1 Similarity manipulation 
A minimal group paradigm based on the one used by Montalan et al. (2012) was conducted 
to manipulate the similarity between the participant and four target faces. First, participants 
were asked to estimate the number of dots in 10 stimulus patterns, each presented for 1000 
ms. Their estimation performance was ostensibly used to determine the participant’s cogni-
tive style (Overestimator or Underestimator). In reality, the assignment of the cognitive style 
was pre-set and counterbalanced across participants. Participants were informed about their 
alleged estimation performance and read a brief description of the two cognitive styles. 
Overestimators were described as individuals who tend to process numerical information 
with a stronger focus on quantitative characteristics. Underestimators were described as in-
dividuals who tend to process numerical information focusing on qualitative characteristics.  
Next, participants were asked to learn the cognitive styles of four different target faces. Two 
of the targets were assigned the same cognitive style as the participant (“similar targets”), 
and two had the other cognitive style (“dissimilar targets”). The assignment of the similarity 
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condition to the targets was randomized for each participant. To reduce the influence of non-
manipulated factors on the perceived (dis)similarity with the targets, images of four men 
were used for male participants, and images of four women were used for female partici-
pants. The gender of the targets was chosen randomly for participants identified as non-
binary. One similar and one dissimilar target would be later presented in the affective self-
projection paradigm, and the remaining two targets, in a cognitive self-projection control 
task.  
Participants learnt the targets’ cognitive styles through an associative learning task. On each 
trial, a neutral face of one of the four targets, or the word “You”, was presented for 1000 ms. 
Face stimuli were taken from the FACES database (Ebner 2010; see supplementary material 
for more details about the stimuli). Next, the response options (“Underestimator”, “Overes-
timator”) appeared below the stimulus, on the left and right side of the screen. Participants 
had to guess the target's cognitive style by pressing a left or a right keyboard key. In “You” 
trials, participants had to indicate their own cognitive style. The selected response was high-
lighted for 500 ms, after which feedback (“Correct” or “False, this person is an [over 
/under]estimator”) appeared below the stimulus for 1000 ms. A blank screen was displayed 
for 500 ms before the onset of the next trial.  
Participants completed a minimum of 10 blocks of 5-trials each. In each block, the four target 
faces, and “You”, were presented once in random order. To ensure that participants assimi-
lated the cognitive style of all targets, they completed additional blocks until each stimulus 
was classified correctly on 8 out of the last 10 times presented, or if a maximum of 30 blocks 
was reached. On average, participants completed 12.4 blocks (SD = 4.6). Data from two par-
ticipants who did not achieve this learning criterion by the end of the task were excluded 
from the statistical analyses. 
As a manipulation check, participants indicated their perceived similarity with each target 
before and after the minimal group paradigm using a 9-point scale (1 = Not similar to me; 9 
= Similar to me). Participants also rated how much they liked each target (1 = I do not like 
this person; 9 = I like this person), and how sympathetic they found them (1 = Not sympa-
thetic; 9 = Sympathetic).  
5.2.2.2 Affective self-projection 
A paradigm similar to Trilla et al. (2020) was used to estimate egocentric biases during emo-
tion judgments of a similar and a dissimilar target. In two separate within-subject blocks, 
participants were first induced positive or negative affective states using audio-visual stim-
uli. Specifically, participants watched 1-minute videos that displayed a joyful (e.g., playful 
panda bears) or a sad (e.g., a dog seemingly mourning the death of another dog) animal 
scene, with instrumental music of matching valence playing in the background. Further de-
tails about the affect induction stimuli and procedure are available in the supplementary 
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material. The order of the affect induction (positive affect, negative affect) was counterbal-
anced across participants. To assess the effectiveness of the affective state manipulations, 
participants reported their current mood on an 11-point scale (1 = negative mood, indicated 
by a sad emoticon; 11 = positive mood, indicated by a happy emoticon) after watching the 
videos, and at the end of each block. 
Following each affect induction, participants were asked to make quick emotion judgments 
of facial expressions of a similar and a dissimilar target. Ambiguous emotional expressions 
were created for each target by mixing an image of a happy face with a sad face at varying 
degrees (see supplementary material). Each trial of the emotion judgement task began with 
a fixation cross displayed for 1500 ms. Next, one of the morphed emotional faces of the sim-
ilar or the dissimilar target was presented for 500 ms. At the stimulus offset, the response 
options ("happy", "sad") appeared on the right and left side of the screen (location randomly 
determined for each participant) until the participant made a response via a keypress.  
The morph level presented in each trial was selected based on the participant’s previous 
response following a 1-up/1-down procedure (see supplementary material). This adaptive 
psychophysical method allowed to reduce the number of trials needed to estimate the par-
ticipant’s point of subjective equality (PSE), which represents the point on a happy-sad 
morph continuum at which a facial expression is equally likely judged as happy or as sad. 
Individual PSEs were estimated for similar and dissimilar targets after each affect induction 
and were used as the primary dependent variable. According to the morph coding used in 
this study, lower PSE values indicated a higher tendency to evaluate emotional expressions 
as happy (vs sad). Based on this, egocentric biases would be shown if PSEs in the positive 
affect condition were lower than in the negative affect condition. On average, participants 
completed 63.4 trials (SD = 9.4) per block, which corresponds to approximately 2.6 minutes.  
5.2.2.3 Cognitive self-projection 
As a control task, we tested self-projection in the cognitive domain using a procedure based 
on Tamir and Mitchell (2013). This task consisted of three blocks. In the self-block, partici-
pants were asked to indicate their attitude towards a series of 30 statements (e.g., “Stormy 
weather is scary.”; see supplementary materials for the complete item list). In the similar- 
and dissimilar-block, participants had to infer how a similar and dissimilar target would re-
spond to the same statements. All ratings were made on a 9-point agreement scale (1 = 
Disagree; 9 = Agree). A face with a neutral expression was displayed above each statement 
in the similar- and dissimilar-blocks to indicate the target of the judgment. No reference was 
made to their cognitive style. Each statement was presented 2000 ms before the rating scale 
and remained onscreen until the participant responded via mouse click on the rating scale. 
The order of the statements was randomized. There was no response time limit, but partici-
pants were encouraged to answer as quickly as possible without overthinking their response.  
Study 4: Emotional egocentricity & similarity 
 94 
To prevent participants from remembering their own ratings, the self-block was completed 
at the beginning of the experimental session, and the similar- and dissimilar-blocks were 
conducted after the affective self-projection paradigm, with counterbalanced ordered.  
5.2.2.4 Procedure 
The study was introduced to the participants as an investigation on how people make social 
inferences based on minimal information. After signing the informed consent form, partici-
pants were seated in front of the computer where they would complete all the 
measurements, at approximately 65 cm distance of the monitor. All tasks were programmed 
and presented using MATLAB R2015b (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, United 
States) and the Psychophysics Toolbox extension (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007). The 
supplementary Figure S5.3 shows the sequence of the tasks conducted during the experi-
mental session. Instructions for each task were displayed onscreen at the start of each 
paradigm and were also reviewed orally with the experimenter to make sure they were un-
derstood.  
The session began with the first part of the cognitive self-projection paradigm (self-block), 
in which participants had to indicate their own agreement with a series of statements. Next, 
participants underwent the minimal group procedure. This started with baseline ratings on 
similarity, likeability and sympathy for each target face. Participants then completed the dot 
estimation task with the pretext of finding out their cognitive style. At the end of the task, 
the participants alleged estimation performance (‘overestimator’, ‘underestimator’) was dis-
played onscreen, together with the description of each of the two cognitive styles (see 
supplementary material). Following the assignment of their cognitive style, participants 
performed the learning task to assimilate the cognitive styles of the targets. Post-learning 
face ratings on similarity, likeability and sympathy were completed once the participant had 
achieved the learning criterion (i.e. classified correctly each target face in 8 out of the last 10 
times presented), or when the maximum number of learning trials had been reached. 
After the minimal group paradigm, participants were introduced to the two-part procedure 
to assess affective self-projection. To keep the aim of the paradigm implicit, the emotional 
videos and the emotion judgment task were presented as two separate experiments; the first 
concerned with testing a new affect induction procedure, and the second with how we infer 
emotions from facial expressions. Participants wore headphones to listen to the music of the 
emotional videos, which continued playing in the background during the emotion judgment 
trials. The volume of the music was adjusted individually for each participant. Prior to the 
affect induction blocks, participants completed a practice run of the emotion judgment task, 
which was used to estimate their baseline PSEs. The baseline PSE defined the starting morph 
level presented in the adaptive procedure of the positive and negative affect blocks (see 
supplementary material). The order of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants, 
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and each consisted of the corresponding affect manipulation, followed by the emotion 
judgment trials. To prevent carry-over effects of the affect induction, a 5-minutes break was 
introduced between the two blocks, during which participants solved paper-based mazes. 
The session continued with the remaining two blocks of the cognitive self-projection task. 
In each block, participants were asked to predict how a similar or a dissimilar target would 
respond to the same statements that they had rated at the beginning of the session. The order 
of the similar target and dissimilar target blocks was counterbalanced. 
Additional measurements for potential exploratory analyses were performed at the end of 
the session. These included an imitation-inhibition task similar to Catmur and Heyes (2011), 
as well as questionnaires to collect basic demographic information (age, gender, level of ed-
ucation, occupation), and to measure dispositional empathy (Basic Empathy Scale; Heynen 
et al., 2016; and Perspective-taking and Empathic concern scales of the Interpersonal Reac-
tivity Scale; Paulus, 2009) and autistic traits (Autism Spectrum Quotient – short version; 
Freitag et al., 2007). Participants were also asked to estimate the percentage of overestimators 
and underestimators in the population, and to report how desirable they thought each cog-
nitive style is (1 = not desirable, 9 = desirable). None of these measurements were included 
for the analyses presented in this manuscript, but data is available in the OSF repository 
(https://osf.io/s5gp6/). 
At the end of the session, participants were disclosed about the cognitive styles used in the 
study and were compensated with 8€/hour or course credit for their participation. On aver-
age, the experimental session lasted around 1.5 hours. 
5.3 Results 
Inferences were based on null hypothesis significance testing with p < .05. The Holm-Bon-
ferroni adjustment was used to correct for multiple testing in post-hoc tests following 
significant interaction effects. Unless prespecified, all statistical tests were two-tailed. Data 
and R code to reproduce all analyses reported here are available at: https://osf.io/s5gp6/. 
5.3.1 Similarity manipulation 
To check whether the minimal group paradigm succeeded in manipulating the participants’ 
perceived similarity with the targets, a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was conducted on the similarity ratings, with targets’ Similarity (similar targets, dissimilar 
targets) and Time (pre-learning, post-learning) as within-subject factors. The ANOVA 
yielded significant main effects of Similarity, F(1,61) = 13.34, MSE = 1.70, p < .001, η2p = .179, 
and Time, F(1,61) = 15.75, MSE = 0.80, p < .001, η2p = .205, which were qualified by a significant 
two-way interaction, F(1,61) = 15.60, MSE = 1.53, p < .001, η2p = .204 (supplementary Figure 
S5.1). Follow-up pairwise comparisons confirmed that, after learning the targets’ cognitive 
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styles, those paired with the same cognitive style as the participant were perceived as more 
similar to themselves (M = 5.19, SD = 1.81) than targets with the opposite cognitive style (M 
= 3.96, SD = 1.38), t(61) = 4.65, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.70, 1.75], Cohen’s d = 0.59. No significant 
differences in perceived similarity were found between the targets at baseline, t(61) = -0.09, 
p = .93, 95% CI = [-0.39, 0.36], Cohen’s d = -0.01. 
A significant Similarity-by-Time interaction was also found on a repeated-measures ANOVA 
on likability ratings, F(1,61) = 16.94, MSE = 0.94, p < .001, η2p = .217, and on sympathy ratings, 
F(1,61) = 10.80, MSE = 0.97, p = .002, η2p = .150. Follow-up analyses showed that similar targets 
were rated as more sympathetic than dissimilar targets after learning their cognitive styles, 
t(61) = 2.46, p = .05, 95% CI = [0.12, 1.18], Cohen’s d = 0.31, and were also liked more, t(61) = 
3.05, p = .01, 95% CI = [0.29, 1.38], Cohen’s d = 0.39. No significant differences on neither 
sympathy nor likability ratings were found at baseline (all p > .30). Descriptive statistics for 
the face ratings are available in the supplementary Table S5.1. 
5.3.2 Effects of similarity on affective self-projection 
5.3.2.1 Affective state manipulation 
A repeated-measures ANOVA on the mood ratings, with Affect induction (positive, negative) 
and Time of assessment (after affect induction, at the end of the block) as within-subject fac-
tors, revealed a significant main effect of affect induction, F(1, 61) = 320.00, MSE = 5.42, p < 
.001, η2p = .840. As expected, participants felt more positively throughout the positive affect 
block (M = 8.96, SD = 1.32) than the negative affect block (M = 3.67, SD = 1.56).  
A significant interaction with Time indicated that the strength of the induced mood faded 
throughout block, F(1,61) = 77.61, MSE = 0.61, p < .001, η2p = .560 (supplementary Figure S5.2). 
That is, participants reported feeling more positively right after watching the happy video 
(M = 9.40, SD = 1.32) than at the end of the block (M = 8.52, SD = 1.46), t(61) = 7.70, p < .001, 
95% CI = [0.66, 1.12], Cohen’s d = 0.98; and more negatively after watching the sad video (M 
= 3.24, SD = 1.64) than at the end of the block (M = 4.10, SD = 1.67), t(61) = -6.21, p < .001, 
95% CI = [-1.13, -0.58], Cohen’s d = -0.79. Despite the decline of the induced affective state 
during the emotion judgments, inspection of individual mood ratings confirmed that the 
emotional videos elicited the expected mood patterns to all participants, so no data had to 
be excluded on the basis of unsuccessful affect manipulation. 
5.3.2.2 Emotional egocentricity biases 
To check whether the similarity with the target modulated the degree of egocentric biases 
in emotion judgments, we ran a repeated-measures ANOVA on the PSEs, with Affective state 
(positive, negative) and Similarity (similar target, dissimilar target) as within-subject factors. 
A significant main effect of Affective state confirmed the occurrence of egocentric biases, 
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F(1,61) = 99.06, MSE = 51.97, p < .001, η2p = .619. As depicted in Figure 5.1, participants showed 
a higher tendency to judge the ambiguous facial expressions as happy (indicated by lower 
PSEs) when they were in a positive affective state (M = 56.73, SD = 11.27) than when they 
were in a negative state (M = 65.84, SD = 8.85). 
The predicted interaction with Similarity, however, was not statistically significant, F(1, 61) 
= 0.45, MSE = 9.85, p = .51, η2p = .007. This non-significant effect was also shown in the 
preregistered interaction contrast, which directly compared the bias scores (i.e. the differ-
ence in PSE between negative and positive affect conditions) for similar vs. dissimilar targets, 
t(61) = 0.67, p = .25 (one-tailed), 95% CI = [-0.80, ∞], Cohen’s d = 0.08 (Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1. Mean and standard deviation (SD) of the point of subjective equivalence (PSE) and bias scores 
estimated for each target and affect block. Positive bias scores reflect egocentric biases. 
 Similar targets Dissimilar targets 
 M SD M SD 
PSE     
Negative affect 66.14 9.93 65.55 9.49 
Positive affect 56.76 12.99 56.70 11.49 
Bias     
[Neg. - Pos.] 9.38 8.51 8.85 7.16 
 
To follow-up this null result, we applied equivalence testing on the critical interaction con-
trast using Two One-Sided Tests (Lakens et al., 2018). This procedure allowed us to test 
whether egocentric biases were statistically equivalent for similar and dissimilar targets. 
Equivalence bounds were determined based on the preregistered smallest effect size of in-
terest (Cohen’s d = 0.35). A significant equivalence test, t(61) = -2.09, p = 0.02, 95% CI = [-
0.80, 1.86], indicated that the egocentric biases when judging emotions of similar targets 
were statistically equivalent to those of dissimilar targets, thus confirming the null effect of 
similarity. 
In addition, we calculated the Bayes factor to quantify the relative evidence for the null hy-
pothesis (i.e. no differences in bias scores between similar and dissimilar targets) over the 
alternative hypothesis (i.e. stronger bias scores for similar vs dissimilar targets). Bayesian 
analysis was performed in JASP (JASP Team, 2020). A Bayesian paired-samples t-test with 
the default prior set by JASP (i.e. Cauchy distribution centred at 0 with a scale parameter of 
0.707, one-sided) estimated a BF01 = 3.91. This indicates that, given the data, the null hypoth-
esis was 3.91 times more likely than the alternative hypothesis, which is considered 
moderate evidence for the null (Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014).  
  
Study 4: Emotional egocentricity & similarity 
 98 
5.3.2.3 Effects of similarity on cognitive self-projection 
A linear mixed-effect model (LMM) was used to test if the participant’s reported attitudes 
(self-ratings) predicted their inferences about the attitudes of a similar and a dissimilar target 
(other-ratings). The other-ratings were used as the dependent variable in the LMM. As fixed 
effects, we included the Self-ratings (continuous predictor, mean-centred), Similarity (cate-
gorical predictor: similar target, dissimilar target), and their interaction. The maximal 
random effect structure supported by the task design was reduced to achieve model conver-
gence and avoid overparameterization. Principal component analysis was used to detect and 
remove the random slopes that explained zero variance. The final model included random 
intercepts for participant, item and target identity, as well as a by-participant random slope 
for self-ratings and a by-item random slope for similarity. P-values were calculated based on 
Wald-statistics approximation.  
The LMM yielded a significant main effect of self-rating, b = 0.11, 95% CI = [0.06, 0.15], SE = 
0.02, t = 4.60, p < .001, which was qualified by a significant interaction with similarity, b = 
0.26, 95% CI = [0.21, 0.32], SE = 0.03, t = 9.48, p < .001 (Figure 5.1). A simple slopes analysis 
indicated that, as predicted, self-ratings significantly predicted the judgments about a similar 
target, b = 0.24, 95% CI = [0.19, 0.29], SE = 0.03, t = 8.85, p < .001. That is, the inferred attitudes 
for the similar target were positively associated with the participant’s own ratings about the 
same statements. In contrast, no significant association between self- and other-ratings was 
found for dissimilar targets, b = 0.02, 95% CI = [-0.03, 0.07], SE = 0.03, t = 0.67, p = .50.  
 
Figure 5.1. (a) Mean point of subjective equivalence (PSE) estimated for the similar and dissim-
ilar targets in the Emotion judgment task, after positive and negative affect induction. Error 
bars represent within-subject 95% confidence intervals. Smaller dots depict the PSE of individ-
ual participants. (b) Association between the participant’s own attitudes (self ratings) and the 
attitudes inferred for a similar and a dissimilar target (other ratings) in the cognitive self-pro-






In line with previous studies (e.g., Niedenthal et al., 2000; Trilla, Weigand, et al., 2020), we 
found that judgments about others' emotional expressions are biased towards one’s own 
affective experiences. This supports the idea that people tend to project their own affective 
states onto others, particularly when only limited information about the target is available 
(Silani et al., 2013; Trilla, Weigand, et al., 2020; von Mohr et al., 2019). However, contrary to 
our main prediction, the degree of emotional egocentricity did not significantly differ when 
judging similar targets compared to dissimilar targets. Our data was more suggestive that 
similarity does not modulate affective self-projection during quick emotion judgments, at 
least not to the extent to which it influences cognitive self-projection.  
This null effect contrasts with results by O’Brien and Ellsworth (2012), who observed that 
participants attributed their own visceral states (e.g., thirstiness) more strongly to targets 
perceived as similar to themselves, compared to dissimilar others. O’Brien and Ellsworth 
(2012) defined similarity based on shared political attitudes. Thus, it is possible that using a 
somewhat arbitrary characteristic to manipulate similarity lessened the expected effects in 
our study. However, this is unlikely as laboratory-induced groups have been shown to elicit 
stronger effects on social projection than real groups (Robbins & Krueger, 2005), probably 
because they avoid confounding influences of pre-existing stereotypes or implicit associa-
tions. Moreover, our manipulation significantly impacted the degree of self-projection when 
making inferences about the targets’ attitudes. Replicating previous studies (Ames, 2004b; 
Ames et al., 2012; Davis, 2017; Tamir & Mitchell, 2013), participants’ self-ratings were pre-
dictive of the estimates made about similar targets, but not dissimilar targets. The fact that 
the ratings for dissimilar targets were not negatively associated with one’s own attitudes 
suggests that self-knowledge is not used to predict the reversed attitudes for dissimilar tar-
gets (Clement & Krueger, 2002). Instead, previous studies suggest that other types of 
inferential strategies, such as stereotyping, are recruited when making inferences about dis-
similar others (Ames, 2004b, 2004a; Ames et al., 2012; Willard & Markman, 2017).  
Perhaps a more likely explanation of the null result lies in the type of emotion inferences 
evaluated in this study. So far, evidence of a role of perceived similarity has been found with 
paradigms in which participants inferred others’ mental states based on information about 
the situation the target is experiencing (Ames, 2004a), or when predicting more stable char-
acteristics such as attitudes and preferences (e.g., Ames, 2004b; Tamir & Mitchell, 2013). This 
was also the case in the study by O’Brien and Ellsworth (2012), in which participants inferred 
the target’s visceral states based on the contextual information described in a written story. 
This type of social inferences requires a cognitive evaluation of the other’s situation to pre-
dict the other’s mental state, a process that may involve perspective-taking. In contrast, 
attributing affective states based on reading the other’s expressive signals is a more auto-
matic and low-level process of social inference, which could be less prone to contextual 
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influences. The short time frame to make the emotion judgments in our task may have also 
limited the chance to identify the target and recruit the learned information before their 
inferential process. Future studies should test whether similarity becomes a significant pre-
dictor if participants are allowed more time to process the target’s identity. Moreover, the 
role of similarity could be further examined with emotional egocentricity paradigms in 
which emotion attributions result from perspective-taking processes, rather than an evalu-
ation of the other’s emotional displays (e.g., Silani et al., 2013; von Mohr et al., 2019).  
Overall, results from this study strengthen the idea that individuals rely on their own beliefs 
and emotional experiences to infer what other people think and feel. However, the perceived 
similarity with the other does not seem to play a significant role in determining the degree 
of egocentric projections during quick emotion judgments, at least not to the same extent as 




5.5 Supplementary material 
5.5.1 Supplementary figures and tables 
 
Figure S5.1. Perceived similarity with the targets, before and after learning their cognitive style. 
Similar targets refer to those paired with the same cognitive style as the participant; dissimilar 
targets are those associated with the opposite cognitive style. Error bars represent within-sub-
ject 95% confidence intervals (Morey, 2008). Smaller dots depict mean ratings of individual 
participants for each similarity condition and time point. 
 
Figure S5.2. Mood ratings after each affect induction (i.e. before the emotion judgment task), 
and at the end of each block of the affective self-projection paradigm (i.e. after emotion 
judgment task). Error bars represent within-subject 95% confidence intervals (Morey, 2008). 
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Table S5.1. Face ratings on similarity, likeability and sympathy. Means and standard deviations are com-
puted for targets with the same cognitive style as the participant (similar targets) and with the opposite 
cognitive style (dissimilar targets), before (pre-learning) and after (post-learning) learning their cognitive 
style.  
 Pre-learning Post-learning 
 Similar targets Dissimilar targets Similar targets Dissimilar targets 
Similarity  4.11 (1.49) 4.13 (1.51) 5.19 (1.81) 3.96 (1.38) 
Likeability 4.98 (1.45) 5.16 (1.44) 5.55 (1.66) 4.72 (1.40) 
Sympathy  4.85 (1.33) 5.02 (1.33) 5.48 (1.57) 4.83 (1.39) 
 
5.5.2 Minimal group paradigm: cognitive styles 
Bogus cognitive styles were used to create a sense of (dis)similarity between the participant 
and the targets of the main experimental tasks. These cognitive styles were presumably de-
rived from the individual’s performance estimating the number of dots briefly displayed 
onscreen. The cognitive styles were described to the participants as follows:  
German (original) English translation 
Vorangegangene Studien konnten zeigen, dass die 
kognitiven Profile von Personen abhängig davon, 
wie Sie numerische Informationen verarbeiten un-
terschieden werden können. Konkret können 
Personen als Überschätzer/in oder Unterschätzer/in 
klassifiziert werden.  
Überschätzer/in: Personen mit diesem Schätzver-
halten tendieren dazu, numerische Informationen 
mit einem stärkeren Fokus auf quantitativen Merk-
malen zu verarbeiten. Im Gegensatz zu 
Überschätzern/innen verarbeiten Unterschät-
zern/innen numerische Informationen mit einem 
größeren Fokus auf qualitativen Merkmalen. Keines 
dieser Profile ist besser als das andere. 
Unterschätzer/in: Personen mit diesem Schätzver-
halten tendieren dazu, numerische Informationen 
mit einem stärkeren Fokus auf qualitativen Merk-
malen zu verarbeiten. Im Gegensatz zu 
Unterschätzern/innen verarbeiten Überschät-
zern/innen numerische Informationen mit einem 
größeren Fokus auf quantitativen Merkmalen. Kei-
nes dieser Profile ist besser als das andere. 
Previous studies have shown that individ-
uals have different cognitive profiles 
depending on how they process numerical 
information. Specifically, people can be 
classified as overestimators or underesti-
mators. 
Overestimator: People with this estima-
tion behavior tend to process numerical 
information with a stronger focus on 
quantitative characteristics. In contrast to 
overestimators, underestimators process 
numerical information with a greater fo-
cus on qualitative characteristics. Neither 
profile is better than the other. 
Underestimator: People with this esti-
mation behavior tend to process 
numerical information with a stronger fo-
cus on qualitative features. In contrast to 
underestimators, overestimators process 
numerical information with a greater fo-
cus on quantitative characteristics. 
Neither profile is better than the other. 
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5.5.3 Face stimuli 
All face stimuli used in this study was selected from the FACES database (Ebner et al., 2010). 









Female models 048, 054, 063, 071 063, 071 048, 054 
Male models 008, 016, 057, 066 008, 057 016, 066 
Facial expression Neutral Neutral Happy, Sad  
 
For the emotion judgment task, face stimuli displaying ambiguous emotional expressions 
were created by morphing sad and happy faces. The happy and sad faces were chosen based 
on normative ratings corresponding to the young subsample (Ebner et al., 2010). In particu-
lar, we used the facial expression ratings by young males to select the young male happy 
and sad faces, and ratings by young females to select the young female happy and sad faces. 
All selected emotional faces had an accuracy of at least 90% for the corresponding emotion. 
Using a morphing software (Morpheus Photo Morpher v3.11.), 21 morphs were generated 
for each model by mixing the happy face with the sad face in steps of 5%. Morphed stimuli 
were presented at a resolution of 235 x 302 px, which corresponds to a visual angle of 7º 
given a distance of 65 cm. 
All face stimuli were grey-scaled and embedded within an oval to occlude the hair and cloth-
ing using GIMP (version 2.10.8, https://www.gimp.org/). To match the luminance of the 
images, we used two functions of the SHINE toolbox for MATLAB (Willenbockel et al., 2010): 
First the histMatch function was applied to the images that had the same facial identity in 
pairs. This function equates a set of images in terms of luminance histograms. The lumMatch 
function was applied to all the resulting images together to match the mean luminance and 
contrast.  
5.5.4 Affect induction procedure and stimuli 
Audio-visual stimuli were used to manipulate the participant’s affective states during the 
affective self-projection procedure. To induce positive affect, participants watched a 1-mi-
nute video with scenes of panda bears cuddling and playing on a slide, with a cheerful 
instrumental song (“Get Outside!” by Jason Farnham) as soundtrack. Negative affect (sad-
ness) was induced using a 1-minute video of a dog that was seemingly mourning the death 
of another dog lying on the pavement. The video was accompanied by a sad instrumental 
song ("Tears Won’t Stop" by David Fesliyan). Participants were encouraged to allow them-
selves to feel the emotions the videos would elicit. We chose video scenes that portrayed 
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non-human animal characters instead of people to make sure that biases during emotion 
judgments could not be attributed to an increased sensitivity to happy or sad faces due to 
pre-exposure to human emotional expressions. To help maintain the induced affective state 
during the emotion judgment trials, the music of each video kept playing on the background 
until the end of the block, although the volume was automatically lowered to avoid distrac-
tion from the main task. 
5.5.5 Emotion judgement task: PSE estimation 
To assess biases in emotion perception, the point of subjective equality (PSE) was estimated 
after each affect induction (positive affect, negative affect), and for each of the two targets 
(similar, dissimilar). The PSE represents the point on the happy-sad morph continuum at 
which observers are equally likely to judge the target emotion as happy or sad. The PSE has 
been shown to be a sensitive index to detect biases in emotion perception (Harris et al., 2016; 
Marneweck et al., 2013; Trilla, Weigand, et al., 2020). In the current experiment, morph levels 
were coded as the percentage of happy face (vs. sad face) in the morph. For example, a PSE 
of 30 would indicate that a morph composed of 30% happy face + 70% sad face would be 
equally likely perceived as happy or sad. Consequently, lower PSEs were interpreted as a 
higher tendency perceive happy expressions, as it would mean that participants required 
less of a happy face in a morph for it to be judged as happy. 
To reduce the number of trials needed to estimate the PSE, a 1-up/1-down method was im-
plemented in MATLAB with the Palamedes Toolbox (Prins & Kingdom, 2018) following the 
procedure used in Trilla et al. (2020). For each target, one ascending and one descending 
interleaved staircases determined the morph stimulus presented on a trial-by-trial basis 
based on the participant’s previous response. Specifically, the morph level presented in each 
subsequent trial within a staircase increased one step in the happy-sad morph continuum 
(i.e. 5% happier face) if the previous trial was a “sad” response, and decreased one step (i.e. 
5% less happy face) if the previous trial was a “happy” response. Each staircase stopped after 
8 reversals, which are the transition points within a staircase in which the participant 
switches from perceiving a happy face to a sad face, or vice versa. The PSE for each condition 
was estimated by averaging the morph levels of the last 5 reversals of both staircases set for 
that particular target and affective state condition.  
To prevent order effects, blocks of trials of the similar and dissimilar target were alternated 
within each run of the emotion judgement task. That is, participants first completed approx-
imately half of the trials for the similar target, then the first half of the dissimilar target, and 
so on. Which of the two targets was presented first was chosen randomly. To make sure that 
participants recognized the identity of the face morphs, an image of the target with a neutral 
facial expression was displayed at the beginning of each block and remained onscreen until 
the participant pressed a key to start.  
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Before the first affect induction, participants completed one block of trials for the similar 
target and one for the dissimilar target in order to estimate the baseline PSEs. The ascending 
and descending staircases in the baseline blocks started at 0% happy - 100% sad morph, and 
100% happy - 0% sad morph, respectively. The PSE calculated at baseline for each target was 
used to define the start points of the staircases of the experimental blocks. Specifically, the 
ascending and descending staircases for each target started 4 morph steps lower or higher 
(i.e. ± 20% happier face) than the corresponding baseline PSE. The individual adjustment of 
the staircases’ settings allowed to reduce the task duration of the main experimental blocks 
to assure that estimation of the critical PSEs was within the effects of the affect induction. 
The number of trials completed on average was 95.8 (SD = 14.5) at baseline, 62.6 (SD = 9.27) 




5.5.6 Cognitive self-projection paradigm: items 
Items rated by participants in the cognitive self-projection paradigm, on a 9-point agreement 
scale (1 = Not agree; 9 = Agree). 
German (original) English translation 
Alternative Heilmethoden sollten verboten werden. 
Alternative healing methods should be 
banned. 
Das Frühstück ist die wichtigste Mahlzeit des Tages. Breakfast is the most important meal of the 
day. 
Das Leben braucht Party. Life needs party. 
Das Öffentliche Gesundheitssystem ist gut. Public health system is good. 
Der Kapitalismus ist etwas Gutes. Capitalism is a good thing. 
Die Arbeit von Politikern ist wichtig. The work of politicians is important. 
Die meisten Leute machen sich zu viele Sorgen. Most people worry too much. 
Die Nutzung von Tieren in Zirkussen sollte erlaubt 
sein. 
The use of animals in circuses should be 
allowed. 
Die Vorstellung von Künstlicher Intelligenz ist 
gruselig. 
The idea of artificial intelligence is scary. 
Elektroautos sind die Zukunft. Electric cars are the future. 
Es sollte eine Geldstrafe für Nicht-Recycling geben. Not recycling should be fined. 
Essen macht müde. Food makes you tired. 
Flugzeuge sind faszinierend. Airplanes are fascinating. 
Gedichte sind wunderbar. Poems are wonderful. 
Gedruckte Bücher sind besser als eBooks. Printed books are better than eBooks. 
Hausaufgaben sollten verboten werden. Homework should be prohibited. 
Hunde sind besser als Katzen. Dogs are better than cats. 
Kuscheln ist besser als Küssen. Cuddling is better than kissing. 
Lakritz ist lecker. Licorice is delicious. 
Macs sind besser als PCs. Macs are better than PCs. 
Models sind zu dünn. Models are too thin. 
Stilles Wasser ist besser als Sprudelwasser. Still water is better than sparkling water. 
Strandurlaub ist besser als Städteurlaub. 
Beach vacations are better than city 
vacations. 
Stürmisches Wetter ist gruselig. Stormy weather is scary. 
Supermärkte sollten Sonntags offen haben. Supermarkets should be open on Sundays. 
Tanzen macht Spaß. Dancing is fun. 
Teure Dinge sind hochwertiger. Expensive things are more valuable. 
Videospiele sind zu gewalttätig. Video games are too violent. 
Weiche Drogen sollten legalisiert werden. Soft drugs should be legalized. 
Weihnachten ist ein wichtiger Feiertag. Christmas is an important holiday. 
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5.5.7 R packages used for statistics 
All statistical analyses were conducted in R (R Core Team, 2020) and R studio (RStudio Team, 
2019), except for the calculation of Bayes factors, which was done in JASP (JASP Team, 2020). 
The main R packages used were: afex (Singmann et al., 2019) for ANOVA; rstatix 
(Kassambara, 2020) for summary statistics and t-tests; lme4 (Bates et al., 2015), lmerTest 
(Kuznetsova et al., 2017) and sjPlot (Lüdecke, 2020) for linear mixed-effects models; pwr 
(Champely, 2018) for power calculations; TOSTER (Lakens, 2017) for equivalence testing; 
Rmisc (Hope, 2013) for calculation of within-subject confidence intervals; and ggplot2 
(Wickham, 2009) and patchwork (Pedersen, 2019) for figures. 






6. General discussion 
6.1 Part I – Altercentrism: Mimicry 
6.1.1 Contextual factors modulate mimicry 
Current accounts understand mimicry as a motivated and context-dependent behaviour that 
fosters social adaptation and affiliation (Hess & Fischer, 2013; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). 
Study 1 and Study 2 provide evidence favouring this notion by showing that people adjust 
their mimicry behaviour according to social contextual factors.  
6.1.1.1 Not all emotional expressions are spontaneously mimicked 
Mimicry involves integrating social and communicative cues to discern the other agent’s 
affiliative intent. This is especially relevant in the case of facial mimicry, in which emotional 
expressions are an inherent part of the action to be imitated (Fischer & Hess, 2017). Expres-
sions that signal approachability, such as smiles, have been shown to elicit facial mimicry 
reactions consistently (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Hess & Bourgeois, 2010; van der Schalk, 
Hawk, et al., 2011). In contrasts, expressions that signal threat or avoidance, such as an angry 
face, may discourage the observer from mimicking the other, as responding with a negative 
expression could be socially costly (Fischer & Hess, 2017). This pattern of spontaneous imi-
tation of approach vs non-approach emotions was observed in Study 1: While happy 
expressions were generally mimicked, there was no evidence of congruent facial reactions 
when observing angry faces, at least as indicated by the activity recorded over the frowning 
muscle (i.e. Corrugator Supercilii).  
This result adds to a growing body of studies that also failed to elicit mimicry in response to 
angry faces (e.g., Blocker & McIntosh, 2016; Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Deng & Hu, 2018; 
Pavarini et al., 2019; Rymarczyk et al., 2011). Most of these experiments, including ours, eval-
uated mimicry using relatively minimal tasks that do not provide any context for the 
emotional expressions displayed nor define a specific interaction goal. In Study 1, partici-
pants were asked to passively view the stimuli and focus on the targets' physical attributes. 
Under these conditions, angry expressions may have been perceived as an antisocial signal, 
thus decreasing the chances for mimicry.  
Future studies interested in mimicry of anger should consider experimental designs in which 
mimicking non-approach emotions could be advantageous for the task at hand. For example, 
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paradigms that ask participants to evaluate the target’s emotional expressions explicitly (e.g., 
emotion recognition tasks) tend to elicit stronger facial mimicry of both positive and nega-
tive emotions than tasks in which participants judge non-emotional or non-social features 
of the target (Murata et al., 2016; van Dillen et al., 2015). Facial mimicry in contexts in which 
there is a motivation to decipher the other’s affective state may be recruited to support emo-
tion recognition (Drimalla et al., 2019).  
Mimicry of non-approach emotions could also be triggered by setting up situations in which 
the expressed emotion is directed at a third party. For instance, providing contextual infor-
mation that justifies an angry expression (e.g., "This person has just seen someone else 
hurting a child."), or presenting an angry face that directs the attention to a third party. If 
the observer and the target share the same anger-eliciting view, mimicry of anger may serve 
an affiliative goal and would, therefore, be more likely to occur (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008).  
6.1.1.2 Reward modulates mimicry, but how? 
In Study 1, we observed mimicry responses (i.e. increased Zygomaticus Major activity) to 
smiles of targets previously associated with low vs high rewards. The significant reward-
driven modulation of mimicry is congruent with motivational accounts, as it shows that 
mimicry is dependent on contextual factors. However, the direction of the reward effect was 
surprising. Based on previous literature (Korb et al., 2019; Sims et al., 2012), we expected 
stronger facial mimicry responses to targets associated with higher rewards than targets 
associated with low rewards, particularly the former were evaluated more positively.  
Even though this result is at odds with our predictions, this is not the first experiment that 
showed up-regulation of mimicry when responding to seemingly less approachable targets. 
For example, enhanced mimicry was reported for angry out-group members compared to in-
group members (Rauchbauer et al., 2016) and agents that had previously excluded the par-
ticipants (Hühnel et al., 2018; Lakin et al., 2008). These findings have been interpreted as 
evidence that mimicry can be flexibly regulated to support appeasement in response to coun-
ter-affiliative signals (Cheung et al., 2015; Hühnel et al., 2018; Lakin et al., 2008; Rauchbauer 
et al., 2016). Individuals may mimic others in negative contexts as a means to establish or 
regain a positive social bond.   
Differences in the sample characteristics could also account for the unexpected results. In 
Study 1, we only included male participants and same-gender face identities. This may have 
changed the evaluation or type of relationship established between the observer and the 
targets compared to previous studies, whose samples included mostly women (Korb et al., 
2019; Sims et al., 2012). Moreover, the influence of reward on mimicry has been shown to 
vary as a function of autistic traits, with higher autistic traits being associated with weaker 
or reversed reward effects (Haffey et al., 2013; Sims et al., 2012). Given that men tend to score 
higher than women in measures of autistic traits (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Freitag et al., 
Part I – Altercentrism: Mimicry 
 111 
2007), mimicry patterns in our study could potentially reflect the behaviours of individuals 
with higher autistic traits.  
Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that the observed influence of reward is 
related to other uncontrolled factors of the experimental settings, or even a chance finding. 
Given the relatively low statistical power of our and prior studies, it is likely that some of 
the reported effects have been overestimated. In addition, it is important to disentangle the 
exact factors that underlie the influence of the reward manipulations on mimicry. One im-
plied assumption in these studies is that the reward effects are due to a change in the attitude 
towards, or likeability, of the agents associated with high vs low probabilities of winning 
money (Korb et al., 2019). However, the reward manipulations could also affect other factors, 
such as the attentional salience (Sali et al., 2014) or the personal relevance of the stimuli 
(Forbes et al., 2021). Further studies are thus required to resolve the inconsistent observations 
regarding the influence of reward on mimicry and determine the mechanisms behind such 
effects.  
6.1.1.3 Gaze matters, but only under certain conditions 
Study 2 was planned to test further the idea that mimicry is up-regulated when interacting 
with a partner who signals social approachability. In this case, we assessed the role of direct 
and averted gaze as cues of social interest and rejection (Wirth et al., 2010). In contrast to 
earlier findings (Wang, Newport, et al., 2011; Wang & Hamilton, 2014), we could not detect 
an overall effect of gaze on mimicry. The degree of automatic imitation was not significantly 
different when individuals viewed targets who established direct gaze, compared to when 
targets averted the gaze away. This data adds to other failed replications of the gaze effects 
on mimicry (Farmer et al., 2021; Marsh et al., 2016). As in our case, neither of these experi-
ments could support the original finding of stronger automatic imitation following direct 
eye contact vs averted gaze.  
The fact that the influence of gaze had been observed in follow-up experiments (Forbes et 
al., 2017; Prinsen et al., 2017; Wang & Hamilton, 2014) brings confidence to the replicability 
of the original report. However, most of these studies were conducted by the same research 
group and/or used slight variations of the same paradigm and stimuli. When focusing on a 
theoretical prediction rather than the effects within a given paradigm, a combination of di-
rect and conceptual replications is recommended to build confidence in a result (Brandt et 
al., 2014). A finding that can be replicated by other researchers in a different sample and 
using different experimental procedures may confirm that this is knowledge that can be 
separated from the specific circumstances under which it was produced. Based on the exist-
ing set of studies investigating the role of gaze on mimicry, this does not seem to be the case.  
Given the complexity of the social context, random factors related to the sample, the task or 
the stimuli could have confounded the effects observed in the early studies. For example, the 
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original paradigm displayed direct and averted gaze cues by a single white female target 
with a smiling expression (e.g., Forbes et al., 2017; Wang, Newport, et al., 2011; Wang & 
Hamilton, 2014). Given that direct eye contact with a smile is often perceived as a socially 
rewarding cue (Niedenthal et al., 2010), the positive emotional expression in the original 
studies may have intensified the influence of the gaze manipulation. In addition, exploratory 
analyses in Study 2 suggested that gaze effects may be stronger when observing white agents 
compared to dark-skinned agents, at least in a predominantly white participant sample. This 
is congruent with literature showing an influence of group membership and social status on 
the perception of others’ gaze cues (Collova et al., 2017; Dalmaso et al., 2012, 2015; Weisbuch 
et al., 2017).  
Compared to prior experimental designs (e.g., Forbes et al., 2017; Wang, Newport, et al., 2011; 
Wang & Hamilton, 2014), Marsh et al. (2016) and Study 2 presented more diverse target 
identities with different ethnic backgrounds and neutral facial expression. Moreover, the 
statistical approach used in Study 2 (i.e. mixed-effects models) also took into account the 
sampling variability of the stimuli. Arguably, these experimental procedures may have coun-
teracted some of the random factors that might have enhanced the gaze effects in earlier 
studies. In other words, it is possible that gaze influences mimicry, but only under specific 
conditions. Future work will need to systematically tease apart the impact of each contextual 
factor and their interactions to draw a more comprehensive picture of how and when gaze 
modulates mimicry. 
6.1.2 Individual variability in the contextual modulation of mimicry 
As discussed, mimicry is a flexible and adaptive behaviour that depends on situational fac-
tors. However, not everybody adapts to the context in the same way. Individual differences 
in personality traits, socio-cognitive abilities and psychobiological predispositions can de-
termine the contextual modulation of mimicry. Studies 1 and 2 re-examined the role of two 
factors previously associated with differential degrees of mimicry modulation, namely oxy-
tocin and autistic traits. 
6.1.2.1  Inconclusive evidence regarding the role of oxytocin 
Following initial evidence of a role of oxytocin on mimicry (De Coster et al., 2014; Korb et 
al., 2016; Pavarini et al., 2019), we hypothesised that intranasal oxytocin would increase facial 
mimicry compared to placebo, especially when observing emotional expressions of high re-
ward vs low reward agents. Data from Study 1 were, however, inconclusive. Our statistical 
analyses did not yield any significant effects of oxytocin, neither with regards to a direct 
influence on mimicry nor on the modulatory effects of reward. To further assess the non-
significant results, we conducted equivalence testing, a procedure that allows for the rejec-
tion of effects at least as large as the effect size of interest (Lakens et al., 2018). Results 
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suggested data insensitivity: we could neither conclude whether oxytocin had an effect, nor 
that the placebo and oxytocin groups behaved similarly. The study just did not have enough 
power to detect even a strong effect reliably. 
6.1.2.1.1 Statistical power issues 
Results of the equivalence tests reflected a pervasive problem within intranasal oxytocin 
research. Until recently, behavioural intranasal oxytocin studies typically tested a similar or 
lower number of participants to our experiment (e.g., De Coster et al., 2014; Korb et al., 2016; 
Tomova et al., 2019). Between-subject designs with 60 participants can only reliably detect 
large effects (Cohen's d = 0.74) with 80% power. Walum et al. (2016) estimated that approxi-
mately 80% of all attempts to detect a true effect in intranasal oxytocin studies would fail 
due to low statistical power. This is especially concerning for social cognition research, in 
which contextual factors typically exert small effects (Richard et al., 2003). Because under-
powered studies also reduce the probability that a statistically significant result reflects a 
true effect (Button et al., 2013), it is likely that at least some of the positive findings regarding 
the role of oxytocin on social behaviour are false positives. 
While there seems to be a trend in more recent oxytocin studies towards larger samples (e.g., 
Pavarini et al., 2019), estimations by Walum et al. (2016) indicate that sample sizes of hun-
dreds of individuals are necessary to produce reliable data in social cognition research. 
Multi-site collaborative studies could help towards this endeavour. In addition, meta-anal-
yses that pool the effects across experiments could help derive more precise estimates. 
6.1.2.1.2 Oxytocin administration 
Parallel to improving the study samples, more attention should be placed on understanding 
the procedures for oxytocin administration. Given the physiology of the oxytocinergic sys-
tem, administrations through nasal sprays are the only available non-invasive path to 
manipulate oxytocin levels. However, there is still uncertainty on the optimal doses and 
timings for intranasal oxytocin treatments (Quintana et al., 2021). Spengler et al. (2017) iden-
tified that a time window between 45 and 70 min and a dose of 24 IU elicited the most robust 
neural responses to emotional stimuli. However, different administration devices, gender, 
timing, and factors related to the person’s state of mind seem to differentially affect neural 
and behavioural responses (Quintana et al., 2021). It is also still unclear to what extent oxy-
tocin exerts cognitive and behavioural effects by acting on the central nervous system, the 
peripheral system, or both. Without understanding the dose-response pattern and physiol-
ogy of oxytocin treatments, non-significant effects may simply be due to incorrect 
manipulation of oxytocin levels (Quintana et al., 2021). 
Taken all together, current evidence of the role of oxytocin on facial mimicry remains weak. 
Beyond the likelihood of false positives, oxytocin did not have a robust or consistent influ-
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ence on mimicry in previous studies. The effect of intranasal oxytocin on automatic imitation 
originally reported (De Coster et al., 2014) was not replicated (Tomova et al., 2019); and ox-
ytocin only influenced facial mimicry in response to certain stimuli (Korb et al., 2016), 
emotional expressions (Korb et al., 2016; Pavarini et al., 2019) and type of tasks (Korb et al., 
2016). Nevertheless, the fact that our and prior studies could not make robust conclusions is 
not proof that oxytocin does not play a role in mimicry behaviour. Given its close links with 
socio-cognitive processes such as empathy and emotion understanding (Hurlemann et al., 
2010; Shahrestani et al., 2013), and its assumed role as a regulator of behaviour (Ma et al., 
2016; Quintana & Guastella, 2020), oxytocin's involvement in the neurobiology of mimicry 
seems still plausible. Future studies will need to overcome the methodological issues that 
have challenged oxytocin research to draw more reliable insights. 
6.1.2.2 Individual differences in social functioning 
6.1.2.2.1 Autistic traits 
Previous studies had observed reduced gaze effects on mimicry in individuals with ASC 
(Forbes et al., 2017; Vivanti & Dissanayake, 2014). Study 2 extended these findings by show-
ing that autistic traits are also associated with atypical social modulation of automatic 
imitation in a sub-clinical sample. As predicted, automatic imitation following averted gaze 
was stronger with increasing levels of autistic traits. However, no significant associations 
with autistic traits were found for mimicry responses to direct gaze. This pattern of results 
is congruent with previous studies on ASC. While neurotypical participants tended to mimic 
targets with averted gaze less than those with direct gaze, participants with ASC automati-
cally mimicked the observed movements regardless of gaze cues (Forbes et al., 2017; Vivanti 
& Dissanayake, 2014). 
In addition to atypical responding to gaze, individuals with high autistic traits have been 
shown to be less influenced by prosocial priming (Cook & Bird, 2012) and the reward value 
of the observed agent (Haffey et al., 2013; Sims et al., 2012) than individuals with low autistic 
traits. Altogether, these studies are in line with the social top-down response modulation 
theory, which proposes that mimicry patterns in ASC arise from a decreased adaptability of 
mimicry to the social context (Wang & Hamilton, 2012). Individuals with high autistic traits 
may imitate others' actions automatically and spontaneously, but contextual factors do not 
influence their behaviour to the same extent as in individuals with low autistic traits. 
6.1.2.2.2 Social anxiety 
According to the exploratory analyses in Study 2, other impairments in social functioning, 
such as social anxiety, could also be associated with particular mimicry patterns in response 
to direct and averted gaze cues. Specifically, higher dispositional fear of interacting with 
others was linked to a stronger tendency to automatically imitate the observed actions fol-
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lowing averted gaze, as well as with a weaker automatic imitation following direct gaze. 
Descriptively, this mimicry pattern was similar to the one detected in individuals with higher 
autistic traits. Post-hoc analyses suggested that social anxiety accounted for a higher vari-
ance than autistic traits in predicting automatic imitation tendencies following direct and 
averted gaze in our sample. Given the moderately high covariation between autistic traits 
and social anxiety (Cath et al., 2008; Spain et al., 2018), future research will need to disentan-
gle the relative contribution of each of the two factors on the gaze modulation of mimicry.  
If a role of social anxiety and autistic traits is confirmed, a further step will be to identify the 
causes behind the atypical mimicry responses. The fact that two correlated factors are asso-
ciated with similar behaviour does not necessarily imply common underlying mechanisms. 
According to the social motivation theory, the dampened social regulation of mimicry in 
ASC could be related to a reduced sensitivity to social stimuli and rewards (Chevallier et al., 
2012). If a person is intrinsically less motivated to engage socially, cues such as eye contact 
and emotional expressions may be less salient or relevant for regulating one’s behaviour.  
In contrast, mimicry responses to direct and averted gaze in social anxiety could be related 
to a different evaluation of gaze cues compared to individuals without social anxiety. For 
socially anxious individuals, someone looking at them may not be a sign of social interest 
but an indication of being scrutinised (Schulze et al., 2013). Since social anxiety is character-
ised by a fear of being evaluated (Mattick & Clarke, 1998), direct gaze could become a signal 
of social threat and trigger anxiety. Individuals with social anxiety may thus inhibit mimicry 
when observing someone with direct gaze to avoid endorsing the social interaction. 
In sum, Study 2 identified socio-emotional traits that could account for some of the incon-
sistent results regarding the contextual modulation of mimicry across studies. Individual 
differences in social functioning, either related to autistic traits, social anxiety, or a common 
construct, may explain why different samples or individuals adjust their mimicry behaviour 
to the social context differently.  
6.1.3 Up- or down-regulation of mimicry?  
Some studies on the social modulation of mimicry have presented the effects as an enhance-
ment of mimicry in situations where such behaviour would lead to a positive social outcome, 
rather than mimicry inhibition in unfavourable conditions. For example, Wang et al. (2011) 
attributed the gaze effects to an up-regulation of automatic imitation following direct gaze 
(vs averted gaze); and Sims et al. (2012) interpreted the influence of reward as an enhance-
ment of mimicry when observing high reward stimuli (vs low reward). However, as long as 
only two conditions are being compared against each other, the effects could be either re-
ported as "stronger imitation following direct gaze relative to averted gaze" or "weaker 
imitation for averted gaze relative to direct gaze". How one describes these differences is just 
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a matter of which of the two conditions is taken as a reference, but this is an arbitrary choice 
without a baseline condition. 
If mimicry is an automatic and spontaneous process, inhibition should be considered a pri-
mary mechanism for its regulation (Brass et al., 2009; Heyes, 2011). Data from Study 2 are 
consistent with this idea. First, autistic traits were primarily predictive of mimicry reactions 
following averted gaze; the association between autistic traits and mimicry to direct gaze did 
not reach significance. Second, according to the exploratory analyses, participants mimicked 
the dark-skinned agents irrespective of their gaze direction. In contrast, white agents were 
mimicked only following direct gaze. Although not tested directly, this pattern of results 
suggests that the interaction between the target’s ethnicity and gaze was mainly driven by 
a reduced inhibition of mimicry to dark-skinned targets with averted gaze compared to white 
targets. Based on these preliminary observations, inhibitory mechanisms seem to underlie 
the gaze-driven modulation of mimicry.  
Nevertheless, studies that included a control condition to compare the effects of each con-
textual manipulation have also provided evidence of mimicry enhancements. For example, 
Leighton et al. (2010) found up-regulation of mimicry after prosocial priming and down-
regulation after antisocial priming, compared to a no priming condition. Moreover, Likowski 
et al. (2008) reported stronger facial mimicry when observing positive characters compared 
to neutral ones, but did not find significant mimicry differences between negative and neu-
tral characters. Similarly, Wang and Hamilton (2014) reported increased automatic imitation 
to direct gaze compared to a no-gaze condition, but no significant differences were detected 
between averted and no-gaze. Considering these studies, mimicry regulation seems to in-
volve inhibitory mechanisms but also activation of mimicry in circumstances when it may 
not be automatically triggered.  
Research on the neural underpinnings of mimicry control could also help shed light on how 
the contextual modulation of mimicry is implemented. Neuroimaging studies have identified 
the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) as two criti-
cal regions for mimicry control (Brass et al., 2005, 2009). On the one hand, the right TPJ is 
thought to support the ability to distinguish and switch between co-activated self and other 
motor representations (Brass et al., 2005, 2009; Sowden & Catmur, 2015). On the other hand, 
the medial PFC seems to be linked to the inhibitory control of mimicry according to one’s 
own intentions and contextual factors (Brass et al., 2009; Korb et al., 2019; Wang, Ramsey, et 
al., 2011; Wang & Hamilton, 2015). Crucially, both the right TPJ and medial PFC are more 
engaged when the tendency to automatically mimic other’s movements or facial expressions 
conflicts with the task demands (Korb et al., 2019; Wang, Ramsey, et al., 2011; Wang & 
Hamilton, 2015), which supports the idea that mimicry arises automatically and 
spontaneously, but can be inhibited according to the social context (Wang & Hamilton, 
2012).  
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6.1.4 Low replicability of research findings: a matter of context?  
As discussed, the effects of the main contextual modulators tested (i.e. reward and gaze) were 
either not in the expected direction (Study 1) or not statistically significant without account-
ing for additional contextual or intrapersonal factors (Study 2). The fact that these 
experiments did not replicate previous literature may not be as surprising, considering the 
well-known replicability crisis in psychology (Earp & Trafimow, 2015). 
Replications are essential for theoretical development through confirmation and disconfir-
mation of results. A single study will not provide, on its own, sufficient conclusive evidence 
of an effect. It is the accumulation of evidence from different studies conducted in different 
labs and contexts that will increase the confidence in the explored phenomena (Schmidt, 
2009). While none of the mimicry experiments presented here was planned as a direct repli-
cation of the original studies, conceptual replications and follow-up experiments also play 
an essential role. Conceptual replications can detect if variations in methodological ap-
proaches lead to significant changes in the phenomena studied and test the generalizability 
of the results beyond the original method (Schmidt, 2009; Stroebe & Strack, 2014; Trafimow, 
2019). For example, if we are interested in mimicry as a general phenomenon, it is important 
to test if the original effects are generalisable across different forms and mimicry operation-
alisations. Moreover, it is necessary to rule out the possibility that the observed effects are 
due to the idiosyncrasy of the stimuli and context of a particular study. 
Failures to replicate are prevalent in research investigating highly contextual phenomena, 
such as social cognition. A higher contextual sensitivity of an effect makes it more likely 
that any small variations in the experimental conditions, including sample characteristics or 
task design, impact the direction of the effects (Van Bavel et al., 2016). A replication failure 
does not necessarily mean that the original finding is fraudulent nor that the follow-up study 
was incorrect. Just as replication studies may be affected by particular contexts, original re-
sults may also simply be due to the specific settings in which they were initially tested 
(Brandt et al., 2014; Noah et al., 2018). As such, unsuccessful replications can also be key to 
unlocking the underlying psychological processes of an effect (Brandt et al., 2014). 
The mimicry experiments presented here might exemplify the complexity of studying con-
text-dependent phenomena. The fact that we could not replicate the findings of previous 
studies highlights the need to systematically evaluate which conditions are necessary to ob-
serve an effect of contextual cues on mimicry. As in any other field or theory, insights from 
cumulative replication and extension studies will allow us to draw a more reliable and con-




6.2 Part II – Egocentrism: Self-projection 
6.2.1 A new framework to study affective self-projection 
The use of self-representations as a reference point to understand others has been a topic of 
interest in social psychology for many years. However, most of the literature has focused on 
investigating self-projection in the cognitive domain, that is, on the over-attribution of one’s 
own beliefs, traits and attitudes onto others (e.g. Ames, 2004b; Mitchell, 2009; Ross et al., 
1977), neglecting the influence of own affective states. More recently, a shift towards re-
search on the affective domain was initiated by Silani et al. (2013), who developed a paradigm 
to investigate emotional egocentricity. The original results have been replicated with varia-
tions of the same affective perspective-taking paradigm and across research labs (Hoffmann, 
Banzhaf, et al., 2016; Hoffmann et al., 2015; Hoffmann, Koehne, et al., 2016; Riva et al., 2016; 
Steinbeis, 2016; von Mohr et al., 2019), which brings confidence to the occurrence of self-
projection in the affective domain. 
Part II of this dissertation aimed to provide a complementary framework to study emotional 
egocentricity. In particular, we investigated if one’s own affective states also influence how 
we read other’s emotional expressions, a more automatic and low-level process than the type 
of affective inferences previously researched. Supporting the occurrence of egocentricity in 
emotion perception, Study 3 detected that facial expressions were judged as happier after 
participants were induced a happy state, compared to when they were feeling sad. The ego-
centric influence of one’s own affective states on the evaluation of others’ emotional facial 
expressions was further replicated in Study 4.  
6.2.1.1 The paradigm: lessons learnt 
Emotional egocentricity in our studies was measured using a paradigm inspired by previous 
emotion perception research investigating mood-congruency biases (e.g., Qiao-Tasserit et 
al., 2017; Schmid & Schmid Mast, 2010). It consisted of two parts. First, participants under-
went an emotion induction procedure to control the affective state experienced in each 
experimental condition. Second, participants were asked to categorise ambiguous facial ex-
pressions (i.e. morphs created by mixing a happy and a sad face at varying degrees) as either 
happy or sad. Using an adaptive psychophysical procedure, we were able to estimate changes 
in the tendency to judge the faces as happy whilst being in a happy state, compared to when 
feeling sad.  
Overall, our paradigm proved to be a suitable procedure to measure egocentricity during 
processes of emotion perception. The short duration, simplicity and within-subject nature 
of the paradigm make it feasible to be applied in a variety of clinical and non-clinical samples, 
as well as to investigate individual differences in self-projection. Nevertheless, a few points 
should be taken into consideration in future studies when using similar procedures. 
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6.2.1.1.1.1 Emotion induction 
Study 3 used a combination of autobiographical recall and audio-visual stimuli to induce 
happy, neutral and sad states. This procedure was successful in manipulating the partici-
pants’ affect. However, during the debriefing of the experiment, a few participants reported 
that some of the images presented in the induction videos conflicted with the memories they 
imagined during the autobiographical recall, which caused confusion. In addition, the videos 
included photos of people displaying happy and sad expressions. The pre-exposure to emo-
tional faces could have enhanced the sensitivity to this type of stimuli, a priming effect that 
might have contributed to the mood effects during the emotion judgment task. Study 4 over-
came these issues by limiting the emotion induction procedure to viewing sad and happy 
video scenes portraying animal characters instead of humans. With this procedure, the ob-
served egocentric biases in Study 4 could not be attributed to a pre-exposure to emotional 
human faces, which strengthens the idea that one’s current affective states influence how 
individuals interpret others’ emotional expressions. Moreover, to counteract the transient 
emotion induction effects, Study 4 continued playing the background music of the videos 
during the emotion perception blocks. According to the participants’ mood ratings, the 
elicited affective states were overall maintained throughout the emotion judgments blocks, 
although the intensity of the experienced emotions fainted.  
Generally, emotion induction is a complex endeavour, and many different techniques have 
been used in experimental research to elicit different affective states  (Siedlecka & Denson, 
2019). In the context of an emotional egocentricity task, the short audio-visual stimuli 
allowed us to apply within-subject affect manipulations in a single experimental session. 
Moreover, this technique has been shown to elicit more consistent emotional responses than 
other methods, such as imagery or autobiographical recall (Zhang et al., 2014). Nevertheless, 
researchers aiming to use similar affective state manipulations should validate the chosen 
procedure and materials with the specific population that will compose their study sample, 
as individual and cultural differences can determine how people react to the affect induction 
procedure.  
6.2.1.1.2 Psychophysical measures of emotion perception biases 
The point of subjective equivalence (PSE) was used as the primary dependent variable to 
assess emotion perception biases. Earlier research had shown that the PSE is a sensitive psy-
chophysical index to measure subtle changes in the perception of facial emotional 
expressions (Gray et al., 2017; Harris et al., 2016; Marneweck et al., 2013). PSE estimation in 
traditional psychophysical procedures requires participants to make repeated judgments for 
each of the morph levels of the happy-sad continuum, leading to a task duration that would 
have exceeded the transient effects of the emotion induction. To guarantee that emotion 
judgments would be performed within the emotion manipulation effects, we used an adap-
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tive staircase procedure, which reduced the number of trials needed to estimate the PSE. 
Study 4 further adjusted the adaptive procedure to the participants’ baseline PSEs to increase 
the sensitivity to capture small individual variations in emotion judgments.  
The adaptive staircase procedure was easy to implement and successfully reduced the dura-
tion of the emotion judgment task to 1 to 3 minutes. However, future studies could also 
consider more advanced psychophysical adaptive procedures that estimate additional pa-
rameters to describe the participants’ performance on the emotion perception task (Leek, 
2001). For example, in addition to the PSE, some adaptive methods can determine the sensi-
tivity to discriminate between the emotional expressions. This additional measure could 
provide more nuanced insights into how one’s own affective state bias emotion perception 
(e.g., Qiao-Tasserit et al., 2017).  
6.2.1.2 Do emotional egocentric biases reflect general mood effects on cognition? 
Our studies contextualised the observed egocentric biases within the phenomenon of affec-
tive self-projection. However, mood-congruent biases had been already reported in emotion 
perception literature. Using different forms of affect manipulations, prior studies showed 
that individuals tend to be faster in recognising emotional expressions congruent with their 
current state (Niedenthal et al., 2000, 2001) and judge ambiguous or neutral faces according 
to their own emotions (Qiao-Tasserit et al., 2017; Schmid & Schmid Mast, 2010). Mood-con-
gruent biases are also indicated by associations between normal variations in mood states 
and judgments of emotional facial expressions (Jackson & Arlegui-Prieto, 2016).  
In addition to influencing emotion perception, mood can affect other cognitive processes. 
For example, people tend to recall more negative autobiographical memories when they feel 
sad compared to when feeling neutral or happy (Drace, 2013; Matt et al., 1992). Given the 
widespread effects of one’s mood on how we process information and make decisions 
(Forgas, 2017), one could argue that egocentric biases in emotion perception are just one 
more way in which emotional states influence general cognition and behaviour, rather than 
a specific phenomenon within social cognition.  
Nonetheless, the fact that mood-congruent effects may not be limited to socio-emotional 
processing does not undermine the impact of such biases on social cognition. When inferring 
how another person is feeling, it is important to keep our emotions apart from the other’s 
(Juckel et al., 2018). Over-attributions of one’s own affective experiences, especially when 
the other person is in a state incongruent with ours, can lead to erroneous assumptions about 
their affective experiences, motivations and needs. Because understanding others is crucial 
to navigating in the social world, biased interpretations of others’ emotional displays could 
affect social functioning just as much as dysfunctions in theory of mind or perspective-
taking.  
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6.2.1.3 Potential mechanisms underlying emotional egocentricity 
As we have seen, cumulative evidence supports the occurrence of emotional egocentricity, 
such that one’s own affective experiences influence how we judge others' emotional expres-
sions. As a next step, research should investigate the mechanisms that lead to such 
egocentric biases. 
6.2.1.3.1 Mood-guided attention  
One way through which one’s own emotions could bias the evaluations of others' emotional 
faces is by guiding our attention toward face regions that are more diagnostic of a particular 
emotional expression. Studies have shown that some face areas contain more useful infor-
mation than others for emotion identification (Beaudry et al., 2014; Calvo, Gutiérrez-García, 
et al., 2018). For example, the mouth region seems to be important to recognise happiness, 
while the eye region is more relevant to detect sadness and anger (Beaudry et al., 2014; Calvo, 
Gutiérrez-García, et al., 2018; Wegrzyn et al., 2017). Findings from behavioural studies are 
supported by eye-tracking data, which has revealed distinct fixation patterns for different 
emotional expressions (Beaudry et al., 2014; Calvo, Fernández-Martín, et al., 2018; Schurgin 
et al., 2014).  
Due to a limited attentional capacity, we need to distribute our attention as efficiently as 
possible according to both internal and external demands. As shown by Schurgin et al. (2014), 
eye movements during emotion perception follow both "stimulus-driven" and "goal-driven" 
perceptual strategies. Participants fixate their attention to salient features of a stimulus but 
also attend to regions they think will facilitate recognising a particular emotion (Schurgin et 
al., 2014). Our expectations about the other's state could, therefore, bias where to allocate 
our attention. If we use our affective states to guide social inferences, we may fixate our 
attention more on the face regions that are important for recognising happiness (e.g., mouth 
region) when we feel happy and focus more on the eye region when we are sad. In other 
words, by directing our attention to particular face regions, we may be more susceptible to 
detect expressive signals congruent with our own emotions and neglect other facial cues 
that reflect a distinct emotion. This hypothesis could be tested in future studies by tracking 
the participants' eye movements and fixations while performing the emotional egocentricity 
paradigm developed here. 
6.2.1.3.2 Self-other distinction  
At the cognitive level, we need to inhibit our own mental and affective states and amplify 
the representations related to the other to overcome egocentric social inferences. The ability 
to distinguish and switch between the self- and other-representations has been referred to 
as self-other distinction or control (Lamm et al., 2016; Sowden & Shah, 2014; Steinbeis, 2016).  
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Performance in prior emotional egocentricity tasks has been taken as an index of self-other 
distinction abilities (e.g., Bukowski et al., 2020; Silani et al., 2013; Tomova et al., 2014; von 
Mohr et al., 2019). In the paradigm by Silani et al. (2013), the participant is simultaneously 
confronted with multiple perceptual and internal states of the self and the other. These 
include visual inputs about the type of tactile stimulation being applied to oneself and the 
target, the perception of the actual tactile stimulation on oneself, and one’s own affective 
reactions to it. In different trials, the participant is asked to report how they or the other 
person feels in response to the tactile stimulation. To unbiasedly report the own affective 
states, participants need to inhibit the representations related to the other and enhance the 
self-representations. To make unbiased inferences about the other, the opposite process 
should occur: participants need to suppress their own precepts and affective experiences and 
amplify the representations related to the other. A failure to disengage from the self- or the 
other-representations could result in egocentric or altercentric emotion judgments, respec-
tively.  
In the emotional egocentricity paradigm used in Studies 3 and 4, participants were not con-
fronted with conflicting perceptual information about self and others, nor prompted to 
switch between judging their own and the other’s emotional experience. The only input 
provided during the emotion judgment task was the target's facial expressions. To overcome 
egocentric evaluations of the other’s emotions, participants had to nevertheless set their 
current affective states aside and amplify the other’s representations. However, self-other 
distinction in this context was likely more implicit and less deliberate compared to the pre-
vious emotional egocentricity paradigms, in which the representations of the self and other 
were more explicitly confronted. 
As outlined by Quesque and Brass (2019), self-other distinction can occur at different levels 
of information processing, from distinguishing between the self and other bodies (perceptual 
level) and motor actions (action level) to differentiating between beliefs, intentions and emo-
tions of oneself and others (mental state level). Emotional egocentricity tasks in which 
participants are asked to switch between reflecting on the self and others’ affective expe-
riences (e.g., Silani et al., 2013; Steinbeis & Singer, 2014; von Mohr et al., 2019) fit well within 
the mental state level described by Quesque and Brass (2019). In contrast, the type of self-
other distinction recruited to overcome egocentricity during emotion perception may tap 
more into the perceptual level, which relates to more implicit and automatic processes.  
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6.2.1.3.3 Representing the self and the other  
A necessary condition for differentiating and switching between self- and other-representa-
tions is to represent and correctly “tag” the self and other’s states in the first place (Lamm et 
al., 2016). Individual differences in our capacity to spontaneously represent our own mental 
and affective states and those of others could therefore determine the degree of egocentricity 
beyond whether or not self-other distinction is at play.  
In Study 3, we found preliminary evidence of an association between egocentric biases and 
dispositional perspective-taking. Individuals who reported a higher predisposition to take 
the perspective of others displayed weaker egocentric biases. This supports the idea that a 
higher tendency to focus on the other's point of view may protect from over-attributing 
one’s own state by spontaneously enhancing the other’s representation (Bukowski & 
Samson, 2017). Nevertheless, given the limited power to test individual differences in Study 
3, future research on larger samples is needed to further evaluate the relationship between 
emotional egocentricity and dispositional perspective-taking.  
Parallel to the need to represent others, a lower ability to identify one’s own emotional states 
could also underlie individual differences in emotional egocentricity. If awareness of one’s 
own emotional states is necessary for affective self-projection, one would expect lower ego-
centric biases in alexithymia, a condition characterised by deficits in recognising one’s own 
emotions (Silani et al., 2008). In this regard, conflicting results have been found. As it would 
have been hypothesized, one study reported weaker emotional egocentric biases in indi-
viduals with higher levels of alexithymia, an effect observed in both a clinical sample with 
major depressive disorder and control participants (Hoffmann, Banzhaf, et al., 2016). How-
ever, no significant associations were detected between emotional egocentric biases and 
alexithymia in a non-clinical sample using an online adaptation of the classic emotional ego-
centricity paradigm (von Mohr et al., 2019).  
To sum up, the ability to distinguish and shift between self- and other-representations has 
been considered a central mechanism underlying egocentric biases. However, it is not yet 
clear how self-other distinction relates to more automatic and implicit processes of affective 
self-projection. To develop a more complete picture of the role of self-other distinction 
across different instances of emotional egocentricity, future studies could assess associations 
between performance in the different emotional egocentricity paradigms, as well as with 
other tasks thought to involve self-other distinction, such as automatic imitation paradigms 
(Brass et al., 2009; Spengler et al., 2009). Furthermore, research should not neglect other fac-
tors that could also account for individual differences in emotional egocentricity, such as a 
predisposition to spontaneously represent others’ states, or difficulties in recognizing one’s 




6.2.1.4 Limitations of current emotional egocentricity paradigms 
In this section, I have discussed and compared two complementary approaches to study self-
projection during emotion attributions. While they differ in many aspects, both share some 
common limitations.  
6.2.1.4.1 Inferential accuracy 
First, none of the emotional egocentricity paradigms assesses the accuracy of the emotion 
inferences. By measuring biases in emotion judgments due to within-subject changes in af-
fective states, current paradigms can demonstrate that one’s own experiences interfere with 
emotion inferences. However, the attributed affective states are not compared against the 
actual emotional state experienced by the evaluated targets. Because self-projection is 
thought to aid social inferences under certain contexts (Ames, 2004b; Tamir & Mitchell, 2013; 
Todd et al., 2016), it would be interesting to assess whether egocentric tendencies are indeed 
an effective inferential strategy to understand others’ emotions. 
Assessing accuracy is much easier in cognitive egocentricity tasks, in which inferences often 
refer to external objects or agents whose perceptibility can be tracked. For example, in visual 
perspective-taking paradigms the participants’ judgment on what the target sees can be com-
pared to the actual stimuli that are visually accessible to them (Epley, Morewedge, et al., 
2004; Samson et al., 2010). Given that feelings and emotions are subjective, estimating the 
inferential accuracy of affective self-projections is a stronger challenge. Nevertheless, future 
studies using emotional egocentricity paradigms in which two people are simultaneously 
tested (e.g., Silani et al., 2008) could achieve this by comparing the participants’ inferred 
emotion ratings against the targets’ real ratings.  
6.2.1.4.2 Emotion specificity 
So far, most emotional egocentricity paradigms have quantified the affective biases by asking 
participants to make valence or pleasantness ratings on visual analogue scales (Silani et al., 
2013; Steinbeis, 2016; von Mohr et al., 2019) or dichotomous emotion judgements (e.g., happy 
or sad; Study 3 and Study 4). If self-projection entails attributing one’s own emotional states 
to others, we would expect not only congruency in the valence of the experienced and in-
ferred state, but also specificity in the type of emotion. For example, feeling angry should 
specifically increase the tendency to attribute anger to others, but not other negative emo-
tions such as sadness. To assess the specificity in emotional egocentricity, paradigms could 
broaden the range of emotional experiences induced and judged by participants.  
  
Part II – Egocentrism: Self-projection 
 125 
6.2.1.4.3 Ecological validity 
Finally, another limitation is the reduced ecological validity of the paradigms. In Studies 3 
and 4, participants were asked to make emotion judgments of morphed facial expressions of 
only one or two identities, presented very briefly and devoid of context. This procedure al-
lowed to control for potential confounding variables and facilitated the detection of 
perceptual biases. However, such impoverished emotional displays are far from the type of 
information we encounter in daily situations. We typically have more time to interpret the 
other's emotional expressions and integrate further contextual cues, such as other overt be-
haviour (e.g., gestures, postures, tone of voice) or information about the events that preceded 
the other’s emotional display, all of which can condition how emotional expressions are 
perceived (Barrett et al., 2011; Gray et al., 2017; Juckel et al., 2018). 
Research should move towards more naturalistic approaches in which many of these ele-
ments (e.g., emotional expressions, gestures, situational information) are combined. Towards 
this aim, our research group has developed an emotional egocentricity paradigm that inte-
grated both facial emotional expressions and information about the situational context 
(Weigand et al., 2021). In particular, participants were asked to judge facial emotional ex-
pressions while being previously confronted with congruent or incongruent emotion-
inducing situations. Results showed that how participants evaluated the situational context 
egocentrically biased their judgements about the observed emotional expressions.   
Emotional egocentricity paradigms that integrate multiple cues will make causal interpreta-
tions more challenging, but the effects will likely be more generalisable to daily life 
situations. This will also allow testing the extent to which affective self-projection is re-
cruited when individuals are in contextually rich environments. Predictively, self-projection 
may primarily be used when we have limited information about the other person and their 
context or when their emotional displays are ambiguous. When more information is availa-
ble, individuals may rely on alternative inferential strategies that could be more effective in 
understanding what the other is experiencing. 
6.2.2 Self-projection to similar and dissimilar others 
According to the similarity contingency model, the degree to which people recruit their own 
mental states during social inferences depends on their perceived similarity with the other 
person (Ames, 2004b). Using a measure of cognitive self-projection, Study 4 replicated the 
perceived similarity effect found in previous studies. Participants' own ratings significantly 
predicted the attitudes estimated for the similar targets but not for the dissimilar targets. 
This result adds to the extensive bulk of research showing stronger attribution of one's own 
traits, beliefs and attitudes to people we perceive as similar to oneself compared to those 
who are dissimilar (Ames, 2004b, 2004a; Clement & Krueger, 2002; Davis, 2017; Tamir & 
Mitchell, 2013; Woo & Mitchell, 2020). 
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However, results from Study 4 did not support the similarity contingency model for affective 
self-projection. Against our main hypothesis, the degree to which one’s own affective states 
biased emotion judgments was not conditional on the similarity with the target. Our data 
was more indicative that egocentric biases during emotion judgments were comparable for 
similar and dissimilar targets. Differences in the type of inferential process, as well as char-
acteristics of the similarity manipulation performed, could account for the discrepancy in 
the modulation of cognitive and affective self-projection. 
6.2.2.1 Cognitive vs affective inferences 
Perhaps the most apparent difference between cognitive and affective self-projection tasks 
is the type of information participants needed to infer. In the cognitive self-projection task 
in Study 4, participants were asked to predict attitudes and preferences of similar and dis-
similar targets. In contrast, the emotional egocentricity task assessed how participants 
evaluated others’ emotional facial expressions. Comparing the results of both tasks, one 
could conclude that perceived similarity plays a role in self-projection in the cognitive do-
main but not in the affective domain. However, there is evidence that individuals attribute 
their feelings of thirst and coldness to similar targets but not to dissimilar targets (O’Brien 
& Ellsworth, 2012). Given that visceral feelings and sensations tap more into the affective 
domain, it is unlikely that the type of attribute inferred entirely accounts for the null effect 
of perceived similarity on emotional egocentricity found in Study 4. 
6.2.2.2 High- vs low-level inferential processes 
A more likely explanation of the discrepancy between the impact of self-projection between 
the two tasks may lie in the nature of the inferential process assessed. Most cognitive self-
projection paradigms, including the one used here, are assumed to recruit higher-order pro-
cesses of social cognition, such as theory of mind or perspective-taking (Quesque & Rossetti, 
2020). Higher-level processes of affective inferences were also likely recruited in O’Brien and 
Ellsworth (2012), as participants had to predict the target’s visceral states from a written 
story that described the event the target was experiencing. In contrast, reading other’s emo-
tional facial expressions tends to be characterised as a lower-level and more automatic 
process of emotion attribution (Etchepare & Prouteau, 2018; Quesque & Rossetti, 2020; Tracy 
& Robins, 2008).  
Even though emotion perception can be top-down modulated by contextual factors (Barrett 
et al., 2011), the impact of social cues may be weaker on such automatic and lower-level 
processes compared to more evaluative forms of emotion attribution. That is, emotional ego-
centricity may be modulated by similarity but to a lesser degree than cognitive egocentricity. 
If this were the case, our study might not have had enough power to detect such small effects, 
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as our effect size of interest (Cohen's d = 0.35) was based on meta-analytic estimates of the 
influence of social categorisation on cognitive self-projection (Robbins & Krueger, 2005). 
In addition to power issues, our experimental design may have limited the chance for the 
participants to consider contextual factors during the emotion judgements. Variables such 
as the gender, race or gaze direction of a face have been shown to bias the evaluation of 
emotional expressions, even when presented at comparably short times as in Study 4 (Adams 
Jr. & Kleck, 2005; Craig & Lipp, 2018; Harris et al., 2016). However, implicit associations with 
factors related to the target’s identity may be more readily available than evaluations of the 
perceived similarity with the other. Given the quick responses required in the emotional 
egocentricity task, participants may not have had enough time to retrieve and integrate the 
previously learnt information about the target. This contrasts with the cognitive self-projec-
tion task, which participants did not have strict time constraints to make their judgements 
about the targets’ attitudes and preferences. 
6.2.2.3 Perceived similarity: a context-dependent evaluation? 
Finally, how similarity was determined may have also conditioned the observed pattern of 
results. In Study 4, perceived similarity was manipulated by assigning the same or a different 
cognitive style to the participants and the targets they evaluated. The cognitive style osten-
sibly reflected how numerical information was processed, a characteristic that was unrelated 
to the content of the inferences made during the cognitive and affective self-projection tasks. 
Laboratory manipulations based on arbitrary features can be powerful tools to create a sense 
of similarity without being confounded by pre-existing stereotypes on the social groups the 
target belongs to (Clement & Krueger, 2002). However, one limitation of this kind of manipu-
lations is that it could create a feeling of (dis)similarity that may not be relevant for the type 
of social inferences being investigated.  
In natural social interactions, similarity is evaluated according to the current setting and 
may even be founded on factors that might not reflect the “true” similarity (Ames, 2004b). 
For example, we may feel similar to a person in the context of an election because we share 
the same political attitudes; but evaluate the same person as very dissimilar when we are at 
work because we have different professional roles. Depending on what we need to infer and 
in which context, we may recruit more or less self-projection according to the situational 
evaluation of similarity.  
It could be hypothesised that knowing whether a target processes cognitive information in 
a similar way as oneself may not inform if the person will show similar emotional reactions. 
If this is the case, participants might not have recruited this information about the targets 
during the emotional egocentricity task. To test this hypothesis, future studies could manip-
ulate perceptions of similarity based on emotion-related vs non-emotion attributes and 
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examine whether such manipulations differentially modulate affective vs cognitive self-pro-
jection.  
In sum, data from Study 4 suggested that perceived similarity does not modulate the degree 
of egocentric biases when reading others' emotional expressions, at least not to the same 
extent as it influences more cognitive or evaluative forms of social inferences. Importantly, 
these results should not be interpreted as conclusive proof that similarity does not play a 
role in affective self-projection. Further data is required to assess whether this negative find-
ing is related to the type of inferences studied, the similarity manipulation, power issues, or 
if it reflects a true null effect of similarity on affective self-projections.  
6.3 Self-other control: a common mechanism behind altercentric 
and egocentric processes? 
As discussed earlier, self-other distinction has been hypothesised as one mechanism under-
lying (emotional) egocentricity. Notably, the ability to switch between representations of 
self and others also plays a central role in altercentric phenomena (Sowden & Shah, 2014). 
Self-other distinction and control has been proposed as a basic neurocognitive mechanism 
across socio-cognitive functions (Happé et al., 2017; Sowden & Shah, 2014). In some cases, 
the self-representation needs to be suppressed (e.g., when overcoming self-projection during 
social inferences), while other situations require one to distance oneself from the represen-
tations of others (e.g., when counteracting automatic imitation tendencies).  
The idea self-other distinction subserves multiple socio-cognitive functions is supported by 
studies showing associations between the control of automatic imitation and performance 
in other social cognition domains, such as perspective-taking and theory of mind (Spengler, 
Bird, et al., 2010; Spengler, Cramon, et al., 2010). In addition, training participants to inhibit 
automatic imitation has shown to induce changes in their perspective-taking abilities 
(Santiesteban, White, et al., 2012) and empathic responses to pain (de Guzman et al., 2016), 
which bring more direct and causal evidence for this hypothesis.  
On the neural level, the right TPJ has been consistently implicated in tasks requiring a shift 
from self to other representations (Martin et al., 2018; Santiesteban, Banissy, et al., 2012; 
Spengler et al., 2009), and vice versa (Brass et al., 2005; Hogeveen et al., 2015; Santiesteban, 
Banissy, et al., 2012; Sowden & Catmur, 2015; Spengler et al., 2009). On the affective domain, 
self-other distinction is thought to rely on a region located anterior to the right TPJ, namely 
the supramarginal gyrus (Bukowski et al., 2020; Silani et al., 2013).  
Though the notion of a common underlying mechanism is appealing, at present, it remains 
unclear how self-other distinction unfolds across different levels of social information pro-
cessing (e.g., perceptual, action and mental state; Quesque & Brass, 2019) and domains (e.g., 
affective vs cognitive mental states). According to personal goals and demands of the social 
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context, individuals need to inhibit or amplify different co-activated representations of self 
and others. One challenge for future research will be to relate and study the interplay of self-
other control abilities across altercentric and egocentric processes.  
6.4 Implications and future directions 
In this dissertation, I have reviewed extensive literature assessing contextual determinants 
of social cognition. Many of the studies, including ours, tested the effects of a single contex-
tual variable, or two at most. However, what defines a social context is rarely one isolated 
factor. It is the interplay between multiple social and contextual cues that gives meaning to 
a situation and allows one to understand other agents. A social cue that may be perceived as 
a sign of social interest in one setting (e.g., direct gaze with a happy expression) could ac-
quire a completely different meaning when displayed in another situation (e.g., direct gaze 
with an angry expression). Even when situational factors are not explicitly manipulated, 
contextual information may be implicitly provided by the particular attributes of the agent 
presented (Hess & Fischer, 2013). Furthermore, as seen in Part II of this dissertation, even a 
person's internal states may influence how social cues are perceived and interpreted.  
Given that context is inherent in social interactions, research on altercentric and egocentric 
socio-cognitive phenomena would benefit from analysing contextual cues in a more inte-
grated manner. Instead of focusing on single isolated variables and treating other contextual 
factors as “confounders”, it may be more fruitful to acknowledge and exploit the richness of 
a social environment, even in controlled laboratory settings. The increasing adoption of 
second-person neuroscience paradigms manifests the trend towards more ecologically valid 
research (Schilbach et al., 2013). By developing experimental settings that simulate better a 
real-life interaction, second-person neuroscience studies have shown that some of the neu-
rocognitive mechanisms that had been identified with tasks relying on social observation 
differ from the brain networks recruited when individuals are actually engaged in social 
interactions (Redcay & Schilbach, 2019).  
Adopting a more situated notion of social cognition may also help elucidate potential mecha-
nisms underlying disorders of social interaction. One benefit of examining socio-cognitive 
processes together with the context in which they unfold is that it encourages researchers 
to specify the situations in which a particular phenomenon is manifested, as well as its 
boundaries. By using this integrated approach, research may be able to determine not only 
what socio-cognitive processes are necessary for social functioning, but also in which con-
texts those become relevant or should be inhibited. This could be specially important to 
understand socio-cognitive deficits in ASC. As previously reviewed, there is evidence 
suggesting that atypical social functioning in individuals with ASC may arise from a reduced 
ability to implicitly encode and integrate contextual cues to regulate their behaviour and 
cognition (Baez & Ibanez, 2014; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). By linking the social cognition 
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deficits in clinical samples to the context in which they are manifested, future studies may 
be able to identify more fine-grained domains of disability, but also detect preserved 
capacities that could be enhanced.  
6.5 A note on publishing non-significant results  
Throughout this dissertation, I have presented and discussed more non-significant results 
than I would have expected at the beginning of my doctoral studies. Under the framework 
of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST), non-significant effects are a possible out-
come. However, the trends in psychological science in the last decades have not promoted 
the publication of negative findings (Joober et al., 2012). Publication biases have been long 
documented, whereby positive results are more prone to be considered for publication, more 
favourably reviewed and more likely cited. This is also true for fields such as experimental 
and social psychology (Earp & Trafimow, 2015; Francis, 2012), in which non-replications and 
null results are likely due to the high contextual variability of social human behaviour (Van 
Bavel et al., 2016).  
A publication bias is problematic as it can give the perception that a false effect is true and 
can overestimate the size of true effects (Francis, 2012). A complex interplay between aca-
demic pressures and incentives, and the higher publication rate of positive findings, have 
stimulated questionable research practices (John et al., 2012). Selective reporting of measures 
and results, p-hacking, hypothesising after the results are known (HARKing), and data-peek-
ing are some practices that increase the probability of false positives and reduce the 
interpretability of the published statistical results. Given that such practices are frequent in 
psychology research (John et al., 2012), it is expected that many of the positive reported 
effects are false (Ioannidis, 2005). In contrast, negative results that are more likely to be true-
negative results are not reported.  
6.5.1 Different types of non-significant results 
On their own, non-significant outcomes in NHST do not allow conclusions about the pres-
ence or absence of the effect. A non-significant result does not necessarily provide evidence 
against the hypothesised effects as it could also indicate data insensitivity. Joober et al. (2012) 
defined three different categories of negative results. Conclusive negative results refer to 
those that bring clear evidence of the absence of an effect or the opposite effect as originally 
hypothesised. Explorative negative results are well-designed and adequately powered stud-
ies that yield neutral or opposite results based on exploratory data analysis. Finally, 
inconclusive negative results are those in which there is no evidence of an effect in a study 
that was inadequately powered. 
A note on publishing non-significant results 
 131 
Different statistical approaches have been recently proposed as complementary strategies to 
NHST to make null results informative (Dienes, 2014; Harms & Lakens, 2018; Lakens et al., 
2018). On the one hand, equivalence testing is a tool based on frequentist statistics that al-
lows rejecting the presence of an effect that is as large or larger than the smallest effect size 
of interest (Lakens et al., 2018). On the other hand, Bayesian statistics propose the use of 
Bayes factors, which allow estimating the relative evidence for the null hypothesis over the 
alternative hypothesis given the data (Dienes, 2014).  
These statistical tools helped us interpret and assess the implications of the non-significant 
results obtained in the work presented here. For example, we demonstrated that the non-
significant effect of similarity on emotional egocentricity in Study 4 reflected a conclusive 
negative result. In other words, we could provide evidence that similarity in our study did 
not modulate the degree of egocentric biases during quick emotion judgements, at least not 
to the extent that it did on cognitive self-projection. In contrast, equivalence testing in Study 
1 revealed that the study lacked statistical power to detect the hypothesised intranasal oxy-
tocin effects on mimicry. Study 1, therefore, would fit under the category of inconclusive 
negative results, according to Joober et al. (2012).  
6.5.2 Transparent reporting and open science  
Reporting non-significant effects, even when these are inconclusive, is crucial to assess the 
overall significance of a research field. A single null finding may not be meaningful on its 
own. However, cumulative negative findings can change the confidence in the original re-
sults and contribute to a more accurate estimation of the true effect size in meta-analyses 
(Earp & Trafimow, 2015; Joober et al., 2012).  
Some of the null results presented here have made the way to this dissertation a bit more 
challenging. However, it has also pushed me to be more critical with published literature 
and adopt research practices that promote reproducibility and transparency. Whenever pos-
sible, we preregistered the hypotheses, methods and statistical analyses of the experiments 
(Study 2 and Study 4) and shared the collected data and statistical analyses in public reposi-
tories (Studies 1-4). Moreover, manuscripts have been published in open-access formats, and 
some were available as preprints beforehand. While there is still a lot to improve, and not all 
best practices can be adopted for all research projects, each small step towards open and 
reproducible science will hopefully help achieve a more credible and realistic picture of re-





Social cognition involves complex mechanisms to understand and navigate through social 
interactions. In this dissertation, I have presented some evidence supporting the idea that 
social-cognitive processes are situated and depend on multiple contextual factors, including 
the person’s own state of mind, their perceptions about the other, their goals, and interper-
sonal relationship. Due to the constant and complex interchange between oneself and others, 
social functioning requires a balance between being influenced by, representing, and switch-
ing between our own mental and affective states and those of others.  
The studies discussed in this dissertation have also demonstrated the complexity of investi-
gating highly contextual phenomena. Extending findings from earlier studies (e.g., 
investigating modulating factors of a previously reported effect) was initially a primary mo-
tivator of my research. However, the failure to (conceptually) replicate several of the 
previously reported phenomena highlights the need to revisit some of the effects and sys-
tematically re-evaluate the constructs and operationalisations social cognition research aims 
to investigate. Studying such processes isolated or without taking the context in which they 





Glossary of terminology 
Altercentrism Influence of the representations of beliefs, actions, perceptions, 
or emotions of others on the representations related to the self.  
Automatic imitation Form of stimulus-response compatibility whereby observation of 
another's action prompts the tendency to produce an identical ac-
tion. 
Egocentric bias Inaccurate social inference due to an over-attribution of one's 
own mental states onto others. 
Egocentrism Influence of one’s own beliefs, actions, perceptions or emotions 
on the representations related to the other.  
Emotion perception Ability to determine the affective state of another person by in-
terpreting their physical changes, such as facial expressions, body 
postures and prosody. 
Empathic concern Tendency to react with feelings of sympathy and concern for un-
fortunate others. 
Empathy Ability to share and understand the emotional states of another 
person, with the recognition that the other is the source of one’s 
state.  
Imitative compatibility Tendency to perform topographically similar movements or body 
configurations to an observed action. 
Mimicry Spontaneous imitation of another person’s behaviours or emo-
tional expressions that occurs without conscious awareness. 
Glossary of terminology 
 134 
Oxytocin Hormone and neuromodulator that plays a role in both social and 
non-social behaviour by maintaining stability through changing 
environments. 
Perspective-taking Ability to consider a situation from the point of view of another 
agent. 
Self-other control Ability to switch between coactivated representations related to 
the self and to others. 
Self-other distinction Ability to distinguish between the representations of our own be-
liefs, actions, perceptions, sensations and emotions, and those of 
others. 
Self-projection Inferential act of attributing one's own mental states and behav-
iours onto others. 
Social cognition Conjunction of cognitive processes that allow us to understand 
other agents and to coordinate with the social world. 
Social context Specific setting in which a cognitive process, social interaction or 
action occurs or unfolds. The social context can include factors 
related to the situation, personal characteristics and the 
relationship between the interaction agents. 
Social inference  Judgment about the mental states of another person or group. 
Spatial compatibility Tendency to respond in the same relative spatial position as the 
observed movement.  
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